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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND WORLDVIEW
1. Weltanschauung: a problematic philosophical concept
The concept of  Weltanschauung is a philosophical concept with
an unsettled history.1 It is perhaps provocative to call it a philo-
sophical concept, since forceful arguments have been given for
the thesis that a worldview is something fundamentally different
from philosophy.2 Other authors acknowledge that a connection
between philosophy and worldview did once exist, but that this
connection was a historical phenomenon which has been or in
any event must be overcome.3 Finally, almost all recent studies
on the concept of worldview—including those who assert a posit-
ive relation between philosophy and worldview—assume a prin-
cipal difference between a worldview and philosophy.4
Even though the relationship between worldview and philo-
sophy thus appears to be a problematic one from a contempor-
ary point of view, the roots of the concept do lie within the philo-
sophical  domain.  Moreover,  several  nineteenth  and  early
twentieth century philosophers identified philosophy and world-
view. I will therefore examine these philosophical roots of the
concept of worldview, the arguments with which worldview and
philosophy were identified, and the changes the concept under-
went which lead to the separation of the two. To this end I will
analyze  the  concept  of  Weltanschauung  in  the  work  of  three
1 Throughout this book I will use the words ‘Weltanschauung’ and its English
counterpart  ‘worldview’  interchangeably.  Despite  the  fact  that  ‘welt-
anschauung’ has found its way into current English dictionaries, I will, true to
its German origin, write it as Weltanschauung.
2 E.g. by Husserl, see section 2 below.
3 E.g. by Meier, Weltanschauung, and Marquard, ‘Weltanschauungstypologie’.
4 E.g. Wolters, ‘On the Idea of Worldview’, and Naugle, Worldview.
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philosophers, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Wilhelm Dilthey,
and Wilhelm Windelband. The choice of these three will be fur-
ther discussed below (section 3 of the present chapter). 
The  purpose  of  the  present  study  is  to  analyse  how  the
concept of worldview was defined and used, and how philosophy
and  worldview  were  identified  in  philosophical  discussions
between 1847 and 1914—between the year of the first publica-
tion by Trendelenburg on the topic and the year of the last pub-
lication  by  Windelband  addressing  the  concept  of  worldview.
The analysis will demonstrate that the importance of the concept
of  worldview  ultimately  lies  in  the  philosophical  debate  it
prompts,  and  in  the  fundamental  issues  which  this  debate
touches upon. I will not give an exhaustive historical analysis of
the origin and use of the term ‘Weltanschauung’. There are sev-
eral publications which focus on this task completely or in part.5
I will give here only a very brief overview of the term’s history, in
order to reaffirm its philosophical roots.
The  word  Weltanschauung  is  used for  the  first  time by  Im-
manuel  Kant,  in  his  Kritik  der  Urteilskraft,  which  appeared  in
1790.6 Kant uses the term only once, to refer to the (infinite) to-
tality of the phenomenal world, as it is perceived (in a noumenal
way). In the first half of the nineteenth century, the meaning of
the term in philosophical discourse broadened as it came to be
used outside the context of Kant’s critical philosophy. To give
but one example, Hegel applies the term in his lectures on the
history of philosophy to a detailed representation of the totality
of knowledge of the world, which is expressed in historical philo-
sophical systems.7 In the course of the nineteenth century one
can observe a rapid increase in the term’s use. Its basic meaning
becomes  that  of  a  ‘global  outlook  on life  and the  world’,8 a
5 Publications (partially) addressing the history of the term Weltanschauung are
Meier,  Weltanschauung (1970);  Betz,  ‘Zur  Geschichte  des  Wortes  “Weltan-
schauung”’  (1980); Wolters,  ‘On  the  Idea  of  Worldview’  (1989); Naugle,
Worldview.  The History of a Concept  (2002); Thomé, ‘Weltanschauungsliteratur’
(2002); Thomé, ‘Weltanschauung’ and ‘Weltbild’ (2004).
6 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (henceforth: KdU), A/B 92. 
7 E.g.  Hegel,  Vorlesungen über  die  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  32,  94.  Cf.  Meier,
Weltanschauung, 128. 
8 Wolters, ‘On the Idea of Worldview’, 15.
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meaning which is further specified according to the particular
context in which it is used. By the end of the nineteenth and be-
ginning of the twentieth century,  Weltanschauung could for in-
stance  be used synonymously  with  philosophy,  but  could  also
stand for a personal ‘view of the totality of the world and the
place of man within it’.9 
In the course of the twentieth century the term is often used
with a meaning close to that of ‘ideology’.10 A worldview is thus
taken as something fundamentally different from philosophy. A
crucial  role  in  this  judgement  of  the relation  between philo-
sophy and worldview is played by the concept of science: a world-
view cannot be scientific, it is argued, whereas philosophy has or
claims to have a scientific character, and thus cannot be a world-
view. A Weltanschauung is a ‘comprehensive conception or appre-
hension of the world esp. from a specific standpoint’,11 and is by
definition subjective, as opposed to the objectivity of scientific
philosophy.12 
2. Philosophy, worldview, and science: Husserl’s dilemma
A clear expression of the dichotomy between science and philo-
sophy  on the one hand,  and worldview on the other,  can be
found in Edmund Husserl’s essay ‘Philosophie als strenge Wis-
senschaft’, which appeared in the first issue of the journal Logos
in 1910.13 This was at a time when the concept of worldview was
quite popular  among philosophers,  and during the period in
which Wilhelm Dilthey developed and had started to publish his
Weltanschauungstypologie.14 Husserl’s text raises several issues that
bear relevance to our discussion of the relation between world-
9 Windelband, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 2.
10 Cf. Meier, Weltanschauung, 216-222.
11 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, eleventh edition, 2003. 
12 This is argued by Meier, Weltanschauung, passim. 
13 Logos 1 (1910), 289-341. 
14 Although Dilthey read Husserl’s essay as an attack on his position, Husserl
claimed it was not directed at Dilthey specifically. Cf. Biemel, Briefwechsel, 438.
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view and philosophy. As these issues offer a framework for the
discussion of  the relation of  philosophy  and worldview,  I  will
briefly present them here.15
According  to  Husserl,  worldview  philosophy  (Weltanschau-
ungsphilosophie) is a systematic perfection—albeit a relative one—
of life-experience, wisdom and ‘mere’  world- and lifeviews.  As
such, worldview philosophy fulfils an important function: it is an
expression of  the  ideal  of  excellence  (Tüchtigkeit)  and of  the
‘idea of humanity’. The philosophical expression of a worldview
provides the individual with directions for achieving a virtuous,
excellent life. And since worldview philosophy has its roots in
the common consciousness (Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein) of its time,
it appears to the individual to have objective validity. Worldview
philosophy  has  an  important  ‘educational  force’  (Bildungs-
macht).16
Despite  this  positively  valued  function  of  worldview  philo-
sophy,  it  falls  short  in  one  important  respect,  according  to
Husserl: it cannot be rigorous science (strenge Wissenschaft). The
decisive point which separates worldview and science is the rela-
tion to time, which in turn rests upon the absoluteness (or lack
thereof) of science and worldview. The idea of humanity, and
the ideal of excellence which are incorporated in a worldview,
are confined to a certain historical period. A worldview is relat-
ive to a certain ‘phase in the life of mankind’ (Phase des Mensch-
heitslebens).17 Rigorous science, on the other hand, is timeless, as
it entails absolute values:
Die »Idee« der Weltanschauung ist dabei für jede Zeit eine andere …
Die »Idee« der Wissenschaft ist eine überzeitliche, und das sagt hier,
durch keine Relation auf den Geist einer Zeit begrenzt. … Wissenschaft
ist ein Titel für absolute, zeitlose Werte. Jeder solche Wert, einmal ent-
deckt, gehört hinfort zum Wertschatze  aller weiteren Menschheit und
15 The topic of Wissenschaft versus Weltanschaaung in Husserl is discussed more
extensively  (and in connection with Husserl’s  later  work) by Orth,  Edmund
Husserls  ›Krisis  der  Europäischen  Wissenschaften  und  die  transzendentale  Phäno-
menologie‹, chapter 2. 
16 Strenge Wissenschaft, 331-332.
17 Strenge Wissenschaft, 331.
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bestimmt offenbar sogleich den materialen Gehalt  der  Idee  der  Bil-
dung, Weisheit, Weltanschauung, sowie den der Weltanschauungsphilo-
sophie.18
The wealth of worldview philosophies, as observed by Husserl,
has its practical legitimacy in the need for a worldview (Weltan-
schauungsnot):19 It is inevitable to make decisions in practical life,
based on the problems of everyday life—here and now:
In dem Drange des Lebens, in der praktischen Notwendigkeit, Stellung
zu nehmen, konnte der Mensch nicht warten, bis – etwa in Jahrtausen-
den – Wissenschaft da sein würde…20 
A worldview provides the framework from which these decisions
can be made.
Philosophy is faced with a dilemma here: Should philosophy
aim  to  provide  a  worldview,  and  thus  fulfil  the  need  of  the
present time, or should it aim at rigorous science, thus fulfilling
the  need  of  the  future—the  need  for  a  scientific  basis  from
which practical  decisions can be made? According to Husserl,
the quest for philosophy as science should not be abandoned.
The need of the present should not prevent the quest for an en-
during, even eternal solution to the problems: a scientific solu-
tion. Only philosophy as rigorous science can provide a lasting,
eternal answer to the questions to which worldview philosophy
provides a temporary answer. 
Husserl’s text is helpful for our analysis in that it offers an in-
dication of what is at stake in the systematic discussion of the
concept of worldview. Even if his plea for philosophy as ‘rigorous
science’,  and  his  characterization  of  a  Weltanschauung  as  un-
scientific,  leave several  topics unaddressed,21 the central  issues
18 Strenge Wissenschaft, 332-333.
19 The observation of the need for a worldview is shared by Windelband and
Rickert, cf. Griffioen, ‘Rickert, Windelband, Hegel und das Weltanschauungs-
bedürfnis’. See also the chapter on Windelband below.
20 Strenge Wissenschaft, 334. Cf. 336: ‘Es ist sicher, daß wir nicht warten können.
Wir müssen Stellung nehmen…’.
21 It  would  be  especially  interesting  to  discuss  whether  the  ‘eternal’  and
‘absolute’  character  which  Husserl  ascribes  to  true  science  is  indeed  a
characteristic of (actual or ideal) science. Unfortunately, this would lead us too
far astray. Even without addressing this issue, the key concepts and questions
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which it raises can serve as the framework for an analysis of the
relation between science and worldview. Husserl’s dichotomy of
worldview and science provides us with the three key-terms for
the  subsequent  analysis  of  the  concept  of  worldview  in
Trendelenburg,  Dilthey,  and  Windelband:  philosophy,  world-
view, and science. Each of these authors argues for the identifica-
tion of philosophy and worldview in one way or another. Yet the
idea of philosophy as science is present in each of them as well.
The guiding questions for this study therefore will be: 1. What is
the meaning of the concept of worldview in the philosophical
system under consideration, and what is its systematic place? 2.
In what way is the concept applied to philosophy itself? 3. How is
the scientific character of philosophy construed? 4. How is philo-
sophy as worldview related to philosophy as science? 
The answers to these questions will provide us with three dif-
ferent  interpretations  of  the  relationship  between  philosophy
and worldview. I will  not mechanically address these questions
one after the other for each of the three positions however, but
rather start with the meaning of the concept of worldview, and
analyze  its  philosophical  role  and significance  from there.  In
each case however, the discussion will provide us with answers to
the questions above. Together, the three perspectives will enable
me  to  evaluate  them  in  their  mutual  relations.  From  there
Husserl’s topic, the question whether philosophy as science and
philosophy  as  worldview  are  compatible,  can  be  more  thor-
oughly discussed, in chapter 5. A less radical distinction between
science and worldview might provide another way out of Husser-
l’s dilemma than the rejection of worldview philosophy altogeth-
er.22
which arise  from Husserl’s  text  serve  very  well  as  guiding  concepts  for  the
subsequent discussion.
22 Still  another way  out  of  Husserl’s  dilemma is  taken by  the  early  Martin
Heidegger in his lectures from the 1919  Kriegsnotsemester (Gesamtausgabe Bd,
56/57). Heidegger argues that philosophy is neither worldview nor theoretical
science,  but  rather  non-theoretical  ‘original  science’  (Urwissenschaft).  Cf.
Heinz, ‘Philosophie und Weltanschauung’. 
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3. Outline: three worldview concepts
The concept of worldview and its systematic position in the work
of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) are analyzed in
chapter 2. Trendelenburg is one of the first to apply the concept
of worldview to philosophical systems themselves, and to develop
a classification of types of worldviews. The concept of worldview
is defined by Trendelenburg as the answer which a philosophical
system gives to the fundamental metaphysical question: how are
thought and being related? On the basis of this definition, he
distinguishes three types of worldviews that have been realised in
philosophical systems. 
The  aim of  Trendelenburg’s  classification  of  philosophical
systems in accordance with their fundamental metaphysical prin-
ciples is to come to a decision between the three types. As we
shall see, the decision must be made in favour of the ‘organic
worldview’, the metaphysical principle which ascribes priority to
thought  over  being.  However,  the  exposition  of  the different
types of worldviews is not enough to provide this organic world-
view with the foundation it needs. The foundation of the organic
worldview which is derived from the classification of worldviews
is not theoretical, but rather ‘practical’: one must choose in fa-
vour of the organic worldview for the sake of ethics. The meta-
physical principle entailed in the organic worldview is the only
principle which enables ethics, according to Trendelenburg.
The practical decision does not render a theoretical founda-
tion of the organic worldview obsolete. A worldview represents
the basic metaphysical principle of the philosophical system, ac-
cording to Trendelenburg, and lack of theoretical support would
leave the system as a whole unsupported. To provide a theoretic-
al  foundation for  the  organic  worldview  is  therefore the task
which Trendelenburg sets himself in his magnum opus, the Lo-
gische Untersuchungen (1840, 18622). The aim of this work is to
provide a philosophical system based on the principle of motion
(Bewegung), which according to Trendelenburg is a principle ori-
ginal to both thought and being. If this approach is successful, it
provides  the organic  worldview with a  theoretical  foundation,
thus making it a scientific worldview.
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The Weltanschauungstypologie of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911),
a student of Trendelenburg, is the topic of chapter 3. Dilthey’s
typology  of  worldviews  has  been  presented  as  the  exemplary
philosophical  approach to worldviews at the beginning of  the
twentieth century.23 Even though Dilthey was by no means the
only one to philosophically address the issue of worldview, his
approach  is  a  significant  one.  More  than  other  students  of
Trendelenburg who developed a typological approach to world-
views, Dilthey addresses the issue of worldview in his later work
as a fundamental reflection on the method of post-metaphysical
philosophy, in an age in which historical consciousness has come
to full bloom. Dilthey aims to integrate the plurality of historical
philosophical worldviews through the development of a historic-
al theory, the Weltanschauungstypologie, which provides an explan-
ation of their structure and relations. 
The plurality of worldviews itself is accepted as an irreducible
fact by Dilthey, as the different types of worldviews are produced
by life. They each have their own legitimacy, and appear with ne-
cessity. Yet their respective claims to exclusivity and validity can-
not be objectively decided on. The function of Dilthey’s Weltan-
schauungstypologie is  therefore  different  from  the  typological
approach of Trendelenburg: for the latter, the typological argu-
ment must lead to a decision (albeit a provisional, practical de-
cision) for one of the worldviews. I will argue that not only the
function,  but  also  the  content  of  the  typological  theories  of
Trendelenburg and Dilthey is different. Contrary to a received
view, the three types which make up Dilthey’s Weltanschauungsty-
pologie cannot be uniformly mapped to the three types which are
distinguished by Trendelenburg. 
Dilthey’s theory is marked by ambivalence towards metaphys-
ics, as we shall see. On the one hand, the typology treats philo-
sophical  worldviews  as  merely  historical phenomena.  As  meta-
physical  systems  they  claim  absolute  validity,  yet  these  claims
cannot be warranted. On the other hand, Dilthey observes that
even though metaphysical systems belong, or should belong, to
the past, the metaphysical tendency of human thought is inerad-
icable. I will argue that this persistence of metaphysics can be ob-
23 Marquard, ‘Geschichtsphilosophie’, 107.
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served in Dilthey  as  well,  for  his  Weltanschauungstypologie itself
aims at providing a worldview, which is a better understanding of
life. This better understanding of life is based on a metaphysical
foundation, however. 
The third and final  worldview concept,  which is  to  be dis-
cussed in chapter 4, is that of Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915).
Nowadays  Windelband  is  best  known  for  his  Lehrbuch  der
Geschichte der Philosophie, and as a representative of the ‘Southw-
est-German school’ of neo-Kantianism.24 I will argue that Windel-
band  develops  in  his  work  a  (rather  unique)  conception  of
philosophy as worldview.25 This conception is based on a meta-
physical interpretation of Kant, especially of his  Kritik der Urteil-
skraft. Windelband’s Kant interpretation owes much to that of his
teacher, Kuno Fischer, who, in turn, had a notorious encounter
with Trendelenburg over the right interpretation of Kant. This
discussion  focussed  on  the  question  whether  Kant  had  suffi-
ciently argued for the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, as
forms of appearance, in his transcendental aesthetics. I will ar-
gue that the differences in the evaluation of  Weltanschauung in
Trendelenburg and Windelband must be understood against the
background of the Fischer-Trendelenburg controversy.
Early on in his philosophical career, Windelband held that a
philosophical,  scientific  worldview,  that  is:  knowledge  of  the
world as  it  is  in itself,  is  impossible.  Windelband rejected the
idea of a philosophical worldview with an appeal to Kant’s epi-
stemology:  Kant  had  shown  the  impossibility  of  all  scientific
knowledge beyond the realm of experience. In his later work,
however, Windelband arrives at a different interpretation of Kant
—and at a different,  positive interpretation of the concept of
worldview. Even if philosophy is primarily a theory of science,
this theory results in a philosophical worldview. A crucial step in
24 Although this  is  a  common classification  of  Windelband,  the  term neo-
Kantianism  is  in  itself  not  very  informative.  It  covers  a  wide  range  of
philosophers  and  philosophical  positions.  Cf.  E.W.  Orth,  ‘Die  Einheit  des
Neukantianismus’.
25 Windelband’s interpretation of worldview and its systematic legitimation is
also unique in the sense that it is different from that of other neo-Kantians,
such  as  Heinrich  Rickert  for  instance.  Cf.  Krijnen,  Nachmetaphysischer  Sinn,
120f.
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Windelband’s argument is the inclusion of the historical sciences
alongside the natural sciences: the philosophical foundation of
the  objectivity  of  the  historical  sciences  can  only  be  accom-
plished through a system of universally valid values. The philo-
sophical knowledge of this noumenal realm of values constitutes
the  scientific,  philosophical  worldview.  According  to  Windel-
band, this noumenal realm is expressed in history, and therefore
can be known through history.  At this  point the metaphysical
character of his concept of worldview, and of the Kant-interpret-
ation underlying it, most clearly come to light.
In the final chapter I will compare and discuss the three inter-
pretations of the concept of worldview and its place in philo-
sophy. The question what systematic place the concept of world-
view has in the philosophical systems under consideration will be
the leading question for the comparison. How and why is the
concept introduced into philosophy? Is it a ‘purely’ philosophic-
al concept, introduced for systematic reasons, or is its introduc-
tion motivated by more general, cultural considerations? 
After this first comparison, I will address the systematic found-
ations of the respective concepts of worldview. As each of the
three positions discussed here make an identification between
philosophy and worldview—each in its own way—the question
whether this identification is philosophically warranted must be
discussed. This boils down to the question—to use Husserl’s ter-
minology—whether philosophy as rigorous science and as world-
view are compatible, and if so, in what form. The answer to this
question will  show whether there is  another viable way out of
Husserl’s dilemma.26
26 ‘Another’ way, not only compared to the choice made by Husserl, but also
compared to Heidegger, cf. note 21.
CHAPTER 2
FRIEDRICH ADOLF TRENDELENBURG:
AT THE ROOTS OF THE WORLDVIEW DEBATE
1. Introduction
Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg was the first to construe a philo-
sophical system as a worldview (Weltanschauung or  Weltansicht).1
Philosophical systems, in their basic forms, must be interpreted
as  Weltanschauungen. In an essay from 1847, ‘Ueber den letzten
Unterschied der philosophischen Systemen’, Trendelenburg de-
velops  a  classification  of  philosophical  systems,  according  to
their basic, metaphysical structure. In this chapter Trendelenbur-
g’s concept of worldview and his classificatory account, as well as
their systematic-philosophical background will be discussed. 
Trendelenburg’s classification of philosophical systems, com-
prehended as worldviews, has been influential. Several of his stu-
dents have formulated typological theories—of which Dilthey’s
Weltanschauungstypologie,  which  will  be  the  topic  of  the  next
chapter, is the best known.2 It is not surprising, then, that paral-
lels  between Trendelenburg’s classification and these other at-
tempts can be established. Especially Dilthey’s typology of world-
views  has  often  been  compared  to  Trendelenburg’s  classifica-
tion.3 Even if the nature and extent of the relation of Dilthey’s
1 These  two  terms  are  used  alongside  each  other  and  as  synonyms  by
Trendelenburg. 
2 See also Kym, Die Weltanschauungen und deren Consequenzen. Köhnke,  Entsteh-
ung und Aufstieg, 172f., lists a number of these attempts.
3 The  structural  similarity  between  Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie and
Trendelenburg’s  typological  approach  is  emphasised  by  Wach,  cf.  Wach,
Typenlehre,  8,  12,  18,  and 31.  Marquard refers to this text when he renders
Wach’s thesis as the claim that ‘the three fundamental forms in Trendelenburg
are  in precise  agreement with Dilthey’s  types  of  worldviews’,  cf.  Marquard,
Weltanschauungstypologie,  109.  Although  Wach  indeed  relates  the  types  of
worldviews  in  Dilthey  to  those  in  Trendelenburg,  he  does  not  speak  of  a
precise agreement. Rather, he speaks of the more ‘differentiated’, and ‘subtle’
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Weltanschauungstypologie and  Trendelenburg’s  classification  of
worldviews will be addressed later on, these observations already
serve to indicate Trendelenburg’s influence. However, to give a
more  complete  account  of  Trendelenburg’s  systematic-philo-
sophical  relevance,  not  only  his  classificatory  account as  such
must be taken into consideration, but also the philosophical the-
ory of which it is a part. To this end, the concept of worldview
and the classification built on it should not be studied in isola-
tion, but in the context of the central philosophical goals that
they serve. 
This chapter will therefore analyze the concept of worldview
in Trendelenburg’s work, notably his typology of worldviews, in
the context of his systematic-philosophical project. Especially his
principal work, the Logische Untersuchungen is taken into account.
First the structure, function, and presuppositions of Trendelen-
burg’s theory of worldviews are analyzed in section 2. We will
find that his typology of worldviews rests on a basic, metaphysical
question.  This  question  is  also  central  to  the  programme  of
Trendelenburg’s  Logische Untersuchungen. This programme, as it
is most clearly expressed in the second edition of the  Logische
Untersuchungen, is the topic of section 3. Section 4 then studies in
more detail  some key concepts and results of this programme
which are necessary to an understanding of Trendelenburg’s the-
ory of worldviews and its relation to his systematic programme.
Section 5 examines the metaphysical dimensions of Trendelen-
burg’s discussion of worldviews. Trendelenburg’s notorious dis-
cussion with Kuno Fischer on the interpretation of Kant (the so-
called  Fischer-Trendelenburg  debate)  serves  to  highlight  the
metaphysical dimensions of Trendelenburg’s account, and some
central and potentially problematic issues in his ‘metaphysics of
motion’. These issues, notably the issue whether Trendelenburg
problematically employs a correspondence theory of knowledge,
are discussed in section 6. It will be my conclusion that we must
read Trendelenburg as an idealist to avoid these potential prob-
lems. In section 7, the scope of Trendelenburg’s idealism will be
analyzed further and compared with German idealism. Together,
character of Dilthey’s typology. Cf. Wach, Typenlehre, 31.
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these results will enable a concluding perspective on the struc-
ture and function of Trendelenburg’s  philosophical  worldview
theory, which will be given in section 8.
2. Towards a scientific resolution of the plurality of worldviews
Trendelenburg’s most concise definition of ‘worldview’ can be
found in his Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik (1860):
Die Weltanschauung ist der metaphysische Grundgedanke, der, conse-
quent mit sich selbst, die besondern Erkenntnisse zum Ganzen einigt
und Uebereinstimmung mit sich fordert.4 
This  description reveals  several  relevant  aspects  of Trendelen-
burg’s use of the concept of Weltanschauung. First, a worldview is
taken as a conception (Gedanke), more specifically, a fundament-
al conception (Grundgedanke). Because this conception is a fun-
damental conception, it cannot as such be deduced from other
conceptions or principles. The adjective ‘metaphysical’ indicates
that a worldview is a fundamental conception with respect to a
metaphysical question. What this metaphysical question is, how a
worldview can provide an answer to this question, and in what
sense this  answer  is  ‘fundamental’,  are  issues that  will  be  dis-
cussed in detail in the following. 
A further  aspect  of  Trendelenburg’s  use  of  the concept  of
Weltanschauung is that a worldview unifies the totality of know-
ledge. Although a worldview is ‘only’ a fundamental conception,
it is also an ordering principle which unifies all knowledge in a
coherent totality, and it even revises knowledge: ‘Was ihm [dem
Grundgedanken] widerspricht, wird von ihm zurückgewiesen’.5
A worldview therefore not only unifies knowledge, but also cor-
rects it by bringing knowledge into relation with the fundament-
al metaphysical conception. 
4 Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, 22.
5 Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, 22.
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This critical unification of knowledge into a totality from a
fundamental  metaphysical  conception  (worldview)  indicates  a
claim to exclusivity. As an ordering principle of the totality of sci-
entific knowledge a worldview is incompatible with other world-
views. Different worldviews, departing from different fundament-
al metaphysical conceptions, result in different configurations of
the totality of knowledge. The development of a worldview into a
totality  therefore  leads  to  a  denial  of  other  worldviews;  the
choice of one fundamental metaphysical approach excludes the
realisation of the others. Trendelenburg also speaks in this con-
text  of  an  ever-renewing  conflict  (Kampf)  between  different
worldviews.6 For  the very reason that a  worldview embodies  a
fundamental  metaphysical  conception,  which brings  all  know-
ledge into a relation with itself, it is also, according to Trendelen-
burg, incompatible with other worldviews. 
It must be concluded, however, that the totalities that result
from the different worldviews are relative, or limited totalities,
that is, they are limited views of the world, relative to the funda-
mental metaphysical conception that lies at its root. These lim-
ited views on the totality are ‘final hypotheses’ (letzte Hypothesen)
and as such cannot give definitive theoretical support for their
fundamental metaphysical conceptions. If such theoretical sup-
port can be given, there will not be an ever-returning conflict
between the different worldviews. The concept of worldview as it
is  employed here by Trendelenburg therefore entails  recogni-
tion of the limits of philosophy, its inability to provide conclusive
theoretical  support of its most fundamental  metaphysical  con-
ception—at least insofar as the current state of philosophy for
Trendelenburg is concerned, for we will soon learn that he does
see a way out of the recurring conflict of worldviews.
Trendelenburg’s  notion  of  a  worldview  as  a  fundamental
metaphysical  conception,  introduced here on the basis  of  his
1860 Naturrecht, has its origins in an essay of 1847, entitled Ueber
den  letzten  Unterschied  der  philosophischen  Systeme.  In  this  text,
Trendelenburg raises the question how philosophical systems—
6 Trendelenburg,  Naturrecht,  23:  ‘Werden  diese  Weltanschauungen  zur
Totalität ausgebildet, so widersprechen sie einander und der Kampf derselben
erneuert sich immer wieder, wie der Kampf letzter Hypothesen.’ 
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in their diversity and detached from the ‘external’ context of his-
tory—are ‘internally related’.7 This question is first of all taken
up as the search for a fundamental  difference between philo-
sophical systems, as the title of the essay indicates. This point of
ultimate difference between philosophical systems is at the same
time a point at which the connection between the systems re-
veals itself, and is therefore the point at which the systems can be
brought in relation to one another. 
Like natural objects, which according to Trendelenburg can
only be put in a ‘meaningful overview’ from the perspective of a
fundamental  difference,  philosophical  systems  should  also  be
ordered and brought in relation from the perspective of a funda-
mental difference.8 Despite this analogy with taxonomies in the
natural sciences, however, Trendelenburg’s treatment of philo-
sophical systems differs in two essential respects. The philosoph-
ical ‘taxonomy’ of systems which Trendelenburg aims at has a
non-empirical and dynamical character.
The classificatory procedures of philosophy should not take
their starting point in the factual, historically present philosoph-
ical systems, as specimens for the taxonomy that has to be de-
vised.  The fundamental  difference between systems should be
developed from the philosophical subject matter as such (aus in-
nern Verhältnissen der Sache) and only subsequently be applied to
factual,  historical  philosophical  systems.  For  Trendelenburg,
common distinctions that are applied to the diversity of historic-
al philosophical systems—such as nominalism/realism, dogmat-
ism/scepticism,  critical/dialectical  philosophy—are insufficient
as fundamental differences. For one thing, these distinctions of-
ten  serve  not  as  systematic  distinctions,  but  rather  as  ‘catch-
words’ (Stichwörter) which reveal only the systematic presupposi-
tions  of  the  philosopher  who is  applying  them.9 Moreover,  it
cannot  be  determined  without  systematic  discussion  whether
one of these distinctions can function as the fundamental dis-
7 Trendelenburg,  ‘Ueber  den letzten  Unterschied  der  philosophischen Sys-
teme’, 1 (henceforth cited as Unterschied).
8 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 1: ‘[Naturkörper die sich...]nur in einem letzten
Unterschied der Sache zu einem bedeutsamen Ueberblick ordnen.’
9 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 2.
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tinction.  Philosophy should therefore devise its  ‘taxonomy’ of
systems in a non-empirical way, and find the fundamental  dis-
tinction between systems antecedently, out of the philosophical
concepts themselves.
As a consequence of this approach, it can be concluded that
the relation of Trendelenburg’s classificatory method to history
—especially the history of philosophy—is secondary in character.
This  result  is  important  in  comparison  to  Dilthey’s  Weltan-
schauungstypologie,  and other positions in the worldview debate
which we will encounter later on, in which the relation between
philosophy and (its) history plays an important role. While the
philosophical-historical  interests  of  Dilthey  and  other  parti-
cipants in the later philosophical  debates around the topic of
worldview cannot be overlooked, it is also clear from the outset
that Trendelenburg’s prime motivation behind his classification
of worldviews is not historical, but rather systematic. 
This systematic motivation itself, however, has philosophical-
historical consequences. It is applied by Trendelenburg, for in-
stance,  as  an  instrument  for  the  analysis  and  classificatory
presentation  of  the  history  of  philosophy.  Trendelenburg  de-
mands that the fundamental distinction between philosophical
systems that has to be established for it to be a final and funda-
mental distinction must be applicable to every historical system.
Moreover,  the  most  general  distinction  should  provide  the
‘germ’ (Keim) of more specific differences between systems.10 Al-
though  Trendelenburg’s  classificatory  theory  thus  clearly  has
consequences for the study of the history of philosophy, his ‘tax-
onomy’ must be considered to be non-empirical, for it takes its
point of departure in systematic considerations, not in the ob-
jects to be classified (the philosophical systems). This already re-
flects the systematic goal which, as we shall see, Trendelenburg’s
classification serves. 
This systematic concern becomes even more apparent when
one considers the dynamic character of Trendelenburg’s classific-
ation. The distinction of philosophical systems that Trendelen-
burg aims at consists of more than just a ‘grouping’ (Anordnung,
Gruppierung) of systems in a ‘descriptive system’. The philosoph-
10 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 13.
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ical systems are to be understood as ‘living processes in minds,
struggles of fundamental ideas for the dominance in thinking
and willing’.11 That is, the fundamental and final distinction is
not only  a point of  separation between different kinds of sys-
tems, but also a point at which the different systems encounter
one another, and ‘struggle for dominance’.  The philosophical
systems that are organised according to the fundamental distinc-
tion do not ‘statically’ stand next to each other, as in a mere de-
scription  of  different  kinds,  but  compete  for  dominance  in
thinking. Consequently, the final distinction between worldviews
also presents the ‘final and fundamental problems’ (die letzten
Probleme).12 That philosophy should try and is able to solve these
problems is apparent from the further course of Trendelenbur-
g’s analysis. The classification of the different types of worldviews
ends in (at least) a temporary solution of these problems, as we
will see shortly. 
How is this final and fundamental distinction between philo-
sophical systems determined by Trendelenburg? The fundamen-
tal difference is to be found in a contrast of philosophical con-
cepts:
In den verschiedenen Gestalten der Philosophie liegen Versuche vor,
verschiedene Grundbegriffe als die letzten und als die schöpferischen
geltend zu machen […] Wäre es möglich, den letzten Gegensatz unter
diesen Begriffen zu bestimmen […] so würden sich in demselben ver-
muthlich die letzten Unterschiede der Systeme nachweisen lassen.13 
Since the totality of knowledge in its origin is the object of philo-
sophy, it can be expected that the greatest contrast between the
concepts that determine and create other concepts (and there-
fore are able to form the ‘centre’ (Mittelpunkt) of a system) also
determines  the fundamental  difference between philosophical
systems. 
11 Trendelenburg,  Unterschied,  1:  ‘… lebendige  Vorgänge  in  den  Geistern,
Kämpfe der Grundbegriffe um die Herrschaft im Denken und Wollen.’
12 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 2.
13 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 3.
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This  fundamental  contrast  is  eventually  construed  by
Trendelenburg  as  the  opposition  between  thought  (Gedanke)
and ‘blind’ or ‘naked’ force (Kraft). The contrast between the
subjective and the objective, which according to Trendelenburg
manifests  itself  in  German  philosophy  ‘since  Kant’,  becomes
sharpest when ‘thought opposes the world’ (das Denken der Welt
gegenübersteht).14 The subjective, the ‘one, concentrated activity of
thought’,  seeks  to  understand  and  found  the  objective,  the
world, it seeks to absorb the infinite totality of beings (die unend-
liche Fülle des Seienden).15 But to constitute the fundamental differ-
ence, thought and the world must be taken in their greatest op-
position.  Being  is  most  alien  to  thought,  and  therefore  the
opposition is  greatest  when being confronts thought with the
claim  (Anspruch)  that  it  is  ‘determined  by  itself  and  not  by
thought’.16 Being thus construed, fully independent of thought,
is  in  sharpest  contrast  with  ‘conscious  thought’  (der  bewußte
Gedanke).  This  contrast  between  ‘blind  force’  and  ‘conscious
thought’ is the greatest amongst the philosophical concepts.17
But this opposition is not limited to philosophical concepts as
such. It can also be encountered in the world: ‘In der Welt, wel-
che wir überblicken, haben wir in beiden zwei Endpunkte, zwei
Aeusserste vor uns’.18 The contrast therefore is not only a logical
one, resulting from the principles of knowledge, but also a meta-
physical one, that is, pertaining to the world as it is. In the experi-
ence of the world thought and being are two extreme and op-
posing spheres. For this reason, Trendelenburg can describe a
14 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 4.
15 Trendelenburg,  Unterschied, 5. This subjectivity must not be interpreted as
pure thought (reines Denken), it has its organon in the ongoing generations of
man.  Trendelenburg’s  critique  of  ‘pure  thought’  in  Hegel’s  dialectics  is
discussed in Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg, 48f.
16 Trendelenburg,  Unterschied,  5:  ‘...aus  sich  selbst  und  nicht  aus  dem
Gedanken bestimmt zu sein.’
17 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 7. According to Trendelenburg, the conceptual
pairs  subjective/objective  and  ideal/real  can  be  used  to  express  the  same
distinction,  but  they  are  also prone to confusion.  Trendelenburg especially
wants to avoid the impression of static  objectivity  in the objective and real.
Instead he puts emphasis on the activity of force.
18 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 9.
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worldview as a fundamental metaphysical idea, and also construe
the question of the relation between force and thought as the
fundamental  metaphysical  question.  This  connection between
logic and metaphysics will be discussed in more detail in the fol-
lowing sections.
The relation between force and thought can be conceived in
three different ways, according to Trendelenburg. A first possib-
ility is to take force as fundamental, in such a way that thought is
not original, but a ‘product’, ‘accidens’, or ‘result’ of the blind
forces.19 The philosophical systems that can be retraced to this
metaphysical starting point are designated by Trendelenburg as
materialistic systems, worldviews that are determined by the ‘act-
ive cause’ (cause efficiens). Alternatively, he also refers to this type
of worldview as a physical or mechanical worldview, or—from a
historical perspective—as  Demokritismus.  The second option,  in
contrast with the first, is to put thought before force. This option
leads to the idealistic systems, worldviews determined by the ‘in-
ternal end’ (causa finalis), an  organic or teleological worldview.
Historically,  this  option is  designated as  Platonism.20 The third
way in which the relation between force and thought can be con-
ceived is the view which does not ascribe priority  to either of
these two fundamental  concepts,  but intead takes  them to be
equally valid ways in which the mind represents the ‘essence of
the  infinite  substance’.21 These  systems  of  indifference between
cause and end are connected historically by Trendelenburg with
the name of Spinoza.
The two fundamental concepts, force and thought, thus de-
termine the final  and fundamental  distinction,  and hence de-
termine Trendelenburg’s classification of philosophical systems
as worldviews. It is important to lay emphasis on the fact that
these two concepts do not as such constitute the fundamental
distinction, but that the fundamental distinction is determined
by the way in which the  relation between these two concepts is
conceived. The fundamental metaphysical conception, which is
19 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 10.
20 ‘Platonism’ is used by Trendelenburg in a broad sense, which for instance
also includes Aristotle. Cf. Unterschied, 14.
21 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 12.
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embodied by a worldview, is not to be conceived as one concept.22
It is an answer to the question how these two fundamental con-
cepts are related. An interpretation of Trendelenburg’s classifica-
tion which takes each type of worldview as determined by only
one fundamental concept thus fails to recognize the internal dy-
namics that philosophical systems have in Trendelenburg’s ana-
lysis.  This  dynamical  relation  between  thought  and  force,  or
thought and being, is essential to Trendelenburg’s project of a
philosophical ‘theory of science’. We will  return to this in the
next section. 
The relation between the three possible types of worldviews is
also of a dynamic nature. The worldviews stand in a relation of
‘conflict’ (Kampf). Only one of the three worldviews can be ‘true
and actual’.23 But this observation of a dynamics of worldviews as
such is not the point at which Trendelenburg’s analysis ends, as
in an irresolvable plurality of worldviews. His classificatory meth-
od aims  at  a  critical  judgement  of  the different  fundamental
metaphysical  conceptions,  and  at  a  (preliminary)  decision
between them. 
The worldview of ‘indifference’ between thought and being,
Spinozism, is discarded by Trendelenburg. It is a merely hypo-
thetical possibility of determining the relation between thought
and force. Historically it has never been realised (not even by
Spinoza himself) without collapsing into either materialism or
idealism. The Spinozistic worldview is a systematic possibility, res-
ulting from the determination of the fundamental  contrast as
the contrast between force and thought. Systematic and historic-
22 Joachim  Wach  therefore  characterises  Trendelenburg’s  typological
approach too simply as a reduction of a philosophical system to  one concept
(Wach, Typenlehre, 14-15). Although Trendelenburg does occasionally speak of
fundamental concepts (Grundbegriffe,  e.g.  Naturrecht,  3), he in fact assigns to
each  type  a  fundamental  principle  (Grundgedanke)  which  describes  the
relationship  between  two  fundamental  concepts  (i.e.  thought  and  force).
Wach ignores the dynamic character of Trendelenburg’s typological theory,
which rests on the relationship between thought and force.
23 Cf. e.g. Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 10 or Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, 23.
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al philosophical scrutiny shows that it cannot exist as an actual
and an independent type of worldview, alongside the other two
types.24
A decision  between  these  two  other  types  is  not  so  easily
made, however. Both the materialistic and the organic worldview
carry inherent problems in them, which prevent a decision by
purely theoretical means. The materialistic systems stand for the
insoluble difficulty of explaining how the ‘harmony of the living’
can be derived from the ‘blind forces’ which this worldview takes
as  fundamental.25 Put  differently,  this  is  the  problem  of
(physical) reductionism: when reality is ultimately taken to con-
sist of forces, atoms or other elements, how can the possibility
and existence of more complex structures be demonstrated? 
The organic worldview in turn has problems explaining how
the domain of thought (which is taken as fundamental) can real-
ise itself in the domain of force: ‘Es hilft nichts, den Gedanken
vor die Kraft zu stellen. Man soll zeigen, wie es geschehen kön-
ne, daß er die Kraft ergreife und regiere’.26 To solve this prob-
lem, the organic worldview has to presuppose an original com-
mon  point  of  thought  and  force,  but  this  point  lies  ‘as  yet
beyond speculation’ (bis jetzt über die Speculation hinaus).27 In this
essay from 1847, however, Trendelenburg foresees the possibility
of a solution to this problem of an original unity of thought and
force:
Vielleicht läßt sich hoffen, daß einst die Naturwissenschaften die Kräfte
zu einer ähnlichen Einheit fügen [...] Dann würden sie am Ende den
Platonismus nicht stürzen, sondern nur fester gründen. Dann erst wer-
den sich die Kräfte der Natur wie die Laute der Sprache verhalten; sie
werden einen Sinn haben und einen göttlichen Gedanken kund geben,
wie diese einen menschlichen.28 
24 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 21. Cf. Naturrecht, 23.
25 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 22-23.
26 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 24.
27 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 25. 
28 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 28.
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The continuing scientific examination of the manifold of forces,
which results in an incrementally developing unity of (scientific)
knowledge of the forces,  should eventually  grasp the original
unity of thought and force. Thus the origin of both blind force
and  human  thought  in  a  comprehensive,  objective  thought
would be demonstrated.29
Although this task cannot be solved at the level of theoretical
thought (yet), Trendelenburg decides in favour of the organic
worldview. His argument for this decision is not theoretical, but
practical. For the sake of ethics, Trendelenburg puts his confid-
ence in the organic worldview.30 Only the organic worldview can
be the foundation of ethics, Trendelenburg will argue in 1860,31
in 1847 he formulates more subtly: ‘Das Organische und Ethi-
sche steht in einem Bunde; denn das Ethische ist das sich selbst
erkennende, das bewußt und frei gewordene Organische’.32 The
materialistic worldview cannot provide a foundation of the good,
nor of thought, because of its reductionist character. Only an or-
ganic worldview, which aims at totality,  can provide a solution
here: ‘Weder das Gute noch der Gedanke könnte am Ende und
im Einzelnen herauskommen, wenn er nicht im Ursprung und
im Ganzen läge’.33 Only  a  worldview  which acknowledges  the
primacy of this original thought as the totality of knowledge over
individual forces can provide the proper place for the good. To
show how thought and being originate in this ‘original thought’
would  become  the  aim of  Trendelenburg’s  Logische  Untersuch-
ungen, especially in the second edition.
29 Ibid.
30 Burkhard Gerlach calls Trendelenburg’s argumentative strategy here a ‘vote
of  confidence’  (Votum)  for  the  organic  worldview,  cf.  Gerlach,
‘Trendelenburgs Akademievortrag’, 317. 
31 Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, VII.
32 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 28.
33 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 29.
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3. Philosophy and the sciences:
the programme of the Logische Untersuchungen
In  order  to  grasp  the  systematic-philosophical  context  of
Trendelenburg’s  classification of worldviews, I will  analyze this
classification against  the backdrop of  his  principal  theoretical
philosophical  work,  the  Logische  Untersuchungen.  The  practical
choice of the organic worldview turned out to be provisional in
the previous section, a placeholder for a theoretical foundation.
This is also apparent from Trendelenburg’s legitimation of the
decision for the Platonic or organic worldview in his  Naturrecht
auf dem Grunde der Ethik. Although Trendelenburg argues here,
too, that the ‘ethical principle’ only can be found in the organic
worldview, he also points to the efforts of logic and metaphysics
to  found  the  organic  worldview:  ‘Die  Logik  und  Metaphysik
entscheidet sich nach unserer Ansicht für die organische Weltan-
schauung und sucht diese zu begründen’.34 It is in the  Logische
Untersuchungen that Trendelenburg undertakes the project of a
theoretical  foundation  of  the  organic  worldview.  This  pro-
gramme of the Logische Untersuchen, to provide a ‘logic and meta-
physics as founding science’, is clarified by Trendelenburg in an
additional chapter in the second edition of this work (1862).35
There he describes the task of philosophy in relation to the sci-
ences as the articulation of a ‘theory of science’—and as such
philosophy is a ‘founding science’.36
According to this view, philosophy has to rely on the sciences,
and the sciences in turn have to rely on philosophy, to provide
their  foundation:  ‘Wo es  noch keine  anderen Wissenschaften
34 Trendelenburg,  Naturrecht,  23.  In the  synoptical  table of contents  at  the
beginning of the work, Trendelenburg writes that ‘only the organic worldview
can be the foundation of ethics’, VII.
35 Trendelenburg,  Logische Untersuchungen 1,  4-14.  Henceforth cited as  LU,
followed by volume number. References to the Logische Untersuchungen without
date  are  to  the  expanded,  second  edition  (1862).  References  to  the  first
edition have the year of publication (1840) added. The difference between the
first  two  editions  as  far  as  the  concept  of  worldview  is  concerned  will  be
discussed in the following.
36 LU 1, 11, 14. 
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giebt, da giebt es auch eigentlich noch keine Philosophie’.37 The
special sciences develop at first independently and in a scattered
fashion, like ‘disjointed parts’ (unverbundene Stücke). They deal
with parts or even ‘parts of parts’ of the universe. According to
Trendelenburg, the goal of scientific knowledge must be found
in the totality:
Erst  wenn  das  Universum  vom  erkennenden  Geiste  wieder  erzeugt
wäre, würde sich in vollem Sinne der Organismus der Wissenschaften
darstellen, in welchem die einzelnen Disciplinen Glieder eines Ganzen
werden.38
In 1862 this totality is still far away, almost infinitely remote.39 In
such  a  totality  philosophy  and  the  special  sciences  would  no
longer  be  disconnected disciplines.  Philosophy  assimilates  (in
sich aufnehmen) the sciences into itself, and the sciences help to
build philosophy (auferbauen). On the road to this totality, philo-
sophy has the task of investigating and presenting the ‘idea of
the totality and the universal’ from the parts and from the partic-
ular:
Inzwischen ist es auf dem Wege zu dem weit hinausgerückten Ziel das
Geschäft der philosophischen Forschung, die Idee des Ganzen in den
Theilen, die Idee des Allgemeinen in dem Besondern aufzusuchen und
darzustellen.40
To fulfil this task, philosophy turns to the special sciences. These
sciences are differentiated according to their respective objects
and methods.41 The restriction of the object of knowledge is a
hallmark of the special sciences. This restriction points beyond
37 LU 1, 5.
38 LU 1, 6.
39 ‘Ein solches Ganze, welches erst die Frucht vollendeter Erkenntnis sein kann,
liegt wie die letzte Idee in weiter Aussicht, fast wie in unendlicher Entfernung’,
LU 1, 6. The adverb ‘fast’ (almost) is important here: it signifies the difference
between a real and an infinite task for human knowledge. 
40 LU 1, 6. 
41 ‘Der  besondere  Gegenstand  jeder  Wissenschaft  thut  sich  als  die
Verzweigung eines allgemeinen Seins und die eigenthümliche Methode thut
sich  als  eine  besondere  Richtung  des  erkennenden Denkens,  des  Denkens
überhaupt, kund.’ LU 1, 6.
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itself, however, in that the different objects of knowledge do not
stand unrelated alongside each other, but in reciprocal relations
(wechselseitige Beziehungen). In this way, a consideration of the ob-
ject of scientific knowledge leads to the question of metaphysics
—in its original, ‘Aristotelian’ sense according to Trendelenburg
—what ‘being as such, the universal as ground of the particular
object’  is.42 Likewise,  consideration  of  the  different  scientific
methods leads to the question of their origin in the ‘essence of
thinking’ (das Wesen des Denkens). The question of the unity of
the sciences leads thus to logic and metaphysics: 
Wenn die Wissenschaften sich vollenden wollen, so bedürfen sie gerade
dessen, worauf sie, über sich selbst hinaus, hinführen. Logik und Meta-
physik sind insofern die Consequenz ihres wissenschaftlichen Triebes.43
A philosophical theory of science should therefore encompass
logic and metaphysics. But this must not be taken as a mere addi-
tion of two disciplines. The question of being that metaphysics
addresses,  and  the  question  of  thinking  that  logic  addresses,
have to be completed by  adding the question of the relation
between thinking and being. Only from the relation of logic and
metaphysics can the ‘inner possibility of knowledge’ be under-
stood.44 For this (philosophical) science, which unifies the ana-
lysis of thinking and of being, and the disciplines of logic and
metaphysics,  Trendelenburg  uses  the  expression  ‘logic  in  a
broad sense’ (Logik im weiteren Sinne), and his ‘logical investiga-
tions’ are aimed at precisely such a logic.45
Trendelenburg  explicitly  formulates  this  programme  of  a
founding science which encompasses logic and metaphysics in
the second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen of 1862, that is,
fifteen years after the essay  Üeber den letzten Unterschied der meta-
physischen Systeme. Especially the additional first chapter, entitled
‘Logik und Metaphysik als grundlegende Wissenschaft’, reflects
42 ‘…das  Seiende  als  solches,  das  Allgemeine  als  Grund  des  besondern
Gegenstandes’, LU 1, 6-9, quote: 9.
43 LU 1, 10.
44 ‘…innere Möglichkeit  des Wissens verstehen und das Denken in seinem
Streben zum Wissen begreifen’, LU 1, 11.
45 LU 1, 12.
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this  new self-interpretation of the  Logische Untersuchungen.  But
other passages are examples of this revised self-interpretation as
well, for instance an added paragraph in the Rückblick at the end
of the work. There the aim of the work is described as a ‘theory
of science’ which is ‘logic in a broad sense’ and which investig-
ates the logical and metaphysical presuppositions of science.46 
This  updated self-interpretation of  the second edition not-
withstanding, the programme that is made explicit in the second
edition  is  in  fact  already  found  in  the  first  edition.  There
Trendelenburg defines the task of logic, in relation to the special
sciences, as follows: ‘to bring the unconscious to consciousness,
and to understand what is different in its common origin.’47 The
continuity of the systematic core of the work between the two
editions is also clear when the central question of the work is
taken into account: the question how thought and being are re-
lated.48 This  question,  identically  formulated in both  the first
and second edition, is the same as the ‘basic metaphysical ques-
tion’ which is used to classify the worldviews in the 1847 essay.
Yet despite this continuity of the work’s basic question, it is only
in the revised and expanded second edition,  appearing years
after the 1847 essay, that Trendelenburg explicitly describes the
programme of the  Logische Untersuchungen  as the founding sci-
ence of logic and metaphysics. 
At this point it is possible to draw a preliminary conclusion
with respect to the relation between the programme of the  Lo-
gische Untersuchungen and the typology of worldviews which was
discussed in the previous section. The typology of worldviews ac-
cording to the way in which the relation between the fundament-
al concepts ‘thought’ and ‘force’ is construed stands in an imme-
diate relation to the programme of the Logische Untersuchungen.
The central question of the work in both the first and second
edition is the question how of the thought and being ultimately
46 LU 2, 489, cf. the first edition, LU (1840) 2, 363.
47 ‘... das Unbewußte zum Bewußtsein zu erheben und das Verschiedene im
gemeinsamen Ursprunge zu begreifen’, LU (1840) 1, VI-VII.
48 ‘Wie kommt das Denken zum Sein? Wie tritt das Sein in das Denken? Diese
Frage bezeichen wir als die Grundfrage.’,  LU (1840) 1, 105. Cf. LU 1, 135.
Trendelenburg’s answer to this question in the LU will be discussed below.
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relate and are connected. The revised self-interpretation of the
second edition, in terms of a founding theory of science which
encompasses  logic  and metaphysics,  makes  the answer  to  this
fundamental metaphysical question the foundation of the organ-
ic  worldview,  which  integrates  philosophy and the  special  sci-
ences. The possible answers to this very same question are also
studied and critically judged by Trendelenburg in his 1847 essay
Über den letzten Unterschied der metaphysischen Systeme. The typology
of metaphysical systems which is presented in this essay is there-
fore both a prolegomenon and a stand-in for the intended, final
theory of science. It is a prolegomenon because it provides an in-
ventory of the possible solutions to the fundamental metaphysic-
al problem and suggests the direction in which the final solution
can be found. Yet the typology of worldviews in Trendelenburg is
also a stand-in, for it gives a practical argument for the selection
of the organic worldview right now—until the theoretical project
of an organic totality of knowledge and of the founding connec-
tion of thought and being is completed. The worldviews there-
fore embody what Trendelenburg called the ‘idea of totality in
the parts, the idea of the universal in the particular’, but only as
limited totalities, relative to the fundamental metaphysical con-
ceptions that structure them. A theoretical, philosophical found-
ation of the organic worldview as the fundamental metaphysical
conception, by way of the logical-metaphysical theory of science,
can elevate this relative totality into a true totality of knowledge.
4. Key concepts of the Logische Untersuchungen
A worldview entails an answer to the fundamental metaphysical
question: how are thought and being related? The classification
of  worldviews  undertaken  by  Trendelenburg,  and  the  subse-
quent critical discussion of the different types of worldviews, was
a preliminary account to establish the organic worldview as the
‘right’ worldview. The classification of worldviews and the choice
of the organic worldview that it enabled were merely a stand-in
for a theory of science that, in conjunction with the results of the
sciences themselves, would provide a final solution to the funda-
mental metaphysical problem. 
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A worldview,  even  the  organic  worldview,  provides  limited
knowledge as long as it is not scientifically established. Until the
scientific-philosophical  foundation  of  the  metaphysical  stance
that is incorporated in the organic worldview is completed, the
knowledge that is provided by the worldviews is essentially un-
founded. Although practical reasons can be given for a certain
fundamental metaphysical stance—as Trendelenburg did in case
of the organic worldview—these reasons are not sufficient as a
theoretical foundation. And, as was argued above, the  Logische
Untersuchungen are considered by Trendelenburg to provide such
a  theoretical  foundation  of  the  organic  worldview,  from  the
second edition onwards. 
The classification of worldviews is intrinsically connected to
the project of a theory of science in Trendelenburg’s work. The
fundamental question that is answered by a worldview is also the
fundamental question of the theory of science. But worldviews
and the theory  of  science  also  stand in a  certain  opposition.
What  a  worldview  in  Trendelenburg’s  classificatory  analysis
provides  only  provisionally,  i.e.  an answer  to  the fundamental
metaphysical question, a theory of science as it is intended in the
Logische Untersuchungen would provide definitively.  The organic
worldview would, strictly speaking, cease to be a worldview—i.e.
a view of the world that allows for other, different views—were it
to be founded in a theory of science. The completion of the in-
tended theory of science—which would include the sciences and
their philosophical foundation into an organic totality—would
entail a resolution of the plurality of worldviews. To gain further
insight into this  relationship between philosophy as worldview
and the sciences, the key concepts and arguments from the Lo-
gische Untersuchungen will be examined in more detail here.
4.1. An original mediating activity
The goal of the Logische Untersuchungen is to provide a systematic
philosophical account of thought and being that will reveal the
connection between the two, and thus provide a foundation of
knowledge  and  an  origin  of  being.  To  achieve  this  goal,
Trendelenburg formulates several conditions which must be sat-
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isfied. Before examining these conditions however, some things
will  be  said  about  the  role  of  dualism in  Trendelenburg’s  ac-
count.
Trendelenburg’s account of knowledge takes its point of de-
parture in a dualism. Even if he is aware of the criticisms levelled
against  dualistic  accounts  of  knowledge,  Trendelenburg  holds
that  human  knowledge  entails  the  experience  of  separation
between the knowing subject and the known object.49 The start-
ing-point is therefore taken in the separation of thought and be-
ing, and the question is how they are united in the process of
knowing (im Erkennen).50 The human mind (unlike the mind of
God, as Trendelenburg notes) is marked by separation, the mind
lives  from the experiences that it  receives.  A  completely  free,
self-active (selbstthätig) human mind, which receives nothing and
constructs everything, would master itself, but would be a master
in  emptiness  (einsame  Herrschaft),  and  would  be  disconnected
from the world. The greatness of the human mind lies in the
symmetry (Ebenmass) of receiving and constructing (bilden).51 
It is important to note that this dualism is indeed a point of
departure: the philosophical analysis starts here, but the goal is to
provide a connection or mediation between thought and being.
Both the separation of thinking and being, and the connection
of the two, are a common experience in the process of know-
ledge.  Trendelenburg consciously  takes a preliminary  concept
(Vorstellung)  of  knowledge  at  the  outset  of  his  investigation.52
This preliminary concept is necessary because thought can only
understand itself in a reflexive activity: one cannot provide a the-
oretically sufficient concept of thought or knowledge other than
through reflexive analysis of thinking by itself.53 The preliminary
concept is the starting-point on which the reflexive activity builds
49 LU 1, 135.
50 LU 1, 134.
51 LU 1, 135.
52 LU 1, 131.
53 ‘Wie das Sehen nur durch das Sehen begriffen wird, so das Denken nur
durch das Denken. [...] In einer höheren Weise wird auch das Erkennen alle
seine Elemente voraussetzen, wenn es sich in sich selbst zurecht finden soll’,
LU 1, 131.
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its investigation. Furthermore, this preliminary concept should
entail or lead to a contradiction (Widerspruch) that would drive
the investigation.54 The preliminary concept of knowledge which
Trendelenburg  uses  is  that  of  knowledge  as  representational
knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge of something (even
if one tries to gain knowledge of ‘nothing’).55 This something,
which as object of knowledge is a part of being, is posited as a
representation in thought. Knowledge (as it is taken in this pre-
liminary  concept)  is  therefore  marked  by  the  opposition  of
thought and being. This opposition is problematic, for the real-
ity of scientific knowledge implies that the gap between thought
and  being  can  be  successfully  bridged.  The  ‘fact  of  the  sci-
ences’56 demonstrates for Trendelenburg the possibility of know-
ledge of the world: 
Die Thatsache der Wissenschaften ist die Basis des logischen Problems.
Sie dringen von den verschiedensten Punkten in die Welt ein. [...] Die
Wissenschaften stellen der Skepsis ein Factum entgegen, dem bedenkli-
chen Zweifel eine wachsende, schöpferische That.57
These two initial assumptions in the concept of knowledge, i.e.
that knowledge is  marked by the opposition between thought
and being, and that knowledge of being (‘the world’) is possible,
define the basic problem of Trendelenburg’s logical investiga-
tions anew:
Es ist die Aufgabe, den Gegensatz zwischen Denken und Sein zu vermit-
teln. In jeder Erkenntnis finden wir ihn ausgeglichen vor; er soll jedoch
in diesem Akte der Ausgleichung zur Anschauung kommen.58 
54 This is an indication of the dynamic character of Trendelenburg’s theory of
knowledge. It is assumed here that, without an apparent contradiction in the
preliminary concept, a further investigation would not commence. The idea
that  knowledge  only  grows  through  the  encounter  of  contradictions,
paradoxes and riddles figures more recently in the work of Thomas Kuhn. 
55 LU 1, 132.
56 Cf. Orth, ‘Trendelenburg und die Wissenschaft als Kulturfaktum’.
57 LU 1, 130-131.
58 LU 1, 136.
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It is for the successful completion of this task that Trendelen-
burg suggests a set of criteria by which a successful mediation
can be recognized. The first observation is that that which medi-
ates between thought and being must be something that is com-
mon to both elements of this opposition.59 More specifically, this
commonality must not be understood as a property that is com-
mon to both thought and being. For such a commonality would
not mediate. As mediation it must be an activity (Thätigkeit). The
first criterion therefore is that that which mediates has to be an
activity that is common to both thought and being.60 
Secondly, the mediating activity that is sought needs to be ori-
ginal, that is, have its origin in nothing but itself. For if the medi-
ating activity originated in something else, then this latter activ-
ity would determine the former, and this activity would have to
be taken as the mediating activity instead. The second criterion
is therefore that the common mediating activity is original, such
that it can only be known from itself. As such, it is the founda-
tion (Grund) of knowledge. For the original mediating activity,
the foundation of knowledge and the origin of being are the
same.61
From this second criterion follows, thirdly, that the mediating
activity has to be simple, not composed. For something that is
composed depends on the composing elements, and is therefore
not original.62 The mediating activity is also the most general by
consequence. For if there were a more general activity, this latter
activity  would determine the less  general  activity,  and this less
general activity would not be the original mediating activity. The
third criterion is thus that the mediating activity is the most gen-
eral, simple (not composed) activity. 
In sum: the duality between thought and being that is experi-
enced in knowledge has to be mediated, and thus resolved, by
an activity that is prior to both thought and being. It forms the
foundation of knowledge of itself, and the origin of its being. A
59 LU 1, 137.
60 ‘Wir  haben  also  eine  dem  Denken  und  Sein  gemeinsame  Thätigkeit zu
suchen.’ LU 1, 138.
61 LU 1, 139.
62 LU 1, 140.
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question still open at this point is whether this original mediat-
ing activity is also the foundation of all  knowledge, and the ori-
gin of all being. To this we will return shortly. The original dual-
ism,  which  was  assumed  in  the  preliminary  concept  of
knowledge, should be overcome by a more original and funda-
mental, monistic activity. Now that the criteria for such a mediat-
ing activity are stated, Trendelenburg’s proposition for the fun-
damental mediating activity can be examined: the principle of
motion. 
4.2. Motion
Motion (Bewegung) fulfils the three criteria formulated above, ac-
cording to Trendelenburg. Since his line of reasoning provides
valuable insight into the nature of this mediating activity that is
provided by motion, it is worth examining the three arguments
in some detail.63
1. The argument for the commonality of motion to both thought and be-
ing. According to Trendelenburg, there is apparently (auf den er-
sten Blick) a distinction between the inside world of thought and
the  outside  world  of  being.64 We  must  bear  in  mind  that
Trendelenburg  here  uses  a  common sense  concept  of  know-
ledge, in which he points out a problem which makes it possible
to gain further insight into what knowledge is. By making clear
that this is Trendelenburg’s way of arguing, in line with his own
prescriptions for the analysis of the concept of knowledge,65 we
should be prevented from accusing him too quickly of naïvely as-
suming a dualism between an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ world.
The investigation into the nature of knowledge only takes this
dualistic model of knowledge, which is borrowed from common
sense,  as  a starting point to arrive at a concept of knowledge
which is scientifically more sound by addressing the problems
63 For a succinct discussion of the concept of motion in Trendelenburg, see
also: Kym, Bewegung, 1-4.
64 LU 1, 141.
65 Cf. LU 1, 131-132.
AT THE ROOTS OF THE WORLDVIEW DEBATE 33
and contradictions entailed in this common sense concept.66 It is
Trendelenburg’s intention not only to overcome the dualism en-
tailed in this common sense concept on a logical or epistemolo-
gical level, but also to secure the connection between being and
thought on a metaphysical level, as we have seen.
As far as the outside world is concerned, every activity is con-
nected to motion. Motion is the most widespread activity in be-
ing  (die  verbreiteste  Thätigkeit  im  Sein).  Everything  that  has  be-
come,  every  form  that  exists  is  produced  (erzeugt)  through
motion, ‘which controls matter’.67 Even rest can only be under-
stood through motion (rest as the counterbalance of motions)
but not the other way round. If one tries to define motion as sus-
pension (Aufhebung) of rest, motion is presupposed, since every
‘suspension’  already  presupposes  the  concept  of  motion,  says
Trendelenburg. With references to natural sciences such as bio-
logy, geology, and astronomy (the absence of a fixed point in the
universe, everything is in motion) he argues the claim that mo-
tion is everywhere in nature.68
There must be a counterpart (literally: counter-picture, Gegen-
bild)  of  external  motion  in  the  inner  world  of  thought.  For
without such a counterpart in thought, thought could not be-
come conscious of the motion of being. This is what Trendelen-
burg  calls  ‘constructive  motion’  (construktive  Bewegung,  as  op-
posed to ‘external’ motion in space) which is at work in visual
perception and imaginative representation (Anschauung and Vor-
stellung). Both in perception and in imaginative representation
motion is essential. When one perceives something (Trendelen-
burg’s example is a mountain), one has to ‘circumscribe’ (um-
schreiben) it  through one’s  view and produce (erzeugen) it  that
way. When one imagines something, it must be produced in the
66 Trendelenburg’s  use of  common sense is  therefore in line with Hegel’s,
despite his critique of Hegel’s dialectical method in the third chapter of the
LU. It will be argued further on, however, that Trendelenburg fails to address
all hidden assumptions in the common sense concept of knowledge he uses,
and  that  this  prevents  him  from  giving  a  fully  satisfactory  account  of
knowledge.
67 ‘…durch die wirkende, die Materie beherrschende Bewegung erzeugt.’ LU
1, 141. 
68 LU 1, 141-142.
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‘space of thought’, through the motion of an ‘inner view’ (die
Bewegung seines innern Blickes). The perceived inner objects are
‘drawn’ in the space of thought (although instantaneously), and
this drawing can only be achieved through motion.69
In the more abstract activities of thought too, like syllogistic
reasoning, motion plays a central role. These activities work with
an arrangement of  concepts  (such as  relations  between  unter-
geordnete,  übergeordnete,  nebengeordnete  Begriffe),  and this  arrange-
ment can only be produced through motion. Every development
of thought puts elements after one another which must be con-
nected through motion.70 Examples of this are causal and tele-
ological  reasoning.  Even in  the  activities  of  abstract  thought,
therefore, the image of spatial motion proves essential. Motion is
therefore  common  to  thought  and  being,  according  to
Trendelenburg.  The only  distinction  that  remains  is  that  one
kind of motion takes place in external space, the other in the in-
ternal  space  of  thought.  Motion  in  the  space  of  thought,
however, is always a counterpart (Gegenbild) of external motion.
Trendelenburg notes that this is not an analogy which is rooted
in language alone, but that perceptive and imaginative thought,
as  well  as  abstract  reasoning,  are  possible  only  through  con-
structive motion.71 
2.  The argument  for  the  originality  of  motion. The second cri-
terion that applied to the activity that mediates between thought
and being was that it must originate in itself,  that is,  must be
both known from itself as well as be the ground of its own being.
The mediating activity cannot be known from something else or
originate in something else. The cause (Ursache) of being and
the foundation (Grund) of knowledge are the same thing for the
mediating activity.  Trendelenburg notes that this  must not  be
taken to mean that the ground of knowledge is the source of be-
ing in general, but only that the fundamental activity in thought
69 LU 1, 143.
70 LU 1, 145.
71 LU 1, 146.
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and being has the same character (‘das Thätige im Sein soll der
Art nach zugleich das Thätige im Erkennen sein’). An idealism
of the former kind not (yet!) intended here.72
Every explanation of  an appearance in nature presupposes
motion.  Explanations  in  the  natural  sciences  explain  motion
from other motions, the more complex motions from the more
simple, comprehensive, universal (allgemeinen) motion. 
So weit also irgendwo die Untersuchung der Erscheinungen reicht, im-
mer bleibt in der Erklärung der einzelnen Bewegung die allgemeine
Vorstellung dessen, was erklärt werden soll, als ein unablösliches Ele-
ment zurück. Wenn hiernach die Bewegung in der Natur nichts Frem-
des kennt, woraus sie sich erzeugt, sondern sich allenthalben als etwas
Ursprüngliches äussert, so kann sie auch nur aus sich verstanden wer-
den; denn was wir sonst begreifen, begreifen wir aus dem, was erzeu-
gend vorangeht.73
Trendelenburg’s  argument  here  appears  to  be  more  general
than just an argument for the fact that motion is known only
from itself. He argues that to understand anything at all, at least
insofar as the world of experience is concerned, motion is in-
volved. Moreover, motion as such is the only thing that results in
the analysis of natural phenomena, it appears as an irreducible,
original element in explanations. Since we can only understand
something from that which produces it, and since motion is not
produced by anything else, it is both the source of its own being
as well as the foundation of its being known.
The  situation  is  the  same  for  representation  (Vorstellung),
where inner motion plays a central role. The whole geometry of
the external world is  re-created in the internal space through
constructive or creative motion (die schaffende Bewegung). Accord-
ing to Trendelenburg, it cannot be put against this view that the
inner objects are caused by external objects, for the answer to
the question how the external objects cause the inner ones always
involves motion: 
72 LU 1, 146.
73 LU 1, 148.
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Die letzte Antwort bleibt immer die Bewegung. Der Gegenstand könnte
die Vorstellung nicht erregen, wenn ihm die Vorstellung nicht durch
ihre verfolgende Bewegung gleichsam zu begegnen verstände.74 
Since motion is also yielded by the final analysis, the conclusion
must be the same. Motion in thought and being springs (stammt)
only from itself, and is also known only from itself.
3. The argument for the simplicity of motion. This seems to be the
most problematic criterion according to Trendelenburg. Motion
seems to be compounded of two moments: space and time. Mo-
tion is usually defined as a change in the external relation of a
thing to a given space.75 This change occurs only in time. Due to
the changing relation to the given space, motion has a certain
direction, and due to the changing relation to the space and the
relation to time, motion has a certain speed. Therefore motion
seems to be composed of both space and time. In this way of ar-
guing, space and time are taken as given (fertige Elemente). These
given  elements  together  compose  ‘factors’  of  motion.
Trendelenburg asks with what justification space and time are
taken as given elements, and whether the concept of composi-
tion (Zusammensetzung) is an original concept. It is claimed that
three ‘elements’  of  motion (space,  time,  factor) each presup-
pose (voraussetzen) motion.76 Trendelenburg argues that without
motion  the  notion  of  composition  of  factors  is  impossible.
Without motion the composing factors (space and time) cannot
be put together. Motion is presupposed in the explanation. This
is  a variation of Trendelenburg’s  more general  argument that
thought  as  such  is  impossible  without  motion;  thinking
something as being compound is a kind of thinking, and there-
fore presupposes motion. 
In the same way, Trendelenburg analyzes space and time. The
concept of time already entails motion (‘the flow of time’). But
space, too, cannot be thought or imagined without motion: our
74 Ibid.
75 Trendelenburg  refers  to  Kant’s  Metaphysische  Anfangsgründe  der  Natur-
wissenschaften (1786), cf. LU 1, 149 and 151 also 151, note 1.
76 LU 1, 149.
AT THE ROOTS OF THE WORLDVIEW DEBATE 37
common idea of space is created by motion. The third criterion
is met insofar as motion is a necessary and indivisible (unzerleg-
lich) activity, which results only in itself when it is analyzed.77 
Can the concept of motion be defined? If motion is simple, it
cannot be determined (bestimmt) or explained (erklärt). Accord-
ing to Trendelenburg, every definition orders its object under a
higher concept,  and analyzes it  into the composing elements.
Since there have been multiple attempts at defining or explain-
ing motion, a successful  definition would counter the claimed
simplicity of motion. Failure to provide a definition of motion
would yield (indirect) evidence in favour of the simplicity of mo-
tion.  Taking  activity  (Thätigkeit)  as  the  more  general  concept
from which motion would be derived is no option for Trendelen-
burg since no specific difference—by virtue of which motion can
be derived from activity—can be found which does not already
include the concept of motion.78 
When motion is defined as a change of spatial location, mo-
tion is also presupposed. The concept of change might seem to
be more abstract and general than the concept of motion, but
change (Veränderung) can only be thought as becoming different
(anderswerden), and this becoming in turn cannot be conceived
without motion.79 As Aristotle already observed, motion cannot
be  defined,  Trendelenburg  concludes.  Every  act  of  definition
already presupposes motion.
In  retrospect,  Trendelenburg  notices  that  the  three condi-
tions that the original mediating activity must fulfil can be taken
as essentially one condition:
Weil die Bewegung eine in sich einfache Thätigkeit ist, die sich nur er-
zeugen, nicht zerlegen lässt, wird sie zugleich die letzte sein, die aus
keiner andern stammt, und wird darum auch aus sich erkannt werden;
weil sie die letzte ist, wird sie allgemein sein und jeder Thätigkeit zum
Grunde liegen; und wenn sich das Denken als die höchste Blüte der
Thätigkeiten in der Welt erhebt, aber diese Blüte die übrigen gleichsam
77 LU 1, 150.
78 Ibid.
79 LU 1, 151.
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als nährenden Boden und tragenden Stamm voraussetzt:  so wird um
dieser Allgemeinheit willen die Bewegung dem Denken und Sein ge-
meinschaftlich angehören.80 
This way of formulating enables us, with the results thus far, to
answer the question left open earlier: motion is not only com-
mon, but also fundamental to thought and being as such. We
have  seen  that  motion  is  the  irreducible  element  of  both
thought and being. Here, Trendelenburg writes that motion is
the activity  which is  fundamental  to  all  activities.  Since every-
thing that is is the result of motion, and since everything which
is known is known through motion, motion is the fundamental
activity as such. Motion is the foundation of all knowledge and
the source of all being.
4.3 End (Zweck)
The mediation which is accomplished by the principle of motion
is only the first step of the theoretical foundation of the organic
worldview. The result of this mediation is that the original rela-
tion of thought and being is explained, and thereby the possibil-
ity of knowledge. Every  Weltanschauung, in Trendelenburg’s use
of the concept, gives an answer to the fundamental metaphysical
question how thought and being are related. A theoretical an-
swer to this question, such as proposed by Trendelenburg’s prin-
ciple of motion, could be part of the project of a scientifically
warranted worldview as such, not just the organic worldview. To
specifically  give  a  theoretical  foundation to  one  of  the  three
worldviews distinguished by Trendelenburg is tantamount to spe-
cifying and theoretically demonstrating the hierarchy of the rela-
tionship between thought and being. Without such a further spe-
cification, the principle of motion could just as well be part of
the project of a naturalist or Spinozist worldview. 
Providing the organic  worldview with a theoretical  founda-
tion thus includes demonstrating the priority of thought over be-
ing. This is the purpose of the second half of Trendelenburg’s
Logische Untersuchungen,  starting with the chapter on  Der Zweck
80 LU 1, 153-154.
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(chapter VIII in the first edition, chapter IX in the second edi-
tion).  Whereas  the  concept  of  motion  established  a  relation
between thought and being, by being common and original to
both spheres, the concept of end (Zweck) is used to show how
thought can control being. Or, as it was worded in the 1847 es-
say: it should explain how thought is able to ‘grasp and control’
force.81 
Just as the first stage of Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchun-
gen, this second stage combines logic and metaphysics: If we can
know with certainty that ends exist, this entails both logical and
metaphysical  knowledge.82 Trendelenburg  again  takes  the  dis-
tinction  between  thought  and  being  as  his  starting  point.
Thought  recognizes  ends  in  being  because  of  the  ends  of
thought itself. The recognition of ends in being requires a differ-
ent mode of analysis as compared to the recognition of causal
processes: the later follow motion back to its source (the ques-
tion:  woher?), whereas the former follows motion to its destina-
tion (the question:  wohin?).83 As this difference is only a differ-
ence of direction of analysis, the decisive question becomes: how
can one know that these ends which are recognized in being are
real ends, and not merely products of thinking?84
According to Trendelenburg, ends are real in both thought
and being. His argument for this is twofold: First, causal explana-
tions (die Erklärung der wirkenden Ursache) are not sufficient to ex-
plain  certain  phenomena,  such  as  those  of  organic  life.
Trendelenburg admits that this is only an indirect argument for
the reality of ends, for it leaves open the possibility that more ad-
vanced research is able provide causal explanations for phenom-
81 Unterschied,  24:  ‘Man  soll  zeigen,  wie  es  geschehen  könne,  daß  er  [der
Gedanke] die Kraft ergreife und regiere.’
82 LU 2,  68.  One could  read  this  as  a  re-introduction  of  metaphysics  as  a
separate  discipline,  but  I  would  rather  suggest  that  this  ‘metaphysical’
knowledge is  the corollary of  the mediation of thought and being through
motion,  which invalidates  the distinction between appearance and thing-in-
itself. Empirical knowledge entails ‘metaphysical’ knowledge by virtue of this
mediation. 
83 LU 2, 71.
84 LU 2, 72
40 PHILOSOPHY AS WELTANSCHAUUNG
ena for which such an explanation is currently lacking.85 A more
direct and positive argument is  supplied by Trendelenburg as
well: especially in organic life, one finds phenomena for which
their realization cannot be understood without a preceding no-
tion of the end, for instance the growth of a germ into a full or-
ganism, or the ordering of cells in a body. 
The reality  of  ends  in  the  sphere  of  being is  of  the same
nature as other scientific knowledge of being: i.e. it is hypothet-
ical.  Yet  the  hypothetical  end  is  confirmed  in  the  totality  of
knowledge of being, and therefore certain in the same sense as
empirical knowledge. Trendelenburg’s argument for the reality
of ends is a good example of his general approach: on the one
hand philosophy should construct the organic worldview in con-
junction with the sciences, while the results of the philosophical
science are of the same, hypothetical character as the results of
other sciences, on the other. 
5. The metaphysical dimensions of the question of worldview
Let us retrace our steps up to this point, and summarize the res-
ults  thus far.  We started from the observation that Trendelen-
burg defines a  ‘worldview’  as a fundamental  metaphysical  no-
tion,  as  an  answer  to  the  fundamental  metaphysical  question
how thought and being are connected. In this way, a worldview
provides both an explanation of the possibility of knowledge and
a foundation of the totality of knowledge. A worldview, taken as
the fundamental metaphysical notion which secures the connec-
tion between thought and being, can thus be taken as an explan-
ation and foundation of the possibility of a ‘view’ (knowledge) of
the ‘world’ (being). Trendelenburg’s analysis of the three differ-
ent  ways  in  which  the  fundamental,  metaphysical  ‘worldview
question’  can be answered resulted in a preliminary, practical
decision in favour of the ‘organic worldview’, which awaits a the-
oretical, scientific foundation. Once this theoretical supremacy
of the organic worldview, the worldview of a universal, founding
thought, has been secured, it would strictly speaking cease to be
85 LU 2, 73.
AT THE ROOTS OF THE WORLDVIEW DEBATE 41
a worldview—cease to be a mere ‘view of the world’, competing
with  other  views.  The  theoretical  foundation  of  the  organic
worldview  would  above  all  found  the  connection  between
thought and being in a scientific way. This theoretical founda-
tion was the task which Trendelenburg set himself in his Logische
Untersuchungen,  the task which he tried to accomplish with his
‘founding science’ of logic and metaphysics, based on the origin-
al  mediating activity  of motion.  These are the steps that have
taken us from Trendelenburg’s notion of (philosophical systems
as a) worldview to his metaphysics of motion. 
It is now time to ask two questions. First,  the question why
Trendelenburg set out to answer the worldview question the way
he  did,  i.e.  through  his  metaphysics  of  motion,  must  be  ad-
dressed. More precisely, what made Trendelenburg address the
problem of knowledge, the problem of the relation of thought
and being, in a new and different way from most of his prede-
cessors  in  German  Idealism?  Trendelenburg’s  objections  to
Hegelian metaphysics are extensively presented in the  Logische
Untersuchungen, but what made him deviate from Kantian meta-
physics, and especially from the limits imposed by Kant on meta-
physics,  despite his  affinities  with Kantian philosophy and the
role as instigator of the neo-Kantian movement which has been
ascribed to him?86 The second question that has to be addressed
is  whether Trendelenburg succeeds in redefining the limits of
metaphysics and solving the worldview question.
An answer to the first question emerges from a notorious dis-
cussion  Trendelenburg  had with Kuno  Fischer,  subsequent to
the publication of the second edition of the  Logische Untersuch-
ungen in 1862.  In this  second edition, Trendelenburg claimed
that  Kant’s  proof  in the  Tranzendentale  Ästhetik that  space and
time are only subjective forms of perception is flawed. More spe-
cifically, Trendelenburg agrees that space and time are a priori
forms of  perception,  and as such subjective,  but  contests  that
Kant has proven that space and time cannot be objectively real
86 See LU 1, chapter 3, for Trendelenburg’s critique of Hegel. See Köhnke,
Entstehung und Aufstieg, chapter 1 for a discussion of Trendelenburg’s role in
the genesis of nineteenth century neo-Kantianism. 
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as well. Trendelenburg argues that Kant has not sufficiently ex-
cluded the ‘third possibility’ that space and time are both object-
ively and subjectively real:
Wenn wir nun den Argumenten zugeben, dass sie den Raum und die
Zeit als subjective Bedingungen darthun, die in uns dem Wahrnehmen
und Erfahren vorangehen: so ist doch mit keinem Worte bewiesen, dass
sie nicht zugleich auch objektive Formen sein können.87
Fischer replied in the second edition of his  System der Logik to
Trendelenburg’s claim that there is a ‘gap’ (eine Lücke) in Kant’s
proof of the subjectivity of space and time with the counter-claim
that  there  is  no  such  a  gap,  and  subsequently  attacked
Trendelenburg’s logic and metaphysics of motion on a number
of issues.88 The discussion evolved into a bitter polemic, through
a series of further publications and letters, by both Fischer and
Trendelenburg and others.89 Prima facie, this encounter might
merely seem a scholarly dispute about the correct interpretation
of an element of Kant’s work. It can indeed be taken as such: A
recent study, for instance, argues that although Kant does not in
fact explicitly show how the possibility that space and time are
both objective  and subjective  is  excluded,  it  is  implicitly  con-
tained in his proof of the subjectivity of space and time and his
concept of the thing-in-itself.90 To restrict the historical interpret-
ation of the encounter to a mere scholarly dispute, however, is to
miss  the  importance  that  this  point  has  in  the  context  of
Trendelenburg’s logic and metaphysics.91
87 LU 1, 163.
88 Fischer,  System der Logik und Metaphysik oder  Wissenschaftslehre  (henceforth:
System), §66.
89 Cf. Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg, 257-272, Cohen, Zur Kontroverse, 230.
90 Michel, Zeitkonzeption, chapter 10.
91 Köhnke  attributes  a  decisive  influence  on  Hermann  Cohen’s  critical
idealism  to  the  Fischer-Trendelenburg  debate.  Michel  does  mention  the
importance that the subjectivity and non-objectivity of space and time has for
Kant’s idealism and his theory of the thing-in-itself (which in turn is decisive
for the possibility of freedom in Kant). But she fails to recognize that this holds
equally true for Trendelenburg, whose aim it is to replace Kant’s theory of the
thing-in-itself.
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What is at stake for Trendelenburg? To answer this question,
we have to look at the objections that Trendelenburg formulates
against Kant. With respect to the claim to exclusive subjectivity of
space and time, Trendelenburg expresses the following worry:
Wenn dies wirklich folgt, so verflüchtigt sich damit die ganze Weltan-
sicht in Erscheinung, und Erscheinung ist vom Scheine nicht weit ent-
fernt.92 
Kant’s theory of the thing-in-itself, which results from the theory
of the subjective forms of space and time as conditions of experi-
ence, pulls all knowledge into the ‘magic circle’ (Zauberkreis)93 of
subjectivity. The distinction between ‘objects of experience’ and
‘things  in  themselves’  blocks  the  possibility  of  knowledge  of
things:
Es ist der spannende Nerv in allem Erkennen, dass wir das Ding errei-
chen wollen, wie es ist; wir wollen das Ding, nicht uns. Dieser Nerv wird
durch jene Annahme [i.e. the strict subjectivity of space and time] ge-
lähmt; denn ihr gemäss jagen wir nach dem Dinge,  fangen aber uns
selbst ein.94
Separating  the  object  of  experience  from  the  thing-in-itself
would render Trendelenburg’s whole project—providing a con-
nection  between  thought  and  being,  and  thereby  a  scientific
foundation of the organic worldview—impossible. The feasibility
of the project depends on the possibility of finding a mediating
activity which is common to both thought and being. And be-
cause for Trendelenburg space and time as forms of experience
are derived from motion, rather than the other way around as in
Kant, the view of space and time as exclusively subjective would
mean that motion, too, is subjective only. For thought and being
are taken as ‘pure’ subjectivity and objectivity respectively, as be-
came clear in the analysis of Trendelenburg’s discussion of the
fundamental metaphysical question. This would mean that mo-
tion cannot be the mediating activity between thought and being
92 LU 1, 158.
93 LU 1, 160.
94 LU 1, 161-162.
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which Trendelenburg required in his programme of a founding
science of logic and metaphysics. But if motion is taken as com-
mon to thought and being, and as both subjective and objective,
the Kantian ‘gap’ is filled:
Wenn die Bewegung ebenso ursprünglich dem Denken, als dem Sein
angehört,  und wenn aus der Bewegung Raum und Zeit  zunächst  er-
zeugt werden: so liegt darin jene Harmonie des Subjektiven und Objek-
tiven, die von Kant gewaltsam zerrissen wurde.95
This  way  of  rendering  the  difference  between  Kant  and
Trendelenburg also prevents an obvious objection from being
raised (and here we move to the second question formulated
above). For one could ask how Trendelenburg can demonstrate
that motion is a common activity of both thought and being. An
examination of Trendelenburg’s arguments as carried out above
would lead to the conclusion that for thought he uses schematic
notions of abstract reasoning and of perceptive and imaginative
representation. He then shows how each of these presupposes
motion. More interesting is how he shows that motion is also the
original activity in being, for this would amount to overstepping
the Kantian limit, from the realm of experience to the realm of
being. We have seen above that Trendelenburg relies heavily on
the results of the natural sciences for his demonstration of the
originality of motion in being. This might be surprising at first.
For would such a strategy not merely prove that motion is the
original activity in our scientific image of the world? Would such
a strategy not be necessarily limited to our empirical knowledge
and therefore remain trapped in empirical  consciousness,  the
realm of thought, the ‘magic circle’? However, such an objection
is only possible by tacitly assuming a Kantian distinction between
the object of  experience and things  in themselves.  If  we pre-
clude  such  a  distinction  between  the  objects  of  (empirical)
knowledge and things as they are in themselves, this objection
can be prevented. 
95 LU 1, 168.
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But this would mean that objects (in themselves, if you like,
though the addition is redundant and meaningless on this view)
are as scientific knowledge tells  us.  And this  in turn has  con-
sequences for the ontological part of Trendelenburg’s founding
science of logic and metaphysics: the only ontological achieve-
ment of this founding science is that it secures the connection
between thought and being. It does not tell us ‘how the world is’
or ‘what the world is made of’. That is a task that is left to the sci-
ences—even if it means that we sometimes have to adjust the in-
ventory of things that make up ‘the world’. Trendelenburg’s me-
diation  between  thought  and  being  does  therefore  cross  the
limits which Kant has set to metaphysics, but it does so by a very
small margin. Ontology as a philosophical discipline, or rather:
as part  of the founding science of logic  and metaphysics  that
philosophy is, is restricted to the task of enabling the mediation
of thought and being by demonstrating the originality of motion
in both. 
6. Motion and the mirror of nature.
Did Trendelenburg indeed succeed in filling the Kantian gap
and in providing a foundation of our knowledge of the world? In
order to answer this question, several other issues have to be ad-
dressed first. Somewhat ironically perhaps, these problems are
best approached via the objections that Kuno Fischer made to
Trendelenburg’s metaphysics of motion. In the second edition
of his System der Logik und Metaphysik oder Wissenschaftslehre, which
appeared  in  1865,  Fischer  raised  a  number  of  objections  to
Trendelenburg’s  Logische Untersuchungen and the metaphysics of
motion it presents. We encountered one of the objections above,
the objection to Trendelenburg’s claim that Kant failed to prove
the strict subjectivity of space and time. Trendelenburg’s main
aim in his responding essay ‘Ueber eine Lücke in Kants Beweis
von der ausschliessenden Subjectivität des Raumes und der Zeit’
(1867) is to counter this specific objection of Fischer.  The Fi-
scher-Trendelenburg debate is often connected with just this par-
ticular question, the question whether there is indeed a ‘gap’ in
Kant’s argument for the exclusive subjectivity of space and time.
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But the objection concerning the Kantian gap is by no means
Fischer’s only or even his main objection. Inspection of the 1865
edition of Fischer’s System der Logik und Metaphysik reveals that he
considers Trendelenburg’s perception of a gap in the Kantian ar-
gument rather a symptom of more fundamental problems that
attach to the metaphysics of motion. Trendelenburg’s Kant inter-
pretation, indeed closely connected to the more general ontolo-
gical-epistemological framework developed in the Logische Unter-
suchungen,  is  only  a  problem  of  secondary  importance  in
Fischer’s  critical  discussion  of  Trendelenburg’s  position.96 Fi-
scher discusses the matter of the Kantian gap only as the penul-
timate of his objections, and even there he is more concerned
with Trendelenburg’s claim that space and time are both subject-
ive and objective than with the question whether Kant has ex-
cluded that possibility or not (although Fischer explicitly claims
that Kant has in fact done so).97 In the summary of his objections
at the end of §66 of his  System der Logik und Metaphysik, Fischer
does not even mention the issue of the ‘Kantian gap’.98
We will discuss two main points of critique that Fischer levels
against Trendelenburg’s  Logische Untersuchungen.  First,  an issue
which  amounts  to  a  meta-critique  targeting  the  enterprise  of
Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen as such. The question is
raised by Fischer thus:
Wenn die Bewegung ist, was im Grunde die logischen Untersuchungen
wollen, Bedingung und Princip alles Erkennens: wo bleibt unter diesem
Gesichtspunkt die Möglichkeit der logischen Untersuchungen selbst?99
This  is  the  question  of  reflexivity:  the  question  whether
Trendelenburg’s  epistemological  claims,  as  knowledge  claims,
can explain the possibility  of knowledge,  including these  claims
themselves.  According  to  Fischer,  especially  the  ‘principle  of
knowledge’  (Erkenntnisprincip)  that  is  posited  by  a  theory  of
knowledge should be such that it is not only able to explain and
96 Fischer, System, 165-182. 
97 Fischer, System, 174f.
98 Fischer, System, 181-182.
99 Fischer, System, 180.
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justify knowledge as such, but also explain and justify the insight
into knowledge given by the theory of knowledge itself. This task
cannot be fulfilled by the principle of motion, and therefore he
considers the principle of motion to be ‘dogmatic’ with respect
to the possibility of a theory of knowledge.100 
A second main point of critique is that the concept of ‘mo-
tion’ as used by Trendelenburg is not one concept, but rather a
set of homonyms:
Das Bewegungsprincip ist nicht einmüthig, denn es zerfällt in so viele
Arten,  die nur in dem Worte Bewegung übereinstimmen, aber nicht
aus einer Quelle entspringen, auch nicht entspringen können.101
Fischer discerns, rightly, a double task that motion must fulfil,
for  it  to  be  the  fundamental  mediating  activity.  On  the  one
hand, motion is the source of correspondence between thought
and being.  On the other  hand, motion is  also what  mediates
between thought and being. Following on from the distinction
of this double task, Fischer discerns four ‘kinds’ (Arten) of mo-
tion: 1. constructive motion in thought, 2. constructive motion
in being, 3.  nachbildende Bewegung, which brings being into the
sphere of thought, 4. vorbildende Bewegung, which brings thought
into the sphere of being. According to Fischer, motion as a prin-
ciple is doubtful as long as its unity has not been proven suffi-
ciently.102 Indeed, if it could be shown that Trendelenburg’s prin-
ciple of motion is a compound of different principles, one of
Trendelenburg’s  conditions discussed above—that the original
mediating activity cannot be compound—would not be satisfied.
In addition, if motion in being is of a different kind than motion
in  thought,  the  correspondence  between  thought  and  being
would need more argumentation than Trendelenburg provides.
This second central point of Fischer’s critique can also be ex-
pressed as the claim that motion cannot be original.103 It is in the
context of this point of critique that Fischer makes an important
100 Fischer, System, 181.
101 Fischer, System, 181 (emphasis in original).
102 Fischer, System, 166-167.
103 Fischer discusses this as a separate objection, but I argue here that it is in
fact another rendering of the same objection. 
48 PHILOSOPHY AS WELTANSCHAUUNG
observation, namely that Trendelenburg employs a picture-the-
ory of the (formation of) knowledge. To Fischer the problem is
not that Trendelenburg employs a picture-theory of knowledge.
His point is rather that this means that motion cannot possibly
be original in all of its functions. When the ‘external’ motion,
the motion in being, is pictured by an ‘internal’ motion, the mo-
tion of thought, both ‘kinds’ of motion cannot be original at the
same time. As a picture, the motion of thought depends on the
motion in being, which it represents. If the picture in thought is
an independent ‘sketch’ (Entwurf) which does not depend on
the motion in being, it is not clear how these two kinds of mo-
tion can correspond. For, according to Fischer, motion as repres-
entation and as ‘material process’ are not one and the same.104 
The objection that motion is a complex principle and the ob-
jection that motion cannot be original are two sides of the same
coin.  Fischer’s  objection that  Trendelenburg’s  concept of mo-
tion is equivocal implies that motion in thought and motion in
being are different. Something that is compounded of different
elements, such as the principle of motion, cannot be original ac-
cording to Fischer, for the elements are more original than the
compound. The equivocality of the concept of motion, the com-
plexity of this concept, thus implies that it cannot be original.
Conversely, when one of two different things is an image of the
other, the image depends on the original. In that case, Fischer
claims, both cannot be original. Hence, since image and original
are different, motion in being (original) and in thought (image)
are different. The concept of motion, which covers both motion
in thought and motion in being, is therefore a complex concept.
The objections of Fischer discussed here can thus be summar-
ised by the claim that Trendelenburg has not sufficiently proven
the unity, originality and simplicity of the principle of motion,
and that this principle fails to mediate between thought and be-
ing, for motion in thought and in being remain different. 
Trendelenburg  addressed  Fischer’s  objections  in  his  essay
‘Ueber  eine Lücke  in  Kants  Beweis  von der  ausschliessenden
Subjectivität des Raumes und der Zeit’. The bulk of this essay is
dedicated to a discussion and refutation of Fischer’s claim that
104 Fischer, System, 167.
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Trendelenburg has not revealed a gap in the Kantian argument
on the exclusive subjectivity of space and time. In the last part of
the  essay  Trendelenburg  also  discusses  the  specific  objections
that Fischer raised in his System der Logik und Metaphysik. 
By way of  introduction to his  discussion of Fischer’s  objec-
tions,  he  also  makes  some more  general  observations  on the
method that he employs in the Logische Untersuchungen. These re-
marks about the method employed are intended as a clarifica-
tion,  and  as  an  indication  of  the  way  in  which  it  should  be
judged. According to Trendelenburg, the method of the Logische
Untersuchungen is on a par with the method of other sciences, in
that the Logische Untersuchungen first postulate their principle hy-
pothetically,  and subsequently  investigate the consequences of
this principle (i.e. motion) for the ‘facts of the sciences’ (That-
sachen der Wissenschaften).105 In this way, Trendelenburg’s investig-
ation increasingly secures this principle as a foundation of the
whole  of  knowledge,  by  relating  it  to  all  branches  of  science
(and  therefore  by  making  it  a  worldview).  A  critique  of  this
method would have to travel the opposite road to establish the
invalidity of the principle. Trendelenburg accuses Fischer of giv-
ing only ‘external’ objections, and not engaging with the ‘inner’
structure of the Logische Untersuchungen. Although these remarks
are  intended  as  a  rejection  of  Fischer’s  critique  as  such,
Trendelenburg also replies to Fischer’s objections in more de-
tail.  The  replies  to  the  most  important  objections,  discussed
above, will be analyzed here.
One of the two main objections discussed above is the prob-
lem of ‘reflexivity’ that Fischer raised. Or, as he argued: if the Lo-
gische Untersuchungen try to establish motion as the foundation of
thought and being, what motion enables this enterprise itself?
The answer to this objection already lies in the methodological
105 Trendelenburg, ‘Ueber eine Lücke in Kants Beweis von der ausschliessen-
den Subjectivität des Raumes und der Zeit’ (henceforth: Lücke), 260. The ‘facts
of  the  sciences’  are  not  only  the  results  of the sciences—though these  are
taken into account in Trendelenburg’s argument as well, as we have seen—but
first and foremost these facts are the sciences themselves (cf.  das Faktum der
Wissenschaft as  discussed  above).  Trendelenburg’s  logic  is  a  ‘theory  of  the
sciences’ (Wissenschaftslehre), that is, a theory which founds the possibility of the
sciences as a method of producing valid knowledge.
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clarification discussed above: the Logische Untersuchungen operate
methodologically by analogy with the sciences, that is, hypothet-
ically and empirically. That the theory of science has the whole
of knowledge as its object does not constitute a fundamental dif-
ference  to  Trendelenburg.  The  principle  of  knowledge  that
founds and structures the whole body of scientific knowledge is
itself a part of this body of knowledge. To Trendelenburg, the
fact that the  Logische Untersuchungen, as the results of a science
(logic in Trendelenburg’s broad sense of the term), are subject
to the same motion that they postulate as the founding principle
of the whole of knowledge, does not lead to special difficulties.106
Behind this difference of opinion on the issue whether reflex-
ivity poses a problem lies a different concept of the function of a
theory of knowledge. This different concept of (the task of) a
principle of knowledge provides a possible explanation for the
difficulties  that  Fischer  has  in  understanding  Trendelenburg’s
approach in the Logische Untersuchungen on this point. It is a con-
sequence of this element of Fischer’s critique that the principle
of knowledge posited by a theory of knowledge is not itself a part
of the body of scientific knowledge. For if this were the case any
principle of knowledge would constitute instances of (scientific)
knowledge itself. Any principle of knowledge would then be sub-
ject to the same objection that Fischer raised against Trendelen-
burg. According to Fischer, the principle of knowledge that ex-
plains and founds the possibility of knowledge is not itself part of
the knowledge that  it  explains.  Furthermore,  the principle  of
knowledge should explain the possibility of a theory of know-
ledge itself. This ‘foundationalist’ approach to the principle of
knowledge means that the founding principle is of a different or-
der from the knowledge that it founds, and even different from
the theory of knowledge itself.  If it is knowledge at all,  it can
only be knowledge of another kind than the knowledge that is
explained and founded by the principle of knowledge. 
In Trendelenburg’s approach, the knowledge of the principle
of  knowledge,  which  is  yielded  by  a  philosophical  theory  of
knowledge, is of the same nature as the knowledge of the sci-
ences: it is  hypothetical and empirical.  It is hypothetical since
106 Lücke, 262.
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the principle of motion is proposed as the solution to the prob-
lem how thought and being can be mediated.  It  is  empirical
since the proposed principle is tested against the facts of the sci-
ences; the principle of knowledge must be able to structure the
body of scientific knowledge into an organised whole. But the
project of a philosophical foundation of the organic worldview,
of which the Logische Untersuchungen must be considered an im-
portant part, also indicates as much. The successful completion
of this project depends on the input of the sciences as well, as we
have  seen  when  discussing  Trendelenburg’s  typological  ap-
proach to worldviews above. It is not philosophy which provides
a foundation for the sciences, as if it were laying the groundwork
for them, but both philosophy and the sciences reciprocally en-
able each other to carry out their respective tasks. In the vocabu-
lary  just  applied  to  Fischer,  Trendelenburg’s  approach to  the
principle of knowledge is therefore essentially  non-foundational:
there is nothing external to the whole of knowledge that is its
foundation, but the ‘founding’, ordering principle is part of the
whole of scientific knowledge itself, and can only be established
in an ongoing investigation, both by philosophy and by the sci-
ences.
Now let us turn to the second objection discussed above: that
Trendelenburg has not proven the unity and originality of mo-
tion as the principle of knowledge. This objection is at the root
of two specific objections by Fischer, as we have seen. First, he
raises the issue that the principle of motion is a complex concept
—compounded of different concepts that were gathered under
the name of ‘motion’—and therefore cannot be original (which
is demanded by Trendelenburg of the original, mediating activ-
ity).  Secondly,  Fischer claimed that Trendelenburg’s theory of
knowledge employs a picture theory of knowledge, and that the
original and the corresponding image cannot both be original,
for the image depends on the original.
In his reply, Trendelenburg does not deny that the principle
of motion fulfils  different tasks in the  Logische Untersuchungen.
The question to be asked, then, is whether these different tasks
correspond  with  different  principles  or  not.  According  to
Trendelenburg, this is not the case. Both the  nachbildende and
the vorbildende Bewegung are branches of the constructive motion
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in thought.107 In that case the question is reduced to the ques-
tion whether the constructive motion in thought and the con-
structive motion in being are the same: 
Aber es ist ein alter Einwand, den sich auch die logischen Untersuchun-
gen selbst machten, dass die Bewegung in der Vorstellung, die nur Vor-
stellung der Bewegung sei, nicht dieselbe sein könne, als die Bewegung
im Sein, die Bewegung ausser unserer Vorstellung, die an die Materie
gebunden ist.108
Trendelenburg’s reply to this objection is that the mental image
of  (external)  motion is  something  different  from the motion
that constructs the mental image (‘Die constructive Bewegung in
der Vorstellung ist, wie wir glauben, etwas Anderes als die Vor-
stellung der Bewegung.’)109 The point, according to Trendelen-
burg, is not if and how one motion (internal) depicts another
one (external), but whether motion is the founding principle in
both thought and being. Trendelenburg’s claim is that motion is
as constitutive for thought as it is for the realm of being. And a
scientific refutation of this claim would have to take the form of
a  further  specification of  the concept  of  constructive  motion,
and would have to show how the different concepts that share
the name of ‘motion’ can be disentangled.110 
This brings us to the more specific point whether Trendelen-
burg actually employs a picture theory of knowledge in the Logis-
che Untersuchungen, and if he does, whether this is as problematic
as Fischer asserts. Fischer asserted that in making a representa-
tion (Anschauung) of an object, the constructive motion makes a
copy  of  the external,  original  motion.  Therefore the internal
motion cannot be original, for it is derivative with respect to the
original,  external  motion.  Trendelenburg  reacts  quite  vehe-
mently to this element of Fischer’s critique: he accuses Fischer of
107 Lücke, 270: ‘Denn die den Dingen nachbildende und die den Dingen im
Zweckbegriff vorbildende Bewegung sind im Geiste betrachtet nichts anders
als die sich verzweigende constructive Bewegung, die bildende im Denken, die
sich in jener auf das Gegebene, in dieser auf ein Problem anwendet.’
108 Lücke, 270.
109 Lücke, 271.
110 Lücke, 271.
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employing  a  ‘dubious  metaphor’  of  copy  and original,  and a
‘dialectic  of  the painter’.111 On closer  inspection,  it  turns  out
that Trendelenburg gives several arguments in his response to
this element of Fischer’s critique. 
In reply  to  Fischer’s  question how the internal  space,  con-
structed by motion, can be original if it is an image (Abbild) or
copy of the external one, Trendelenburg states: 
…dass im Geiste kein Abbild, also auch nicht das Abbild des sogenann-
ten Originalraums, zu Stande kommen kann, es sei denn durch Hülfe
derselben entwerfenden Bewegung, welche schon für sich der Vorstel-
lung des Räumlichen erzeugt.112 
Trendelenburg in fact denies that there exists something like an
‘original’  space,  before and independent  of  motion,  which is
subsequently  represented in thought through motion.  Only  if
our representations were to have access to the original  space,
without motion, it would make sense to speak of copy and origi-
nal: 
…nur wenn es ein Abbild gäbe ohne ein Bilden, d.h. ohne die Thätig-
keit, welche gerade die Vorstellung des Raumes in uns erzeugt, liesse
sich vielleicht durch die zweifelhafte Metapher von Original und Copie
etwas ausrichten.113 
Reality, both as it is given to us in appearance and as it is repre-
sented in thought, always depends on motion. That is the argu-
ment  that  Trendelenburg  gives  for  the  originality  of  motion.
This claim is not affected by the counter-claim that the ‘copy’ de-
pends on the ‘original’, for both are constructed by motion and
consequently both depend on motion.
This brings us to the more general question how thought and
being are related, or more specifically: how motion in thought
and motion in being are related—for it is motion which is the
mediating  activity.  Fischer  claims  that  the  ‘internal’  image
(Nachbild) of the ‘external’ motion in being is dependent on its
111 Lücke,  263:  ‘…zweifelhafte  Metapher  von  Original  und  Copie…’,  Lücke,
268: ‘…Dialektik des Portraitmalers…’.
112 Lücke, 263.
113 Lücke, 263.
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external  original  (and therefore,  again,  is  not itself  original).
Otherwise, if the image in thought is independent of being, the
correspondence (Uebereinstimmung) between the two would be
doubtful.114 Trendelenburg’s reply to this dilemma is two-staged.
First,  he  dismisses  Fischer’s  doubt  about  the  correspondence
between thought and being, on the grounds that the success of
the sciences gives no support to such a ‘vague doubt’ about the
correspondence between thought and being, for the sciences are
based  on  the  assumption  of  correspondence.115 Secondly,
Trendelenburg denies that the constructive motion in thought
produces a copy (Nachbild) of the material motion. Instead he
speaks of a ‘contrasting image’ or counterpart (Gegenbild). 
It can be doubted whether this reply is entirely adequate. We
can ask for instance whether the success of the sciences in ac-
complishing their tasks really proves the assumption of corres-
pondence, and whether this is indeed a necessary assumption in
scientific practice. But a more fundamental question, it seems, is
whether Trendelenburg’s successfully defends his theory against
Fischer’s claim that his ‘picture theory’ of the relation between
thought and being is problematic. The essence of this defence
lies in the fact that Trendelenburg speaks of ‘correspondence’
(Uebereinstimmung)  and  ‘counterpart’  (Gegenbild)  instead  of
‘copy’ (Nachbild) as such. But even a correspondence theory of
knowledge, which does not assume a visual or other copy, must
be able to explain how knowledge can correspond to its object.
And it cannot be denied that Trendelenburg does in fact use a
notion of correspondence in his analysis of knowledge, despite
his explicit denial of the accusation of employing a picture the-
ory (the German verb entsprechen can be translated as ‘to corres-
pond’):
Die apriorische Thätigkeit des Geistes, als solche nimmer ein Abbild,
entspricht der Bewegung im Raume.116
114 Fischer, System, 167.
115 ‘...so  fragt  sich,  wie  diesen  weithin  sich  erstreckenden  siegenden
Thatsachen der  Wissenschaft  gegenüber,  welche auf  die  Voraussetzung der
Uebereinstimmung gegründet sind, sich die Fraglichkeit, die nur einen vagen
Zweifel ausdrückt, noch aufrecht halten lasse’, Lücke, 268.
116 Lücke, 268. 
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The problems of a correspondence theory of knowledge in gen-
eral, however, arise only when such a theory is accompanied by
an ontological dualism. Knowledge is conceived as being inside,
in the subject, in consciousness, the res cogitans, whereas the ob-
ject to which knowledge corresponds is consequently on the out-
side, external, in being, the res extensa. The problem with such a
metaphysical dualism is that the connection between inside and
outside usually remains obscure. How can one know that know-
ledge indeed corresponds to an object outside of consciousness?
An answer to this question would seem to involve the possibility
of a point of view not limited to consciousness (or being), but
one that encompasses both. For if the only access to the realm of
being is through our knowledge of it, there are no means to se-
cure  the  objectivity  of  our  knowledge—i.e.  secure that  know-
ledge is indeed knowledge of objects ‘outside’ of consciousness.
But a characteristic of modern philosophy since Kant is that the
only  recognized access  to things is  through their  appearance,
and this excludes such an encompassing point of view. The ques-
tion how knowledge can be knowledge of things outside con-
sciousness must be left unanswered if an ontological gap is as-
sumed between consciousness and the world. 
At first sight, Trendelenburg seems to assume an ontological
dualism as well. He admits that dualism is a fundamental experi-
ence in human thought.117 And he routinely speaks of thought
versus being, inside motion versus outside motion, and so on.
But  again,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  dualism  that
Trendelenburg  admits  as  a  common  experience  in  human
thought is but a starting point in his analysis. He actually sets out
to overcome the dualism that appears to exist between thought
and being, or more precisely: he aims to show how thought and
being are both derivative with respect to motion, which is origin-
al and the root of both. 
Any dualism that might occur between subject and object of
knowledge is not of an ontological kind, for both are rooted in
motion, but is epistemological in character. The duality between
subject and object of knowledge is the duality of two regions of
117 LU 1, 135 
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motion, and therefore of a local character. The finitude of hu-
man thought which experiences something other than itself, be-
yond its boundaries, might deceive us into thinking that there is
a  fundamental,  ontological  gap  between  thought  and  being.
Trendelenburg  denies  such a  fundamental  metaphysical  dual-
ism. Philosophy as theory of science unifies ontology and episte-
mology through the one principle of motion. Once one accepts
that motion mediates between thought and being, these at first
sight opposing concepts are retrospectively nothing but modali-
ties of one principle: motion. To read Trendelenburg in such a
way that his ‘correspondence’ theory is not problematic, despite
his  sometimes  misleading  terminology—even  his  project  of  a
‘mediation’ of thought and being suggests a given, ontological
dualism instead of a mere apparent, local, epistemological dual-
ism as a point of departure—we must read him as an idealist
from the outset of his endeavour. 
7. Trendelenburg’s idealism and the limits of philosophical language
The previous section concluded that we must read Trendelen-
burg as an idealist in order to avoid a problematic interpreta-
tion. This might seem a remarkable conclusion if one takes into
account that Trendelenburg conceives his work as in many re-
spects critical of German Idealism, especially Hegel’s idealism.
Yet, despite the differences and criticism, some important paral-
lels can be observed between Trendelenburg’s project and the
central  issues  of  German  Idealism.  Highlighting  the  parallels
and  the  differences  can  help  us  to  elucidate  the  nature  of
Trendelenburg’s idealism.
In a recent study, Frederick Beiser has suggested a common
core among the many forms of idealism in the German philo-
sophical  tradition from Kant to  Hegel.118 Although the  philo-
sophical  positions  discussed  by  Beiser  differ  considerably  in
many respects,  he argues  that a common set of philosophical
problems can be discerned at the root of each of these positions.
The two issues that preoccupied Kant and the philosophers fol-
118 Beiser, German Idealism, 1-14.
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lowing him were ‘how to explain the possibility of knowledge,
and how to account for the reality of the external world.’119 Ac-
cording to Beiser, the paradoxical situation arises that the solu-
tion of either of these issues undermines the solution to the oth-
er. For to show the possibility that the subject has knowledge of
the object is to imply that some kind of identity between subject
and object of  knowledge must  be established.  To explain the
reality of the external world, however, ‘it is necessary to establish
some kind of dualism between the subject and object, given that
it is just a fact of our experience that the object appears given to
us and independent of our conscious control.’120 The principle
of ‘subject-object identity’ sought by German idealism therefore
stood for the paradoxical task of both overcoming the dualism
between the subject and object of knowledge as well as showing
its necessity.
Besides this core programme of German idealism, Beiser ar-
gues that there are two general tendencies that play an increas-
ingly important role in this period. Against common interpreta-
tions of German idealism, Beiser maintains that two of its central
tendencies are a critique of subjectivism, and anti-foundational-
ism. The ‘struggle against subjectivism’ is revealed in the central
place occupied by the problem of demonstrating the reality of
the external world: ‘The refutation of idealism, the proof of the
reality of the external world, became a fundamental desideratum
and preoccupation of post-Kantian idealism.’121 The anti-founda-
tionalist  tendency  that  Beiser  discerns  is  directed  against
‘Cartesian  foundationalism’,  which  he  describes  as  seeking  to
base our knowledge of the world in a self-evident first principle.
Except for Rheinhold, most of post-Kantian idealism up to and
including Hegel is marked by scepticism about first principles
and foundationalist systems.122 
119 Beiser, German Idealism, 13.
120 Ibid.
121 Beiser, German Idealism, 3.
122 Beiser, German Idealism, 6-9. Although Beiser acknowledges that ‘Hegel en-
dorsed the systematic ideal’, he maintains that this was not a system based on
self-evident first principles and constructed by a geometrical method. Hence
his conclusion with respect to Hegel: ‘If Hegel was a foundationalist at all, it
was only by subverting the foundationalism of the Cartesian tradition.’ (8).
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Trendelenburg’s  idealism shares these two tendencies,  anti-
foundationalism  and  a  critique  of  subjectivism,  with  German
idealism. His method, taking the sciences as a ‘fact’ and putting
his philosophical theories forward in the same ‘hypothetic-em-
pirical’ fashion as the sciences, is anti-foundational. Trendelen-
burg does not seek an external, indubitable foundation for sci-
entific knowledge, but the principle of knowledge is posited as a
metaphysical-logical hypothesis and is thus part of and on a par
with the scientific knowledge that it founds. His critique of the
Kantian distinction between the appearing object and the thing-
in-itself brings out Trendelenburg’s fear that philosophy might
fall prey to subjectivism. He expresses the fear that the exclusive
subjectivity of space and time as forms of experience would con-
fine us to the ‘enchanted circle’ of subjectivism.123 Reality, the
world would be forever out of reach. 
With respect to the first of the two central issues of German
idealism—how the possibility of knowledge can be explained—
Trendelenburg’s  approach shows a similar strategy.  The whole
point of the  Logische Untersuchungen,  especially as explained in
the added first chapter of the second edition, is to provide a the-
ory of (scientific) knowledge. The central contribution of this
theory  of  knowledge  is  to  show  how  a  mediation  between
thought and being can be brought about. It turns out that both
thought and being originate in motion, which provides the prin-
ciple of subject-object identity that enables an answer to the first
question of idealism. 
The principle of motion can be taken as Trendelenburg’s re-
sponse to the second central issue of German idealism—the real-
ity of the external world—and this response is more complex,
for it redefines this very question as well. Although Trendelen-
burg admits a common sense experience of dualism between the
subject and object (‘external’ reality) of knowledge, a metaphys-
ical dualism is denied. The principle of motion also serves to as-
sure that there is no fundamental dualism between thought and
being. The epistemological dualism between subject and object
of knowledge is produced by motion, and so was interpreted as a
‘local’ dualism above. The dualism that is experienced in ‘com-
123 LU 1, 160.
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mon sense’ is therefore produced and can be explained by the
principle of motion. In retrospect, the question about the reality
of the external world is not the most fundamental question, for
this question is a product of epistemological relations. It is not
an ontological given. A philosophical explanation of the possibil-
ity means that the principle of motion is acknowledged as the
mediating principle between thought and being. This explana-
tion can also serve to explain the experience of dualism, as this ex-
perience is due to the finitude of human thought. It is by no
means a universal, ontological condition.
At the same time, it is only in retrospect, and even then with
some  difficulty,  that  this  interpretation  can  be  given  to
Trendelenburg’s  metaphysics  of  motion.  What  shines  through
here is the paradoxical relation of the two core issues of ideal-
ism, as indicated by Beiser, as well as the reversal of common ex-
perience  that  takes  place.  But  the  problem  is  also  due  to
Trendelenburg’s  terminology,  which can be misleading at first
sight. Much of the epistemological language contains dualistic
metaphors. Trendelenburg also uses the terminology of a corres-
pondence theory of knowledge, as we have seen. But if one per-
sists in the idealist reading of Trendelenburg and, encountering
dualistic terminology in his work, asks whether it is an epistemo-
logical dualism, or an ontological one, a consistent interpreta-
tion  is  possible.  An  epistemological  ‘dualism’,  the  distinction
between subject and object of knowledge, occurs in Trendelen-
burg’s  analysis  as  well.  But  this  epistemological  distinction
between subject and object cannot be taken as reflecting an on-
tological dualism, e.g. between thought and being.
Meanwhile, due to its ‘dualism ladenness’, ordinary language
and even philosophical language reveal their limits here. This
can be observed for instance in the grammatically suspicious title
of the new first chapter of the second edition of the Logische Un-
tersuchungen:  ‘logic and metaphysics  as founding science’. This
title takes two disciplines, which are separated in common philo-
sophical language, and conjoins them as the fundamental discip-
line. This prefigures the role that Trendelenburg will give to mo-
tion,  which mediates between different philosophical domains
and  apparently  distinct  ontological  spheres,  between  thought
and being,  between logic and metaphysics.  This dualistic con-
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tamination  of  language  might  also  explain  the  confusion  of
tongues in the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate. Fischer’s critique
shows an obsession with dualism: he cannot but interpret the
principle  of  motion as  divided.  If  the principle  is  original  in
thought and original in being, it must be a compound of differ-
ent things, for thought and being are metaphysically disconnec-
ted spheres. Trendelenburg, however, tries to find a philosophic-
al  language  that  belongs  to  a  discipline  in  which  logic  and
metaphysics originate, a discipline that is prior to both. It is to
such an original, non-dualistic philosophical discipline that the
principle of motion belongs.
8. Conclusion
This  chapter  started  investigating  the  notion of  worldview  in
Trendelenburg’s work by observing that he employs a quite spe-
cific concept of Weltanschauung, especially in his 1847 essay Ueber
den  letzten  Unterschied  der  philosophischen  Systeme.  Trendelenburg
not only conceives a worldview as the fundamental metaphysical
notion that underlies a philosophical system, but also as an an-
swer to a fundamental metaphysical question: the question how
thought and being are related. According to Trendelenburg, the
possible answers to this question, which can be specified as the
question how thought (Gedanke) and force (Kraft) are related,
can be classified into three categories. An analysis of the ques-
tion leads to a distinction of three possible answers, and three
corresponding general types of worldviews: naturalism, idealism
(also  called  Platonism,  or  the  organic  worldview),  and
Spinozism. 
This apparently limited tool for classification of philosophical
systems as types of worldviews turned out to have far-reaching
implications against the background of Trendelenburg’s logical-
metaphysical project as laid out in his Logische Untersuchungen. It
is used by Trendelenburg to make way for the so called ‘organic
worldview’, which awaits a theoretical, scientific foundation. Fur-
thermore, it is exactly the question that lies at the foundation of
a worldview (the relation between thought and being) that is the
main theme of his philosophical theory of the sciences, which
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encompasses logic (thought) and metaphysics (being). The  Lo-
gische Untersuchungen aim to mediate between thought and be-
ing, and thereby answer the fundamental metaphysical question.
This mediation, it turned out, is sought by Trendelenburg in
the principle of motion. As a principle which cannot itself be
defined  in  terms  of  other  principles,  it  is  original  to  both
thought and being. Can it also mediate between thought and be-
ing? The objections by Kuno Fischer deny this. An analysis of the
discussion between Fischer and Trendelenburg yielded two im-
portant results. To read Trendelenburg in such a way that he is
immune to a criticism of Fischer’s kind is to read him, first, as an
idealist who denies an original ontological dualism and, second,
as offering a non-foundational philosophical theory of scientific
knowledge. 
In conclusion, then, Trendelenburg’s discussion of the notion
of worldview, and the roots of this discussion in the Logische Un-
tersuchungen,  showed that he rearticulates the relation of logic
and metaphysics (or: epistemology and ontology). The ‘organic
worldview’ pursued by Trendelenburg embodies a non-founda-
tional metaphysics—a metaphysics which encompasses logic (the
philosophical theory of thought) and metaphysics (as ontology:
the philosophical theory of being). The task of this ‘theory of
science’ is to show the possibility of scientific knowledge of the
world. But since this theory of science and the principle of know-
ledge (motion) it proposes are part of science themselves, this
theory  is  essentially  non-foundational:  there  is  no  external
foundation of the whole of scientific knowledge, contrary to Fi-
scher’s requirement for a theory of knowledge. The sciences and
the philosophical theory of science depend on each other. Philo-
sophy as a theory of science shows the possibility of scientific
knowledge, but is as such ‘formal’: it provides only the ontologic-
al connection between thought and being, which enables know-
ledge of the world. How the world is is a question answered by
the sciences themselves. 
Because of this dependence, a worldview, which strictly speak-
ing is the principle of knowledge as such, the answer to the fun-
damental  metaphysical  question,  can also  be taken in a more
general sense to include the totality of knowledge, consisting of
philosophy and the sciences.  The discussion of  the notion of
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worldview in Trendelenburg therefore gives rise to a discussion
of the limits of philosophy. These limits are first the limits of the
task of philosophy, especially as ontology. Because of the content
of this task of philosophy, these limits are also its limits vis-à-vis
the sciences. As a worldview, philosophy is theory of science. In
the  following  chapters  we  will  see  to  what  extent  Trendelen-
burg’s philosophical approach to worldview has been directional
for the subsequent debate on this issue.
CHAPTER 3
DILTHEY’S WELTANSCHAUUNGSTYPOLOGIE AS
POST-METAPHYSICAL METAPHYSICS
1. Introduction
The theme of classification—classification of types of thought, of
religious  and  philosophical  systems,  and  of  worldviews—is
present in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) from early
on. Sketches, ideas and suggestions of typological classifications
can already be found in his diary entries from the 1860s.1 Yet
Dilthey only started to publish elements of a mature typological
theory  of  worldviews  in  his  later  work,  from  1898  onwards.2
Dilthey developed what would become known as his ‘typology of
worldviews’  (Weltanschauungstypologie)  in  two  key  publications,
Das Wesen der Philosophie (1907) and Die Typen der Weltanschauung
und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen (1911). This ty-
pology  of  worldviews  has  set  the tone for  a  large part  of  the
worldview debate in the first decades of the twentieth century,
and some consider it even,  pars pro toto, as  the philosophical ap-
proach to the question of worldviews.3
In this chapter I will examine Dilthey’s theory of worldviews
in the context of his central philosophical concerns and in the
light of the discussion of Trendelenburg’s conception of world-
view and philosophy in the previous chapter. Fundamental to an
understanding of Dilthey’s theory of worldviews is the concept of
life. This concept is the topic of section 2. Since Dilthey, espe-
cially in his 1907 essay, develops his theory in close connection
1 E.g. Der junge Dilthey, 80, 84, and 89. See also below. 
2 Starting with ‘Die drei Grundformen der Systeme in der ersten Hälfte des 19.
Jahrhunderts’ (1898), and ‘Der entwicklungsgeschichtliche Pantheismus nach
seinem  geschichtlichen  Zusammenhang  mit  den  älteren  pantheistischen
Systemen’ (1900).
3 Odo Marquard’s  position is  exemplary  in  this  respect,  Marquard,  Weltan-
schauungstypologie, 107.
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with his programmatic concept of philosophy, the latter will also
be discussed in some detail, in section 3. The concept of world-
view—actually different interrelated worldview concepts—is then
analyzed in relation to Dilthey’s conception of philosophy in sec-
tion 4. Section 5 will study Dilthey’s classification of worldviews,
his Weltanschauungstypologie. 
The previous chapter already mentioned Wilhelm Dilthey as
one  of  Trendelenburg’s  students.  It  has  been  claimed  that
Trendelenburg’s classification of worldviews strongly influenced
Dilthey’s typology, to such an extent that Trendelenburg can be
considered a precursor to the Weltanschauungstypologie. The valid-
ity of this claim will be examined in section 6. The next section,
section 7, addresses the notion of philosophy as a founding sci-
ence, which can be found in both Dilthey and Trendelenburg.
In the final  section  a  number  of  preliminary  conclusions  are
drawn.
2. Worldview and life
The concept of worldview as used by Dilthey in his later publica-
tions  is  much more  complex  than the concept  in Trendelen-
burg’s work. For Trendelenburg, the concept of worldview was
introduced as shorthand for the fundamental metaphysical no-
tion at the root of philosophical systems. Philosophical systems,
determined by their fundamental metaphysical notion, were ac-
cordingly  construed as worldviews by Trendelenburg. This en-
abled  him to  formulate  the  ‘final  distinction’  between  philo-
sophical systems as the distinction between these fundamental
notions. This in turn allowed him to give a critical analysis of the
possible  fundamental  metaphysical  notions,  an  analysis  which
provided support for one of these notions: idealism, or the or-
ganic worldview. 
For Dilthey, the philosophical worldviews are only the top of a
pyramid  of  interrelated  worldview  concepts.  He  distinguishes
between different kinds of worldviews,  especially  between reli-
gious, artistic, and metaphysical worldviews, which stand in dif-
ferent  kinds  of  relations  to  each other.  Furthermore,  Dilthey
proposes a classificatory or  typological  account for each kind of
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worldview.4 Although  his  typological  account  of  philosophical
worldviews is the most elaborated one, we should bear in mind
that it is only the zenith of this pyramid of interrelated worldview
concepts.  To  understand  the  meaning  and  function  of  the
concept of worldview in a philosophical sense in Dilthey, and the
typological theory of worldviews he presents, we will start with an
analysis of this pyramid, from the bottom upwards. 
The  ground  on  which  this  pyramid  of  concepts  rests  in
Dilthey is the concept of life (Leben). ‘Life is the final root of the
worldviews,’ says Dilthey in his 1911 essay on the types of world-
views.5 What does this statement mean? The concept of life—as
is  evident  from  Dilthey’s  philosophical  self-understanding  as
Philosophie des Lebens—lies at the heart of Dilthey’s philosophy as
such and not only of his worldview theory. Yet it is a somewhat
obscure concept as well. To enable us to interpret Dilthey’s the-
ory of worldviews, we will therefore first attempt to clarify the
concept of life and the function it has in the context of the the-
ory of worldviews in this section.  The further structure of the
pyramid of worldview concepts in Dilthey will be discussed in the
next two sections.
In the same 1911 essay, Dilthey gives the following description
of life: 
In unzähligen einzelnen Lebensläufen über die Erde verbreitet, in je-
dem Individuum wieder erlebt, und, da es als bloßer Augenblick der
Gegenwart der Beobachtung sich entzieht, in der nachklingenden Erin-
nerung festgehalten, andererseits wie es sich in seinen Äußerungen ob-
jektiviert hat nach seiner ganzen Tiefe in Verständnis und Interpretatio-
nen vollständig erfaßbar als in jedem Innewerden und Auffassen des
eigenen Erlebnisses – ist  das Leben in unserm Wissen in unzähligen
Formen uns gegenwärtig und zeigt doch überall  dieselben gemeinsa-
men Züge.6
4 I  will  speak  of  kinds of  worldviews  when distinguishing between different
kinds of worldviews (religious, artistic, philosophical worldviews), and use types
when speaking of different types of worldviews that belong to the same kind of
worldview. 
5 Dilthey, Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen
Systemen (henceforth: Typen), 78: ‘Die letzte Wurzel der Weltanschauung ist das
Leben.’
6 Typen, 78.
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Even if it is insufficient to serve as a theoretical definition of life,
this comprehensive description at least indicates some important
aspects of it. The concept of life as used by Dilthey here has a
dual nature: it has a universal dimension, but at the same time
expresses itself in a multitude of particular appearances. Life as
such appears in every individual, in innumerable individual life-
spans, but at the same time these individual lives are new experi-
ences  of  something  common (wieder  erlebt).  The innumerable
forms show the same traits everywhere, despite life’s pluriform
appearance. 
The concept of life as used here has the character of a medi-
um, in the sense in which ether was once considered to be the
medium of  electromagnetic  waves.  There  are  two  respects  in
which this comparison makes sense: first, life is as such not dir-
ectly visible (es entzieht sich der Beobachtung als bloßer Augenblick der
Gegenwart),  just  as  ether  was  considered  to  be  a  substance
without any perceptible qualities, and, second, life connects ap-
parently distant elements, just as ether was thought of as a medi-
um connecting (sometimes very) remote places. Let us start by
considering the first characteristic. Life as construed by Dilthey
is  not  reflexively,  rationally  accessible  as  it  is,  in  its  totality.
Dilthey also calls life ‘irrational’. Life ‘happens’ immediately, is
always  present  (als  bloßer  Augenblick  der  Gegenwart),  but  is  not
known immediately. Only rational reflection can lead to an un-
derstanding of life. The access to this understanding of life is to
be found in the sedimentation that life produces:  it leaves its
traces such as recollections in the form of life-experience in the
individual (its basic form) and cultural objectifications (which
can achieve different levels of abstraction with respect to the in-
dividual  life-experience).  Life  therefore  cannot  be  known  as
such, but only mediately, through reflexive interpretation of its
products.  These rational  reconstructions  provide partial  inter-
pretations of life, which is irrational in itself.
Life can be understood in Dilthey’s work as a creative force
which is never at rest, always in motion. Life cannot be ‘seen’ as
such, but is accessible only through its products, the objectifica-
tions it receives in human history. But these objectifications of
life are themselves only finite, one-sided manifestations, so that
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life in its totality, life as it is, never reveals itself completely in sin-
gular objectifications. We can only understand life through the
totality of human history and the regularities life reveals in it. 
The second aspect of the comparison of life with a medium is
the  characteristic  of  allowing  a  connection  between  different
and  (apparently)  distant  elements.  In  other  words:  life,  in
Dilthey’s analysis of it, also exhibits a  mediating function.7 This
mediating function can be elucidated by taking a closer look at
the role of the individual subject. Each individual is a point of
origin in the reflexive, interpretative reconstructions of life. The
individual  is  connected  to  other  people  and  things,  and
‘everything that surrounds him he interprets as  life and spirit
that are objectified in it.’8 These interpretations of the world are
what Dilthey calls worldviews. The individual thus plays a crucial
role in the construction of worldviews. Yet the individual is not
the final ground of these worldviews, it is life which creates its
own world from the perspective of every individual.9 Observed
from the  individual’s  perspective,  life  manifests  itself  both  as
Lebendigkeit and as  Welt.  Lebendigkeit can be understood as indi-
vidual consciousness (including emotions, feelings, etc., through
which the individual is connected to life as such). Welt can be un-
derstood as everything which Lebendigkeit encounters in its activ-
ities,  everything to  which it  is  connected through life-connec-
tions (Lebensbezüge). However, both are life viewed from a certain
aspect. Both the Lebendigkeit of individual consciousness and the
world connected to it through life-connections are part of the
continuity of life. The distinction between inner life and outer
7 More on Dilthey’s concept of life can be found in several studies, e.g. Bulhof,
Wilhelm Dilthey,  164f.,  Bollnow,  Dilthey,  33ff.,  Braun,  Leben und Bewusstsein bei
Dilthey,  25ff.  The mediating function of life is  observed both by Bulhof and
Bollnow  (although  Bulhof  interprets  the  mediation  differently).  Despite
Bollnow’s extensive discussion of the ‘historical links’ of Dilthey’s philosophy,
he does not mention Trendelenburg. Bulhof mentions Trendelenburg only in
a short biographical sketch of Dilthey, as his ‘supervisor’ at the University of
Berlin, ‘whose main interest was the history of philosophy’ (10).
8 Typen, 78-79.
9 Typen, 79: ‘So schafft das Leben von jedem Individuum aus sich seine eigene
Welt.’
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world therefore is  only  the product of an intellectual  abstrac-
tion.10 Life  mediates between ‘internal’  consciousness and the
‘external world’ because it precedes this distinction and forms
the original unity from which these points of view are derived.
This mediating function of life, or rather: this two-sidedness
of life—since the separation between individual life and world is
a product of intellectual abstraction, and not itself original—sug-
gests a parallel to the mediating function of the principle of mo-
tion (Bewegung) in the work of Dilthey’s teacher Trendelenburg.
We  will  return  in  the  final  chapter  to  the  question  whether
Trendelenburg’s concept of motion and Dilthey’s concept of life
can be considered to be functionally the same.
According to Dilthey, as we have seen, worldviews are ‘rooted
in life’. But at the same time worldviews can be said to be inter-
pretations of the world. How is it that these interpretations of
the world are rooted in life? On the one hand, through the me-
diating function of life, the world can be understood as correlate
to consciousness, for both are life, taken from a different point
of view.11 Because the world is only experienced through the life-
connections that consciousness has to it, life determines our in-
terpretations, our ‘views’ of the world. On the other hand, the
fact that worldviews are interpretations of the world can be seen as
rooted in life as well. According to Dilthey, life itself gives rise to
reflection on life in the individual. This reflection repeats itself
in different individuals,  giving rise to common life-experience
(allgemeine  Lebenserfahrung).  At  the  same  time,  the  individual
seeks to unite his life-experiences into a meaningful totality, but
fails to do so because of the ‘riddles of life’: the experiences of
birth,  death,  and the overall  finitude of man. The worldviews
which are provided by religion, art, or metaphysics are more or
less systematized attempts to solve these riddles of life. Yet they
are  rooted in the  individual  life  experiences,  which yield the
same questions over and over again. 
10 Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (henceforth quoted as GS followed by
the volume number) 8, 16-17. 
11 GS 8, 17.
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The function of  life for  Dilthey’s  theory  of  worldviews can
therefore be summarized as follows: life mediates between the
individual  and his  world,  for both are part of life.  Life is  the
medium which connects all individual (and therefore only par-
tial) interpretations of it. This continuity underlying the differ-
ent interpretations also explains the constant structure shared by
the  different,  individual  life-experiences  and  worldviews.  Life
thus also mediates between the individual world-experience and
the  shared  experiences  between  individuals.  Without  life
‘gluing’ everything together, Dilthey’s approach entailing a typo-
logical  understanding  of  worldviews  would  not  come  off  the
ground. Without the (metaphysical) foundation of life, the plu-
rality of worldviews would be just that, an irreducible plurality of
interpretations of the world. A question to be asked then is: why
does Dilthey need a  unifying,  mediating structure behind the
plurality  of  worldviews?  A  further  question  to  be  asked  is
whether life can fulfil the different functions which Dilthey as-
cribes to it, without losing its unity—and thus its unifying func-
tion. Much like Trendelenburg’s concept of motion, life fulfils
different functions, and is claimed to be an original unity. Again
the question emerges whether or not there is a functional differ-
ence between Trendelenburg’s concept of motion and Dilthey’s
concept of life.  To these questions  we will  return in the final
chapter.
3. Worldview and the function of philosophy
In Dilthey’s work, as in Trendelenburg’s, the concept of world-
view emerges in the context of a fundamental philosophical self-
reflection. Dilthey discusses the ‘essence’ of philosophy, its func-
tion, limits and possibilities in an essay from 1907, Das Wesen der
Philosophie. Although this essay is not entirely devoted to a discus-
sion of the theory of worldviews (unlike the 1911 essay), the dis-
cussion of the essence of philosophy culminates in a discussion
of philosophical worldviews,  and in their typological  classifica-
tion.12 The classification  of  (philosophical)  worldviews  is  thus
12 ‘Das Wesen der Philosophie’ (henceforth: Wesen), in: GS 5, 339-416.
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connected for Dilthey to philosophy’s self-understanding with re-
spect to its ultimate task and its means of fulfil this task. This
connection between philosophy’s ultimate task and the concept
of worldview is  perhaps even more visible  than in Trendelen-
burg’s account of worldviews. The editor of volume 8 of Dilthey’s
Gesammelte Schriften, B. Groethuysen, has therefore aptly entitled
it  ‘Weltanschauungslehre.  Abhandlungen  zur  Philosophie  der
Philosophie’.13 Dilthey’s theory of worldviews will in fact turn out
to be a meta-philosophy, a ‘philosophy of philosophy’. But be-
fore we can examine this philosophical theory of worldviews, the
concept of worldview and the concept of philosophy that under-
lies the theory of worldviews have to be elucidated. Both ‘philo-
sophy’  and  ‘worldview’  are  quite  complicated  concepts  in
Dilthey’s analysis. Each stands for different functions and dimen-
sions. I will first discuss the concept of philosophy which Dilthey
presents in his 1907 essay in this section, and then discuss the
concept of worldview, which rests on the concept of philosophy,
in the next section. 
In  Das  Wesen  der  Philosophie,  Dilthey  tries  to  determine  a
concept of the essence of philosophy (Wesensbegriff  der  Philoso-
phie).  To  achieve  such  a  concept,  which  would  articulate  the
formative law (Bildungsgesetz) of philosophical systems, he starts
with a first-order determination14 of the concept of philosophy.
This first-order determination is carried out through a determin-
ation of the commonalities between the ‘empirical’ (i.e. historic-
al) philosophical systems. This ‘empirical’ or ‘inductive’ determ-
ination of  the concept  of  philosophy cannot be more than a
first, approximative step towards a complete scientific determina-
tion of the concept of philosophy. The reason for this lies in the
circular nature of all concept-formation in the human sciences.
A selection of what is relevant from the manifold of human life
already presupposes a guiding concept. Only on the basis of this
13 The expression ‘Philosophie der Philosophie’ is taken from a manuscript by
Dilthey, GS 8, 204f.
14 The expression ‘first-order determination’ is used here analogously to the
natural sciences. It refers to an iterative process of determination in which the
value  of  some  expression  or  parameter  is  determined.  The  first-order
determination is an estimation, which is refined in subsequent approximative
steps. 
DILTHEY’S WELTANSCHAUUNGSTYPOLOGIE 71
selection  can  a  more  precise  and  warranted  concept  be  de-
veloped, which in turn can be used to correct the original selec-
tion. Dilthey takes his preliminary determination of philosophy
from tradition:  he  examines  positions  which  are  traditionally
considered to be part of philosophy.
The result of Dilthey’s empirical investigation is negative at
first sight: if anything, historical consciousness reveals the relativ-
ity and transitoriness (Relativität und Vergänglichkeit) of all differ-
ent definitions and appearances of philosophy.15 Yet Dilthey dis-
cerns  some common characteristics  of  philosophical  thought,
which can which can serve to encompass the ‘empirical data’.
These common characteristics are a tendency towards universal-
ity, towards foundation (Begründung), and the aim at the totality
of the given world. Although Dilthey sometimes uses different
terms (such as:  Zusammenfassung,  Grundlegung,  Begründung) for
this common core, it has two essential characteristics: the aim to
grasp the essence of the totality of the world, and the aim to
provide objective, universally valid knowledge. The first charac-
teristic  separates  philosophy  from the  special  sciences,  which
have limited parts of the world as their object. The second char-
acteristic separates philosophy from religion and art, which do
not seek to provide objective, scientifically warranted, universally
valid knowledge. Conversely, the aim at the totality of the world
is what connects philosophy to art and religion, while the striv-
ing for universally valid knowledge connects philosophy to the
sciences. 
The first-order determination of the concept of philosophy is
therefore a functional determination: it does not define or pre-
scribe  a  method or  object  of  philosophy,  but  determines  the
common core of the different, empirical philosophical systems
as a certain  function. This function—to give a scientific, univer-
sally valid interpretation of the totality of the world—is what con-
nects the historical systems. The different empirical philosophic-
al systems result from a constant function which is executed in
ever-varying circumstances. The function of philosophy must not
be considered in isolation, but in connection with the environ-
15 Wesen,  364.  For  the  experience  of  relativity,  see  also  the  discussion  of
Dilthey’s typology of worldviews, below.
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ment in which it operates. To give a complete account of the
concept of philosophy, the function of philosophy must be ana-
lyzed in its relation to society and to the psyche (Seelenleben). 
In Dilthey’s analysis, the structure of the psyche is a teleolo-
gical one in which three global domains can be distinguished.
The first is that of knowledge of the world (Welterkenntnis). The
second is that of life-experience (Lebenserfahrung), which Dilthey
defines as the processes in which we try to determine the values
of life and of things.16 Finally, the domain of principles of action
(Prinzipien des Handelns), by which we seek to govern our lives.
According to Dilthey, the teleological nature of man (the  Ziel-
strebigkeit)  causes  a  development  in  which  we  seek  to  achieve
ever-higher  forms of  knowledge  of  the  world,  life-experience,
and principles of action. The highest forms of these functions of
the psyche are achieved when they are based on universally valid
knowledge.  Since  man strives  by  nature  after  reflexive  know-
ledge  of  himself,  this  directedness  of  the  three  areas  of  the
psyche at universally valid knowledge means that philosophy has
its root in the nature of the psyche, in the nature of man:
Philosophie ist in der Struktur des Menschen angelegt, jeder, an wel-
cher Stelle  er stehe,  ist  in irgendeiner Annäherung an sie begriffen,
und  jede  menschliche  Leistung tendiert,  zur  philosophischen Besin-
nung zu gelangen.17
The relationship of philosophy to society mirrors the structure
of the psyche and can be considered to be an expression of it.
Since society consists of individuals who are characterized by the
threefold structure of the psyche just described, the same struc-
tural regularities can be discerned in society.18 How philosophy
functions in relation to the different ‘systems’ that exist in soci-
ety is a question that will be addressed in the next section.
The two characteristics that Dilthey determined as the (em-
pirical) core of the concept of philosophy allow us to understand
the basic structure underlying Dilthey’s determination of philo-
16 Wesen, 374.
17 Wesen, 375.
18 Wesen,  375:  ‘Da nun diese Gesellschaft aus den strukturierten Individuen
besteht, wirken sich in ihr dieselben strukturellen Regelmäßigkeiten aus.’
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sophical systems as worldviews. Worldviews are interpretations of
(1) the totality of the world, and philosophical worldviews are at-
tempts to give  (2)  scientifically warranted interpretations of the
world. 
4. Philosophical and other worldviews
The notion of a philosophical worldview in Dilthey is as complex
as  the  concept  of  philosophy.  Unlike  Trendelenburg,  Dilthey
sees the notion of a worldview as such as covering more than just
philosophical or metaphysical worldviews. Besides philosophical
worldviews Dilthey distinguishes religious and artistic or poetic
(dichterische) worldviews. These kinds of worldviews stand, each
in its own way, in relation to the philosophical worldview and
refer to it.19 All these kinds of worldview have in common that
they aim to provide interpretations of the totality of the world.
And all of them claim validity for their interpretation. As such,
they have reached a degree of objectification with respect to the
individual’s  interpretation  of  the  world.  These  worldviews  ab-
stract from the particular individual ‘worlds’ and try to address
what is common in the experience of life. Philosophical world-
views are further distinguished from artistic and religious ones in
that they seek to establish objective, scientific validity for their in-
terpretations of the world.20
In  addition  to  this  external  distinction  between  different
kinds of worldviews, Dilthey also describes the inner structure of
worldviews. He suggests that for each kind of worldview it is pos-
sible to give a classification of different types which belong to
that kind—although the classification of philosophical systems is
the only one that is fully developed.21 According to Dilthey, the
inner structure of (philosophical) worldviews is produced by the
structure of the inner life, the life of the mind:
19 For  the  relation  between the  philosophical  worldview  and  religious  and
poetic worldviews: Typen, 87-93 and Wesen, 378-399.
20 Cf. Wesen, 375f., Typen, 87f.
21 Typen, 94f.
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Das tiefste Geheimnis ihrer Spezifikation liegt in der Regelhaftigkeit,
welche der teleologische Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens der beson-
deren Struktur der Weltanschauungsgebilde aufdrückt.22 
The threefold structure of worldviews, which is the counterpart
of  the three domains  of  culture addressed by  philosophy,  ex-
presses the ‘structural coherence of the mind’ (seelische Struktur-
zusammenhang).23 This common structure of human nature (ge-
meinsame  Menschennatur)  has  constant  relations  to  life  (festen
Lebensbezüge), which correspond to the three fundamental rela-
tions of philosophy to culture. Life, therefore, ‘always shows the
same sides’.24 
But not only  the regularities in the structure of worldviews
spring from life. Life is above all the origin of the diversity (Man-
nigfaltigkeit) of worldviews. The worldviews originate in ‘moods
of life’ (Lebensstimmungen), individual attempts to unify the mul-
titude  of  life-experiences  (which  are  conscious  life-relations).
Through several levels of reflection, these moods of life are de-
veloped into worldviews.25 Both the regularity of the structure of
worldviews and their differentiation are therefore produced by
‘life’. For this reason, Dilthey can describe the relation between
worldview and life as: ‘Die letzte Wurzel der Weltanschauung ist
das Leben’.26 While life as such cannot be known, it reveals itself
in different worldviews, in different, but always limited and one-
sided, ways.27
Philosophy  and the  philosophical  worldview  are  related  to
culture. As a fundamental science philosophy addresses a tripart-
ite structure of domains of culture. This tripartite structure re-
22 Typen,  85.  The  three  levels  of  a  worldview  (and  the  three  domains  of
culture)  can  be  connected  to  the  classical  distinction  between  three
intellectual powers: thinking (Weltbild), feeling (Lebenswürdigung), and willing
(praktische Ideale).
23 Wesen, 407.
24 Typen, 85: ‘Das Leben zeigt immer dieselben Seiten.’ 
25 Typen, 79-81.
26 Typen, 78.
27 Compare  also  the  entry  in  Dilthey’s  diary,  dated  16  April  1861:  ‘Große
Systeme sind einseitige,  doch  aufrichtige  Offenbarungen der  menschlichen
Natur’,  Der  junge  Dilthey,  146.  For  the  complexity  of  the  notion  of  life  in
Dilthey, cf. Bollnow, Dilthey, ‘Einleitung’ and ‘Erster Teil’, 11-100.
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turns as the internal structure of a philosophical worldview. The
structure of a worldview (not just of a philosophical worldview)
consists of three layers: First, it contains a ‘view of reality’ (Wirk-
lichkeitsauffassung) or ‘world-picture’ (Weltbild) as its foundation.
On top of this, there is a layer of life-values (Lebenswerte) and of
an ‘understanding’ of the world (Weltverständnis). Finally, a layer
of ideals, ‘achievements of the will’ (Willensleistungen), and aims
(Zwecksetzungen), completes the worldview.28
Since philosophy corresponds to a constant function and to
the (constant) structure of the psyche, there is constancy in the
function philosophy fulfils in society as well—despite the varying
results which are produced by  this  constant function.  As such,
philosophy, in Dilthey’s view, can be considered a cultural system
(Kultursystem). As a cultural system philosophy is connected to
other cultural systems in the ‘household’ (Haushalt) of society.29
Although  the  term  Kultursystem does  not  acquire  a  definite
meaning in Dilthey’s 1907 essay, it can be understood along the
lines of the structure of psyche (since the structure of the psyche
is expressed in the structure of society). Like the psyche, society
forms  a  teleologically  connected  totality.  In  the  case  of  the
psyche, all activities could be viewed from the perspective of the
threefold structure, even if the activities were not directly aimed
at  one  of  the  ends  corresponding  with  this  structure—know-
ledge of the world, evaluation of life, and principles of action.
These three aspects are parts of the reflexive understanding that
the individual forms of himself and his place in the world. Philo-
sophy seeks to integrate these three aspects into a scientifically
valid totality. 
28 Typen,  82-84.  Helmut  Johach  therefore  states  incorrectly  that  a
philosophical  worldview  does  not  have  a  ‘direct  regulative’  function.  Cf.
Johach,  Wilhelm Dilthey,  77. With respect to the highest level of a worldview
Dilthey  clearly  states:  ‘Die  Weltanschauung  wird  nun  bildend,  gestaltend,
reformierend  [...]  einem  umfassenden  Lebensplan,  einem  höchsten  Gut,
obersten Normen des Handelns, einem Ideal der Gestaltung des persönlichen
Lebens und der Gesellschaft’, Typen, 84. This holds for any kind of worldview,
including philosophical worldviews (cf. Typen, 95).
29 Wesen, 376.
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In the case of society, Dilthey suggests a range of functions
which  covers  the  three  functional  aspects  of  the  psyche.  The
functions of the systems of culture range from knowledge of the
world (culminating in the sciences) to the systems in which vol-
untary  actions  (Willenshandlungen) are  differentiated  and con-
nected to structures which have constancy throughout different
individuals and generations—such as law, economic structures,
and infrastructure (Naturbeherrschung).30
The special sciences, art, religion, and philosophy, are taken
as ‘systems of culture’ themselves. Philosophy has a special posi-
tion in relation to the other systems here: to the sciences on the
one hand, to art and religion on the other. Philosophy has in
common with the special sciences that it aims at universally valid
knowledge.  They  are  separated  by  their  respective  objects,
however: philosophy aims at universally valid knowledge of the
totality of the world, whereas the special sciences have limited
parts of the world as their object. Religion and art have in com-
mon with philosophy that they have the same ‘object’: the total-
ity of the world, but they do not share with philosophy the pur-
suit of universally valid knowledge of this ‘object’. These systems
are  characterized by  man’s  contemplation of  himself  and the
connected  totality  (Zusammenhang)  of  things.  They  are  not
bound by finite objects, but aim at an interpretation of the world
as a totality. It is philosophy’s task to give an interpretation which
also is universally valid. Yet all three systems, art, religion, and
philosophy, aim at an interpretation of the totality of the world,
and thus aim at a worldview. As such, they must cover the whole
range of functions which is expressed in the psyche and in soci-
ety. These systems cannot be equated with any one of the func-
tions.
Worldviews  are  interpretations  of  the  world,  and therefore
partial  interpretations of life.  These interpretations of life are
constructed first of all  by individuals who try to formulate an-
swers to the ‘riddles of life’ by attempting to construct a coher-
ent interpretation of the totality of the world. This can be taken
as  the  basic  level  of  the  pyramid  of  worldview  concepts  in
30 Wesen,  376.  Dilthey does not give any examples of the ‘middle’ function:
evaluation of life.
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Dilthey. These worldviews are bound by the context of their con-
struction, however, since the world interpreted is always the life-
world of a certain individual. Since life produces similar experi-
ences everywhere, worldviews can be detached from individual
contexts  and  have  non-local  validity.  Religious,  artistic,  and
philosophical worldviews are forms of worldviews which have a
certain  stability  or  cultural  objectivity—they  are  shared  by
(large) groups of  individuals  and are not exclusive  to one of
them (yet they still originate in one individual—the artistic, reli-
gious,  or  philosophical  ‘genius’).  These  kinds  of  worldviews
form the top of the worldview pyramid, and they aim at,  and
claim, validity for themselves. The philosophical worldviews aim
at, and claim to achieve, objective, scientific validity for them-
selves. In this sense, the philosophical worldviews stand out from
the other two kinds, and can be said to occupy the zenith of the
pyramid of worldview concepts in Dilthey. The pyramid exhibits
a hierarchy between the different kinds of worldviews, with the
philosophical  worldview at the top,  claiming scientific validity.
Now that we have seen what the concept of worldview involves,
and how the philosophical worldview is related to other world-
view concepts, we can go on to analyze Dilthey’s classification of
(philosophical) worldviews, his Weltanschauungstypologie.
5. The typology of worldviews (Weltanschauungstypologie)
Worldviews are interpretations of the world, with the world un-
derstood as the life-world: the world connected through life-con-
nections (Lebensbezüge) to the interpreting subject. The world in-
terpreted in a worldview is therefore never completely separated
from the personality  of the interpreter.  In fact,  Dilthey claims
that every worldview is determined by an underlying life-mood
(Lebensstimmung). Every worldview is bound to the interpreting
subject. Different interpreters in different contexts therefore ar-
rive at different worldviews. Yet each worldview aims at validity,
especially  the  philosophical  worldviews.  According  to  Dilthey,
historical  consciousness  makes  us  aware  of  the  antinomy
between the claimed universal validity and the actual local valid-
ity of (philosophical) worldviews. Although metaphysical systems
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claim to  provide objective,  universally  valid knowledge of  the
world, they cannot fully substantiate this claim. The succession
of different metaphysical systems in history reveals that none of
them succeeds  in providing objective  grounds for themselves.
Subjective,  unscientific  elements  remain  in  them,  elements
which can be traced back to the personality of the creator of
such a system and his context. Metaphysical systems are there-
fore dependent on the local, historical context of their realiza-
tion, despite the fact that they claim to provide universally valid
knowledge,  founded  on  objective  principles  which  are  inde-
pendent of this local context. This awareness of the historical re-
lativity  of  philosophical  systems  (understood  as  worldviews),
causes  a  crisis  in  philosophy  in  the  traditional,  metaphysical
sense. According to Dilthey, the traditional, metaphysical systems
of philosophy each embody a single worldview. This worldview is
claimed to  provide  complete  and objective  knowledge of  the
world.31 Now, since historical consciousness has provided aware-
ness of the historical relativity of every metaphysical worldview, it
is no longer possible to practise philosophy in the traditional,
metaphysical sense—at least not while doing justice to historical
consciousness. A metaphysical philosopher who is aware of the
historical relativity of his metaphysics is dysfunctional: for it is
the function of metaphysical philosophy to provide absolute, not
historically relative, knowledge.32
To overcome this aporia, philosophy, says Dilthey, should take
this knowledge of historical relativity as its starting point. Instead
of solving the conflict between metaphysics and historical con-
sciousness, historical consciousness should be applied to meta-
physical  systems.  For  only  when  philosophical  worldviews  are
taken as independent,  objective totalities  of knowledge of the
world does the conflict (antinomy) between historical conscious-
ness and metaphysics arise:
31 GS 8, 6: ‘Der Gegenstand der Metaphysik ist aber die objective Erkenntnis
des Zusammenhangs der Wirklichkeit.’
32 GS 8, 3-7, 13.
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Die Widersprüche entstehen also durch die Verselbständigung der ob-
jektiven  Weltbilder  im wissenschaftlichen Bewusstsein.  Diese  Verselb-
ständigung ist es, was ein System zur Metaphysik macht.33
The antinomy can be solved by going beyond the level of com-
peting  metaphysical  systems  and  construing  metaphysical  sys-
tems as relative expressions of different sides of life. To achieve
understanding, this historically aware philosophy should not en-
gage with all possible worldviews as such, but try to establish pat-
terns among them. By reducing the plurality  of worldviews to
certain basic types, which are possible ways of expressing life, it is
able both to do justice to the consciousness of the historical re-
lativity  of  each  type  and  to  gain  an  understanding  of  life,
through the basic forms of its expression. Historical conscious-
ness thus produces the need for a view which encompasses all
(types of) worldviews, a view which is not bound to one world-
view as its perspective on the world. Such a typological approach,
which addresses not only philosophical worldviews, but religious
and artistic ones as well, would itself result in a worldview of a
higher order, not vulnerable to historical relativism.34 
The approach to be taken therefore is a comparative analysis
of worldviews, in order to discover the basic types of worldviews
by which life is expressed. Although this  is valid for religious,
artistic, and philosophical worldviews, Dilthey developed this ap-
proach for philosophical worldviews especially. Although typolo-
gical approaches were a main concern for Dilthey from early on
in his career (see the next section), it was only in the last stage of
his life that he developed his typology of philosophical world-
views. In 1898 he published Die drei Grundformen der Systeme in der
ersten  Hälfte  des  19.  Jahrhunderts,  a  study  of  the  basic  types  of
philosophical systems in German Idealism.35 In two further pub-
lications, he introduced a more general scheme for classifying
historical philosophical systems as such: the already mentioned
texts  Das Wesen der Philosophie (1907) and  Die Typen der Weltan-
schauung  und  ihre  Ausbildung  in  den  metaphysischen  Systemen
33 GS 8, 8.
34 GS 8, 9
35 Reprinted in: GS 4, 529-554. 
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(1911). That Dilthey was concerned with this issue can be seen
from related, unpublished material: the manuscripts on Weltan-
schauung brought together in volume 8 of his Gesammelte Schriften
far exceed the published material (the 1911 essay). 
To enable the comparison between Dilthey’s Weltanschauungs-
typologie and Trendelenburg’s typological approach in the next
section, I will briefly present Dilthey’s worldview typology here,
using his 1907 and 1911 essays.36 His typology of philosophical
systems is usually considered to be the Weltanschauungstypologie as
such, but as we have seen, Dilthey deems a complete typology of
all kinds of worldviews, including at least artistic and religious
worldviews,  necessary  to  solve  the  antinomy  of  historical  con-
sciousness and objective,  metaphysical knowledge. But for our
present purposes (the comparison with Trendelenburg), and be-
cause it  is  the part of Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie that is
most elaborate and systematic developed,  I  will  restrict  myself
here to a discussion of his typology of philosophical systems. 
Dilthey  distinguishes  in  the  1907  and  1911  publications
between three basic types of philosophical systems. First, the type
of  naturalism: this worldview contains a sensualist epistemology
and a materialistic metaphysics.  There is no room to consider
the world from the perspective of ‘value and goal’.37 The life-
ideal of this type of worldview is determined by a double per-
spective: on the one hand man, as part of nature, is subject to its
laws,  on  the  other  hand  man  tries  to  subjugate  nature  itself
through (scientific) thought. In the second place38 Dilthey dis-
cerns the worldview type of the idealism of freedom (Idealismus der
Freiheit), which is characterized by the notion of the ‘independ-
ence  of  the  spiritual’  from  all  factuality  (Gegebenheiten).  The
mind (Geist) is conceived as different from and independent of
any  physical  causality.  The  autonomy  (freie  Selbstmacht)  of  the
mind is only ethically bound by other persons. Epistemologically,
36 Typen,  100-118,  Wesen,  402-403.  The  distinction  between  the  types  is
presented slightly differently in the 1911 text, as compared to the 1907 text,
see also note 48 below. 
37 Typen, 105. 
38 The sequence of the second and third type of worldview is different in the
1907 and 1911 texts.
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this type of worldview is based on the (transcendental) ‘facts of
consciousness’.39 In objective idealism, thirdly, the question of the
meaning  of  the  world  is  central.  It  is  paired  with  a  contem-
plative, aesthetic relation to the world. The ‘form of interpreta-
tion’ is characterized by a view of the parts as a totality (Zusam-
menschauen der Teile in einem Ganzen), and by elevation of the life-
structure to a world-structure (Erhebung von Lebenszusammenhang
in Weltzusammenhang).40
The lack of systematic developmental relations between these
different types of worldviews or philosophical systems has been
taken as a problematic element in the Weltanschauungstypologie.41
This objection, however, fails to grasp the intention of Dilthey’s
approach, and only appears justified if  one’s  interpretation of
Dilthey remains at the level of the historic worldviews themselves
and the relationships among them. To Dilthey, worldviews are
necessarily  one-sided interpretations of the world which claim
universal validity, but cannot substantiate this claim. Despite the
claimed objectivity, worldviews still contain subjective, irrational
elements  (e.g.  the underlying  Lebensstimmung).  From Dilthey’s
position it is therefore unfeasible to attempt a critical evaluation
of the worldview types, analogous to the one Trendelenburg un-
dertakes. Only by shifting the perspective to a meta-worldview
which studies the historically appearing worldviews, Dilthey over-
comes the perpetual ‘dialectic’ of systems among one another.
The absence of a hierarchy of basic types is just a property of the
way in which life expresses itself, not a weakness of the  Weltan-
schauungstypologie per se. By applying a scale of less or more ‘sci-
entific’ to worldviews, Dilthey can construct a certain hierarchy
between different kinds of worldviews (religion, art, science). But
since  all  philosophical  worldviews  which  are  subject  to  the
Weltanschauungstypologie  ultimately  fail  to  meet  scientific  stand-
ards, such a hierarchy cannot be established between the differ-
ent types of worldviews. 
39 Typen, 109-110. 
40 Typen, 115.
41 Makkreel, Dilthey, 347.
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6. Trendelenburg as precursor of Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie?
Trendelenburg has repeatedly been considered the precursor of
Dilthey’s  typological  worldview theory.42 Starting with Joachim
Wach’s 1926 essay Die Typenlehre Trendelenburgs und ihr Einfluss auf
Dilthey,  the  influence  of  Trendelenburg  on  Dilthey’s  Weltan-
schauungstypologie has  mostly  been taken for  granted.43 At  first
sight, Trendelenburg’s typological approach does in fact seem to
have a lot in common with the Weltanschauungstypologie. But does
this  impression hold  up under  closer  scrutiny?  To  determine
whether  and  in  what  sense  Trendelenburg’s  typological  ap-
proach can be taken as a precursor of Dilthey’s worldview-theory,
one  should  not  only  consider  the  factual,  structural  parallels
between the typologies as such. One should also take into ac-
count the systematic-philosophical context in which these typolo-
gies are embedded and the function they fulfil in this context.
To this end I will not only compare the respective typological at-
tempts  as  such,  but especially  the philosophical  framework of
which they are part.
The  previous  chapter  determined  the  systematic  place  of
Trendelenburg’s typology of worldviews in relation to the pro-
gramme of his  Logischen Untersuchungen.  This programme con-
sists of a founding science, which would unite logic and meta-
physics in a theory of science and which would found the unity
of thought and being. The typology of worldviews turned out to
be an argumentative strategy, which aimed to make an inventory
of the ways in which the relation between the fundamental meta-
physical concepts, Gedanke and Kraft, can be thought. It further
aimed to enable the critical analysis of the possible answers to
this fundamental metaphysical question, and to make a prelimin-
ary choice in favour of one of the answers, the organic world-
view.  Trendelenburg’s  typology  of  worldviews  therefore  has  a
limited and circumscribed function: to provide a preliminary de-
42 I  have  previously  present  the  argument  of  this  section in  my  ‘Friedrich
Adolf Trendelenburg und die Weltanschauungstypologie Diltheys’.
43 Odo  Marquard  concurs  with  Wach:  Marquard,  Weltanschauungstypologie,
109f.  Köhnke,  Entstehung und Aufstieg,  171-172,  is  critical  about  the  identifi-
cation of the typologies of Trendelenburg and Dilthey by Wach and Marquard.
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cision between the possible metaphysical stances, and to support
the organic worldview as long as it has not received a complete
theoretical foundation. The concept of worldview which he em-
ploys turned out to be limited and circumscribed as well: philo-
sophical systems are interpreted as worldviews and typified in ac-
cordance with their fundamental metaphysical thoughts. 
The function of the Weltanschauungstypologie in Dilthey’s work
is a different one. While the worldviews have their ‘root in life’,
as  we  have  seen,  the  historically  appearing  worldviews  are  as
many expressions of life.  The typology aims at a philosophical
understanding of this expression of life in history: ‘Diese Typen-
unterscheidung soll ja nur dienen, tiefer in die Geschichte zu se-
hen,  und  zwar  vom  Leben  aus.’44 The  philosophical  systems,
each of which claims universal validity for itself, struggle for in-
tellectual  dominance  among  one  another.45 But  unlike
Trendelenburg,  Dilthey  does  not  expect  a  victory  in  this
struggle.46 Philosophy  should  not  aim  at  a  universal  system,
which accommodates all the other systems, but can only strive to
find the formative  law (Bildungsgesetz) in which the differenti-
ation of systems is rooted. In a manuscript addition to the essay
Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysi-
schen Systemen Dilthey writes: ‘das geschichtliche Bewußtsein er-
hebt sich über das systematische Streben’.47 Philosophical analys-
is can only serve to systematize the historical consciousness of
the plurality of philosophical systems. It cannot systematically re-
duce this plurality to a certain unity. The worldviews have their
root in a ‘state of affairs which is inaccessible to proof or refuta-
tion.’48 None of the philosophical worldviews can be elevated by
metaphysics to universal valid science. According to Dilthey, the
Weltanschauungstypologie serves to understand life in the different
ways in which it expresses itself in history; not to reduce the his-
torical plurality of philosophical interpretations of the world to a
systematic unity.
44 Typen, 100.
45 Typen, 75, and GS 8, 161.
46 GS 8, 161, cf. Trendelenburg, Letzten Unterschied, 20.
47 GS 8, 161.
48 GS 8, 216.
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This different function of the Weltanschauungstypologie in com-
parison with Trendelenburg’s  typological  approach can be re-
cognized in a different concept of worldview and consequently a
different content of Dilthey’s typology. The interrelation of the
different  types  is  less  systematically  developed  than  it  is  in
Trendelenburg. For Trendelenburg, each worldview represents
one of the possible fundamental relations between thought and
force. If there is a comparable systematic relation between the
types of worldviews to be found in Dilthey, it must be in the in-
ner structure of worldviews. In the essay on Das Wesen der Philo-
sophie, Dilthey argues that every type of worldview privileges one
of the three ways  of relating to the world—knowledge of the
world in naturalism, the evaluation of life in objective idealism,
and the principles of action in idealism of freedom.49 Every type
of worldview gives an interpretation of the manifold of life from
the perspective of one of the basic ways in which individual life
relates to the world.50 But this three-fold structure receives no
more systematic explanation than that it expresses the structure
of the psyche (seelische  Strukturzusammenhang).51 It  has  its  final
root in life therefore as the teleological structure of psychic life
(Wirkungszusammenhang des Seelenlebens), which differentiates into
the three ways in which individual life relates to the world. The
goal,  to  understand (historical)  life  through its  philosophical
(self-)interpretations, determines the structure of the typology of
worldviews. It reflects the structure of (psychic) life.
As observed above, Joachim Wach (and Odo Marquard fol-
lowing  him)52 has  defended  the  thesis  that  Dilthey’s  Weltan-
schauungstypologie is  developed  in  direct  connection  with
Trendelenburg’s distinction of worldviews. There are, however,
several points which speak against such an interpretation. It is
49 Wesen, 402-404. In Typen Dilthey does not explicitly connect the systematic
relation between the different types of worldviews with the threefold structure
of each worldview.  Furthermore, Dilthey orders the types differently (Wesen:
first objective idealism, then idealism of freedom, in  Typen  this is reversed),
apparently so as to make a systematic connection between the three types and
the threefold structure of a worldview. 
50 Wesen, 404.
51 Wesen, 405 and 407; Typen, 82-83.
52 Cf. Chapter 2, note 3.
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true that at first sight strong parallels seem to exist: both typolo-
gies differentiate between naturalism and idealism, and the dis-
tribution of the historical examples between the different types
is also partly identical (except for the classification of Hegel, for
instance).53 Despite  these  parallels,  however,  the  differences
must not be overlooked. To begin with—notwithstanding Wach’s
claim that Trendelenburg’s typological approach is the ‘germ’ of
the three basic forms in Dilthey’s typology54— it is not possible
to establish unequivocal relations between Trendelenburg’s and
Dilthey’s types. One of the most important differences is to be
found in the relation between the different types of each typo-
logy. We have already seen that, although one of his expositions
relates the three types to the three ways in which consciousness
relates to the world, there is  no hierarchical relation between
the types in Dilthey. There is also no resolution of the plurality
of types; the types are only made part of a historical investigation
which takes them as possible expressions of life. In Trendelen-
burg’s critical analysis of the different types, however, the plural-
ity is reduced to a single worldview (which is one of the original
types,  not  a  ‘higher-order’  historical  worldview  which  encom-
passes all of them).
Trendelenburg’s treatment of the systems of ‘indifference’ or
Spinozism is exemplary here. This third type in the classification
is considered to be a mere theoretical possibility which arises out
of the fundamental opposition between thought and force. In
practice,  Trendelenburg  claims,  it  cannot  be  realized without
gravitating towards one of the other types (naturalism, idealism).
Hence this type of system was never fully realized in history, not
even by Spinoza himself.55 By contrast, the worldview type which
Dilthey associates with Spinoza, objective idealism, is the type to
which  the  ‘central  mass  of  philosophical  systems’  can  be  as-
signed.56 In  Trendelenburg’s  classification  the  third  type  of
53 Dilthey classifies Hegel under objective idealism (the third type in Typen),
whereas Trendelenburg classifies him under idealism, the second type in his
discussion. Cf. Trendelenburg, Letzten Unterschied, 19; Dilthey, Typen, 112. 
54 Wach, Typenlehre, 18.
55 Trendelenburg, Letzten Unterschied, 21.
56 Typen, 112.
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worldview is a mere theoretical option, never actually realized,
while in Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie it is—at least historic-
ally speaking—one of the most important types. 
Would a change of the order of types help to map the differ-
ent typologies into each other? One must conclude that Dilthey’s
objective  idealism  is  indeed  closer  in  important  respects  to
Trendelenburg’s ‘organic worldview’. Regarding the epistemolo-
gy  of  objective  idealism Dilthey  remarks  for  instance:  ‘an die
Stelle der logischen Relation des Besonderen zum Allgemeinen
tritt in ihrem System das organische Verhältnis eines Ganzen zu
seinen Gliedern.’57 The ‘metaphysical  formula’ of this class of
systems is described as the ‘Verwandtschaft aller Teile des Uni-
versums mit dem göttlichen Grunde und untereinander.’58 This
characterization of objective idealism can be construed as being
close  to  Trendelenburg’s  second type—the organic  worldview,
idealism.59
Dilthey therefore has not systematically adopted Trendelen-
burg’s worldview-types as such. The historically and systematic-
ally  important  third  type  of  objective  idealism  for  Dilthey  is
closer to Trendelenburg’s  second type than to the historically
and systematically third type of Spinozism. But a simple reversal
of the second and third worldview type (as in Dilthey’s presenta-
tion of the worldview typology in the 1907 essay  Das Wesen der
Philosophie) gives rise to other problems. Such a reversal would
identify Dilthey’s objective idealism with Trendelenburg’s ideal-
ism or Platonism (the organic worldview). In the first place, this
would render  problematic the historical  classification of  Plato
under ‘idealism of freedom’ in Dilthey’s typology (as well as the
classification of Spinoza under ‘objective idealism’). Secondly, it
seems impossible to connect the idealism of freedom in Dilthey
with Spinozism, which is the worldview of identity or ‘indiffer-
ence’ in Trendelenburg’s classification. This must lead us to the
conclusion that there is no linear relation between Trendelen-
burg’s three types of worldviews and those of Dilthey. If never-
theless  one  wishes  to  give  a  schematic  map  of  the  relations
57 Typen, 116.
58 Typen, 117.
59 For the ‘organic worldview’, cf. Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg, 23f.
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between the two classifications,  it is  a rather complex picture.
Trendelenburg’s  second  type  (idealism)  is  differentiated  into
two types in Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie (idealism of free-
dom and objective idealism). The third type of identity—prob-
lematic in Trendelenburg’s analysis—is absent in Dilthey and re-
placed by objective idealism in the Weltanschauungstypologie.
Historically  it  is  also questionable  whether Dilthey adopted
his threefold typology from his teacher’s classification. The edit-
or of volume 8 of Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften, B. Groethuysen,
refers in his preface to this volume to several entries in Dilthey’s
diary with respect to the genesis of the Weltanschauungstypologie.60
In the notes around 1860 which reflect on historiography, one
often  finds  concepts  such  as  ‘basic  forms’  (Grundformen)  of
worldviews,  ‘main  worldviews’  (Hauptweltanschauungen)  or
schemes of worldviews.61 On April 1st, 1860 Dilthey then writes
programmatically: 
Soll die Analyse der Geschichte der Philosophie wirklich bis zu einer
Klassifikation  ihrer  Hauptformen aus  dem Wesen  des  menschlichen
Geistes Herr werden, so muß sie in den konstituierenden Urelementen
die Verschiedenheit ergreifen.62
Such a classification should take the ‘wechselnden Formen der
Bewegung des Geistes’ as its starting point. The goal is to find
the elements which determine the differences between the sys-
tems, and to classify them accordingly.63 Note that Dilthey here
interprets the motion of spirit (Bewegung des Geistes) as the con-
tinuity underlying the different philosophical systems (the chan-
ging forms). Although a proximity to Trendelenburg’s concept
of motion could be assumed here, it is replaced by the concept
of life as underlying continuity—a concept which shows funda-
mental differences with respect to Trendelenburg’s concept of
motion, as we shall see. 
60 GS 8, VI-VII.
61 Der junge Dilthey, e.g. 80, 84, and 89.
62 Der junge Dilthey, 124.
63 Ibid. 
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Even if the idea of a typology or classification is present in
Dilthey’s  thought from early  on,  the notes in his  diary  which
point to a realization of such a typology always indicate a distinc-
tion between only two basic forms of (philosophical) worldviews.
On April 7, 1859 in a fragment ‘Zur Geschichte der mittelalterli-
chen Weltanschauung’ the diary reads for instance: ‘Zwei Haupt-
klassen von Systemen gibt es.’64 Some time later, Dilthey writes
without restrictions: ‘Zwei große Kreise bestimmen alle Systema-
tik des menschlichen Geistes,  nachdem sich die Anschauungs-
form derselben aus den Tiefen desselben herausgebildet hat.’65
With  respect  to  christian  ethics,  Dilthey  distinguishes  the
‘strongest opposition’ between the different worldviews as that
between the ‘ethical-realistic’ worldview and the ‘idealist’ world-
view. The ‘ethical-realistic’ worldview—of which Goethe, Schlei-
ermacher and Lotze are exemplary—seeks the essence of man in
both his  grandeur  and his  limits  (Hoheit  und  Schranke),  while
idealism confronts the ‘normal’ condition of man with an ideal
of man. This last type which confronts man with a ‘you must’ (du
sollst), and which Dilthey recognizes in the work of Kant, Fichte
and Herbart, can be connected with the worldview type idealism
of freedom in his later Weltanschauungstypologie. The ethical-real-
istic  worldview  can  accordingly  be  connected  with  objective
idealism (in terms of Dilthey’s historical examples as well). With
respect to these typological attempts by the young Dilthey, too,
we must conclud that it is impossible to make a linear connec-
tion between Trendelenburg’s typology and Dilthey’s typological
sketches—perhaps even more so than with respect to the mature
typology of worldviews. In the fragments from the diary there is
no mention of naturalism or positivism in connection with the
classification of worldviews,  and Trendelenburg’s  worldview of
identity or indifference cannot be connected with either of the
two types that Dilthey distinguishes early on. There is no evid-
ence suggesting that Dilthey took Trendelenburg’s classification
and developed it into his own Weltanschauungstypologie, for even
the early classificatory attempts diverge strongly from Trendelen-
burg’s three types of worldviews. 
64 Der junge Dilthey, 86.
65 Der junge Dilthey, 144-145.
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One must conclude therefore,  with respect to  content and
function of the typology of worldviews, that even if Trendelen-
burg gives  a  typological  account of  worldviews,  he cannot be
considered a direct precursor (Vorläufer—Marquard) of Dilthey’s
Weltanschauungstypologie. With regard to function and content of
the  classification  and the  subsequent  evaluation of  the  types,
both theories  are  essentially  different,  despite  some points  of
correspondence.  Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie is  a  meta-
metaphysical  theory  of  philosophical  systems,  aimed  at  medi-
ation of the conflict between metaphysics and history. The plur-
ality of worldviews is elevated to a more encompassing perspec-
tive,  not reduced to a single worldview. Trendelenburg’s  typo-
logical approach fulfils a more limited task: it is an argumenta-
tive strategy in the context of the programme of his Logische Un-
tersuchungen, and it enables a practical and preliminary decision
in the conflict of worldviews in favour of the ‘organic worldview’.
7. Founding science: the limits of philosophy
in Dilthey and Trendelenburg
Further understanding of the relation between the positions of
Trendelenburg and Dilthey can be gained by comparing their
concepts of philosophy. Both similarities and differences reveal
themselves in such a comparison. The notion of philosophy as a
founding and unifying discipline is retained in Dilthey’s concept
of philosophy. Both the validity of knowledge and the summing-
up of knowledge into a totality, which are key elements in Tren-
delenburg’s programme of the logical founding of the organic
worldview, can also be discerned in Dilthey’s concept of philoso-
phy. 
From the point of view of the reflexive and synthetic func-
tions of thought, philosophy is the fundamental science (Grund-
wissenschaft), which can be compared to Trendelenburg’s grund-
legende Wissenschaft:
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Philosophie [ist] die Grundwissenschaft, welche Form, Regel und Zusam-
menhang aller Denkprozesse zu ihrem Gegenstand hat, die von dem
Zweck bestimmt sind, gültiges Wissen hervorzubringen.66
Philosophy, thus construed as a ‘theory of knowledge’ (Theorie
des  Wissens),  examines  as  logic the  validity  of  all  thought  pro-
cesses.  As  epistemology  (Erkenntnistheorie),  philosophy  examines
the validity of the presuppositions of knowledge, especially the
reality of experience and the objective reality of external percep-
tion.67
But there are important differences between Trendelenburg’s
and Dilthey’s position as well. On the one hand, Dilthey speaks
of logic and epistemology as functions of philosophy as funda-
mental  science,  whereas  Trendelenburg  speaks  of  logic  and
metaphysics as the founding science. Although the terminologic-
al shifts might seem insignificant, Dilthey’s abandonment of the
term ‘metaphysics’ is particularly telling. On the other hand, the
difference between Dilthey’s expression ‘theory of knowledge’
(Theorie  des  Wissens)  and  Trendelenburg’s  ‘theory  of  science’
(Theorie der Wissenschaft) reveals a distinction which is important
for  the worldview debate.  Since  they  contribute  to  an under-
standing  of  Dilthey’s  notion  of  philosophy,  I  will  elaborate
shortly on each of these two differences.
The fundamental  metaphysical  question for  Trendelenburg
was the question how thinking and being, taken in their maxim-
al conceptual opposition as ‘thought’ and ‘force’, are connected.
The founding science of logic and metaphysics is the philosoph-
ical discipline which seeks to answer this question. Philosophy
tries to answer the question how ‘knowledge’ and the ‘world’ are
connected. An answer to this question explains the possibility of
scientific knowledge of the world, and thereby ‘founds’ scientific
knowledge.68 
Dilthey also considers it part of the essence of thinking that it
relates to the world: 
66 Wesen, 408.
67 Wesen, 408.
68 Trendelenburg’s answer is essentially non-foundationalist, as was argued in
the previous chapter. 
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Das Denken bezieht sich [...] auf den gemeinsamen Gegenstand aller
Denkakte der verschiedenen Personen, den Zusammenhang der sinnli-
chen  Wahrnehmung,  zu  welchem  die  Vielheit  der  Dinge  sich  im
Raume und die Mannigfaltigkeit ihrer Veränderungen und Bewegung-
en sich in der Zeit ordnet: die Welt.69 
Trendelenburg constructed an opposition between thought and
the world to elucidate the fundamental metaphysical problem: if
thought and the world are alien to each other, how is knowledge
of the world possible? Dilthey thinks of the world from the out-
set as being connected to thought. The world is construed by
Dilthey as the world as it is experienced and acted upon. It is the
world construed as life-world:
Dieser  Welt  sind  alle  Gefühle  und  Willenshandlungen  eingeordnet
durch die örtliche Bestimmung der ihnen zugehörigen Körper und die
in sie verwobenen Anschauungsbestandteile.  Alle in diesen Gefühlen
oder Willenshandlungen gesetzten Werte, Zwecke, Güter sind ihr ein-
gegliedert. Das menschliche Leben ist von ihr umfaßt.70 
Given the thus construed relation between thought and being,
Dilthey no longer designates as ‘metaphysics’ the founding sci-
ence that philosophy is. Metaphysics is marked by a misunder-
standing of the connection between thinking and the world:
Wir verstehen unter Metaphysik die Form der Philosophie, welche den
in der Relation zur Lebendigkeit konzipierten Weltzusammenhang wis-
senschaftlich behandelt, als ob er eine von dieser Lebendigkeit unab-
hängige Objektivität wäre.71 
Metaphysics  thus  introduces a ‘gap’  between thought and the
world.  Philosophy  should  explain  and found  the  relation  be-
tween thought and being. But this founding explanation does
not take the complete separation of thought and being as its
starting  point,  for  it  already  presupposes  in  the  concept  of
‘world’ a connection between thought and being. The metaphys-
69 Wesen, 414.
70 Wesen, 414.
71 GS  8,  51.  For  the  ambivalence  of  Dilthey’s  concept  of  metaphysics,  cf.
Bollnow, Dilthey, 90-93.
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ical forms of philosophy cannot fulfil this founding task, for they
mistakenly separate the world and consciousness, which tries to
gain knowledge of the world. Due to this gap between thought
and being which metaphysics introduces, it is impossible to give
an adequate and satisfying answer to the question how knowl-
edge of the world is possible. 
Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics could be read as an implicit
critique of his teacher Trendelenburg’s ‘fundamental metaphys-
ical problem’. Trendelenburg asks how knowledge of the world
is possible if thought and being are taken as radically different.
He answers this metaphysical question by showing the common
root in motion of both thought and being. Despite the radical
difference between thought and being which metaphysics con-
structs,  it  becomes  clear  with  hindsight  that  they  have always
been connected, for motion was always original to them. Even if
Dilthey’s  critique  of  metaphysics  is  aimed  at  Trendelenburg’s
‘fundamental science’ as well,  Trendelenburg’s theory remains
unaffected. For the connection between thought and the world
is not merely assumed, but is the  result of his fundamental sci-
ence.  Conversely,  the radical  difference  between thought and
the  world  is  not  the  way  in  which  ‘the  world  is  treated’  by
Trendelenburg, but is a constructive hypothesis, aimed at a the-
ory which explains the connection between the two. Trendelen-
burg’s logic-metaphysics of motion is a theory of connection, not
of separation. 
This  is  a  first  and  important  point  of  divergence  between
Dilthey and Trendelenburg. One of the concepts from the pair
‘thinking’ and ‘world’ (or: thought and being), i.e. the world, is
construed  differently  by  Dilthey.  Trendelenburg’s  theory  is
aimed at giving an overview of the possible solutions to the fun-
damental, metaphysical problem of philosophy. But for Dilthey,
there is no fundamental metaphysical problem, at least not the
problem of how thought and being are connected. Trendelen-
burg’s notion of being as completely alien to thinking, even as a
theoretical construction, is missing in Dilthey. From the outset
being is only construed by Dilthey as ‘the world’: being as it is ex-
perienced, as life-world. 
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It is not only the world that is construed differently by Dilthey.
The other term of the pairing ‘thinking’ and ‘world’, thinking,
differs  from Trendelenburg’s  conception as  well.  Instead of  a
‘theory of science’ (Theorie der Wissenschaft), Dilthey speaks of a
‘theory of knowledge’ (Theorie des Wissens). As logic, philosophy
examines the criteria for the correctness of thought processes.72
Philosophical inquiry is aimed at thought processes as such, and
is  not  limited  beforehand to  scientific  thinking  and scientific
knowledge. Although the difference between a  Theorie der Wis-
senschaft and a Theorie des Wissens might seem trivial and insigni-
ficant, it marks a fundamentally different conception in Dilthey
of ‘knowledge’ and ‘thought’. For Dilthey, thinking and scientif-
ic thinking are not identical.
Philosophy construed as fundamental science, which engages
with  all  forms  of  thinking,  not  only  with  the  scientific  ones,
therefore has more than just theoretical significance:73 it relates
to different ‘domains of culture’ (Sphären der Kultur), not just to
scientific knowledge. Dilthey distinguishes between three areas
of  culture.  First,  philosophy examines  the cultural  domain of
Weltvorstellung and  Welterkenntnis.  Here philosophy  aims at the
special  sciences,  examines  and elucidates  the methods,  limits,
presuppositions  and  goals  of  scientific  knowledge.  As  such,
philosophy is  the ‘theory of theories,  the foundation and the
synopsis  [Zusammenfassung]  of  the special  sciences  into  know-
ledge of reality’.74 In this way, philosophy fulfils a task compar-
able  to  the  one  it  fulfils  in  Trendelenburg’s  conception of  a
‘founding science’.
But the two other domains of culture with which philosophy
engages  go  beyond Trendelenburg’s  programmatic framework
for  a philosophical  theory of  science.  These domains  are not
72 Dilthey: Wesen, 408.
73 Which is not say, of course,  that Trendelenburg’s ‘grundlegende Wissen-
schaft’  does  have  only  theoretical  significance.  Rather,  the  practical
significance  is  in  Trendelenburg’s  case  attached  to  the  organic  worldview
which is established by the founding science. With Dilthey, it is a direct result
of  the  broadening of the  concept  of  knowledge to include more than just
scientific knowledge, as we will see.
74 Wesen, 408: ‘Theorie der Theorien,  die Begründung und die Zusammen-
fassung der Einzelwissenschaften zur Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit.’
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limited to the sciences. The next cultural  domain engaged by
philosophy is that of life-experience (Lebenserfahrung). According
to  Dilthey,  life-experience  is  the  increasing reflection  on life,
where life is taken as the ‘inner connection of the psychic per-
formance  in  the association of  a  person.’75 It  is  important  to
stress that this ‘life-experience’ is not a kind of immediate datum
which is given to philosophy. Life-experience always has the form
of reflection on life: ‘Lebenserfahrung ist die wachsende Besin-
nung und Reflexion über das Leben’.76 Life-experience is always
reflexively mediated.  Mediated by individual  reflection and by
the structures of society (die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen), this life-
experience is part of the ‘foundation in reality’ (reale Grundlage)
of philosophy. Philosophy’s aim here is to overcome the subject-
ive character of valuations of life. Philosophy should thus attain
an estimation of the value of things and a conscious comprehen-
sion of the meaning of life. In such a way a ‘system of immanent
life-values’ would be established.77 
Finally, philosophy also relates to the ideals and arrangements
of the ‘practical world’. As such, it is the contemplation on the
will and the arrangements of life in which the will has found its
expression (Lebensordnungen such as: economy, law, state, man’s
mastery of nature, morality [Sittlichkeit]). The philosophical ana-
lysis  of these  arrangements reveals  their  necessity  on the one
hand,  but  examines  the extent  of  their  validity  on the other.
Philosophy is therefore both an ‘inner force’ which aims at the
development and enhancement of the arrangements of life and
also  provides  ‘fixed norms’  (feste  Maßstäbe)  for  these  arrange-
ments.  Philosophy  thus  mediates  between  reality  and  critical
ideal by critically examining the norms which are taken from the
‘reality of life’.78
75 Wesen,  408:  ‘die  innere  Beziehung  der  psychischen  Leistungen  im
Zusammenhang der Person.’
76 Wesen, 408.
77 Wesen, 409-410.
78 Wesen,  411:  Philosophy  becomes  an  ‘inneren  Kraft,  welche  auf  die
Steigerung des Menschen und die Fortentwicklung seiner Lebensordnungen
hindrängt,’  and  provides  ‘zugleich  feste  Maßstäbe  für  diese  [Lebens-
ordnungen] in der sittlichen Regel und in den Realitäten des Lebens.’
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To draw a final comparison between Dilthey and Trendelen-
burg here, let us return to the relation of the different functions
of  philosophy.  Trendelenburg  interpreted  the  answers  to  the
fundamental metaphysical question, the question of the relation
between thought and being, as worldviews. These fundamental
metaphysical  conceptions  secure  the  possibility  of  objective
knowledge of the world as well. This reveals a close relationship
between (in Dilthey’s terminology) the functions of establishing
a worldview and the founding of scientific knowledge. In Tren-
delenburg the worldview function and the logical function are
two sides of the same coin. The scientific foundation of the or-
ganic worldview includes the logical-metaphysical foundation of
scientific knowledge as such. 
Since Dilthey also distinguishes these two functions (among
others), the question can be raised how he construes the rela-
tion between them. We have already learned that the common
property of the different philosophical functions is their reflex-
ive and synthetic nature. But does this also mean that philosophy
ultimately addresses only one problem? At the end of his essay
on the essence of philosophy, Dilthey writes retrospectively:
So überliefert dann die Geschichte der Philosophie der systematischen
philosophischen Arbeit die drei Probleme der Grundlegung,  der Be-
gründung  und  Zusammenfassung  der  Einzelwissenschaften  und  die
Aufgabe der Auseinandersetzung mit dem nie zur Ruhe zu bringenden
Bedürfnis letzter Besinnung über Sein, Grund Wert, Zweck und ihren
Zusammenhang  in  der  Weltanschauung,  gleichviel  in  welcher  Form
und Richtung diese Auseinandersetzung stattfindet.79
The question is then whether this threefold problem of philo-
sophy, and the problem that springs from the ever-present ‘need
for a worldview’, can be solved by one and the same philosophic-
al project, or whether they are two distinct issues that philosophy
has to deal with. Dilthey remains somewhat obscure on this is-
sue,  and it  is  not  surprising  that  both  interpretations  can  be
found in the literature.  Rudolf Makkreel,  in  his  study  Dilthey.
Philosopher of the Human Studies, argues that the worldview task of
philosophy comes ‘in addition to establishing the foundations of
79 Wesen, 416.
96 PHILOSOPHY AS WELTANSCHAUUNG
knowledge’.  He  concludes  that  ‘taken  by  itself’  (!)  Dilthey’s
worldview theory is problematic and ‘in many respects the least
satisfactory  part of  Dilthey’s  philosophy.’80 Ilse  Bulhof,  on the
contrary, interprets Dilthey’s worldview theory as an integral and
concluding part of his philosophical work.81 I will return to this
question in the final chapter. The importance of this question
must not be underestimated. It is not only relevant to the ques-
tion how Dilthey’s worldview theory relates to his other philo-
sophical concerns. More importantly, it also decides how Dilthey
philosophically positions the concept and theory of worldview.
Therefore it is decisive for the question whether Dilthey’s philo-
sophy also constitutes a worldview. 
8. Conclusion: worldview or theory of worldviews?
Does  Dilthey  only  offer  a  theory  of  worldviews  (Weltan-
schauungslehre)—a theory which does not claim to offer a world-
view, an interpretation of the world, itself? It has recently been
argued that although Dilthey aims to provide a scientific theory
of worldviews, he in fact ‘falls prey’ to a non-scientific worldview
himself.82 Yet such an interpretation presupposes a rigid opposi-
tion between ‘science’ or ‘scientific philosophy’ on the one hand
and ‘worldview’ on the other—in other words: it takes Husserl’s
dilemma for granted. 
But  the  interpretation  of  Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie
presented in this chapter argues that Dilthey’s theory of world-
views is an attempt to overcome the limits of traditional, meta-
physical worldviews. Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie is not just
a  theory of  different worldviews,  but an attempt to provide a
more complete interpretation of life. Instead of abandoning the
idea of a philosophical worldview, Dilthey tries to overcome the
limits of traditional philosophical worldviews by integrating the
historical plurality in his typology of worldviews. Yet this further
step is also an attempt to provide a more complete understand-
80 Makkreel, Dilthey, 345.
81 Bulhof, Wilhelm Dilthey, chapter five.
82 Holl, ‘Diltheys “Weltanschauungslehre”’, 88.
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ing of life (‘tiefer in das Leben sehen…’), and thus a ‘view of life
and the world’—a worldview. According to Dilthey’s analysis, the
theory of worldviews therefore results in a more complete, more
valid, more scientific view of life and the world. Despite the pro-
found differences between Dilthey’s and Trendelenburg’s theory
of worldviews, they both aim at establishing a scientific,  philo-
sophical worldview. 
Rather  than  one  who  abandons  philosophical  worldviews,
Dilthey must be considered a philosopher who attempts to con-
struct a philosophical worldview. Yet the question must be asked
whether Dilthey, in trying to overcome the limits of ‘metaphys-
ics’—the claim of universal  validity for limited (and therefore
only partly valid) perspectives on the world—does not fall prey
to  another  kind of  metaphysics,  the metaphysics  of  life.  This
question will be taken up in the final chapter.
CHAPTER 4
WILHELM WINDELBAND:
PHILOSOPHY AS THE SCIENCE OF WORLDVIEW
1. Introduction
In this  chapter, I will  discuss the concept of worldview in the
work of Wilhelm Windelband. In Windelband we find—as we
did in Trendelenburg and Dilthey—an interpretation of philoso-
phy as worldview,  or at least  as aimed at a worldview. Windel-
band’s position is similar to that of Trendelenburg and Dilthey
in important respects, but differs from them in others, which are
perhaps even more important. The relation between the three
positions in the worldview debate and the evolution of the de-
bate which they reveal will be the topic of the next chapter. This
chapter deals with Windelband’s position on the philosophical
question of worldview.
In order to understand his position, I will first address what
can be considered his  early  writings (section 1).  These works
form a somewhat separate group both historically and through
the systematic position presented in them. Secondly, I will  ad-
dress two key publications on Kant and the concept of worldview
which  appeared  in  1904  (section  2).  In  these  publications,
Windelband connects the question of a worldview to the inter-
pretation of Kant, and especially to Kant’s  Kritik der Urteilskraft.
The third section will  further discuss Windelband’s interpreta-
tion of this work and its relevance to the worldview question. In
section 4,  we turn to Windelband’s final  major  work,  his  Ein-
leitung in die Philosophie. As we shall see, Windelband advances in
some respects beyond his 1904 worldview concept in this book.
Section  5  will  then  discuss  the  ‘metaphysical  character’  of
Windelband’s worldview concept and of his Kant interpretation.
Finally, section 6 discusses the historical context of Windelband’s
Kant interpretation, especially the influence of his teacher, Kuno
Fischer.  This  will  reveal  a  systematic  connection  between  Fi-
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scher’s position in the debate with Trendelenburg and Windel-
band’s reading of the Third Critique. In the concluding section,
I  will  sketch the development of the concept  of  worldview in
Windelband and summarize its most important elements.
2. The concept of worldview in Windelband’s early writings
Windelband’s  early  writings,  those dating from the 1870s  and
1880s, do not use the term Weltanschauung (worldview) very of-
ten. If one considers the eleven essays originating in the years up
to and including 1883 in his  two-volume collection  Präludien,1
the term Weltanschauung is absent in seven of these essays.2 Some
of these seven essays do use related terms such as Weltbetrachtung,
Weltauffassung,  or  Lebensbetrachtung,  but  no  more  than  a  few
times, and they do not figure prominently.3 Of the remaining
four essays in which the term is used explicitly, one uses the term
only in passing and in a clearly non-technical, non philosophical
way.4 The topic of worldview is thus addressed more or less sys-
tematically in only three out of Windelband’s eleven early essays
collected in the Präludien. 
1 The Präludien, originally a one-volume collection of essays, steadily expanded
with  each  of  the  subsequent  publications.  From  the  fourth  edition  (1911)
onwards, it was published in two volumes. The fifth edition (1914) is the last to
which new essayswere added. The work contains most of Windelband’s essays,
with a few notable exceptions. For the purpose of this section (the worldview
concept in the early  period),  no relevant publications outside the  Präludien
exist, cf. Jakowenko,  Wilhelm Windelband  (1941), which still contains the most
extensive published bibliography of Windelband’s works.
2 The  term  ‘Weltanschauung’  does  not  occur  in  ‘Über  Denken  und
Nachdenken’ (1877), ‘Über Friedrich Hölderlin und sein Geschick’  (1878),
‘Über Sokrates’  (1880),  ‘Normen und Naturgesetze’  (1882),  ‘Kritische oder
genetische Methode?’ (1883), ‘Sub specie aeternitatis’ (1883), ‘Vom Prinzip
der Moral’ (1883). 
3 ‘Weltauffassung’  and  ‘Weltbetrachtung’  in  ‘Über  Sokrates’,  ‘Lebensauf-
fassung’  in  ‘Vom Prinzip  der  Moral’,  ‘Weltbetrachtung’  in  ‘Kritische  oder
genetische Methode?’.
4 ‘Zum Gedächtnis Spinozas’ (1877). 
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Yet this cursory look at the use of the term Weltanschauung in
Windelband’s early work does not warrant the conclusion that
this concept, and the philosophical  questions connected to it,
were not an important issue for him at the time. For in the three
essays which address the topic (‘Pessimismus und Wissenschaft’
from 1876, ‘Immanuel Kant’ from 1881,  and ‘Was ist Philoso-
phie?’ from 1882), a clear notion of the concept of worldview
and its philosophical value emerge. Furthermore, the concept of
worldview plays a central role in Windelband’s discussion of the
nature of philosophy as science. Especially the essays ‘Immanuel
Kant’  and ‘Was ist Philosophie?’  include important  systematic
discussions connected to, or even centred around, the concept
of worldview.
In the  essay  ‘Immanuel  Kant’  of  1881,  originally  a  lecture
commemorating  the  centennial  of  the  first  edition  of  Kant’s
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Windelband argues that Kant has ‘des-
troyed’ (zersetzt) the concept of Weltanschauung ‘in its traditional
sense’  (im alten  Sinne).5 This  traditional  sense  of  worldview is
taken by Windelband as synonymous with ‘world-picture’ (Welt-
bild).6 According to Windelband, it makes no sense to speak of a
‘picture of the world’ or of ‘picturing the world’ as a totality and
as it is in itself, within Kant’s critical philosophy. As such, one
cannot speak of Kant’s worldview.
This statement is presented by Windelband as an argument
against the possibility  of a  scientific worldview which goes be-
yond the world of appearances. He specifically targets (but does
not  name)  interpreters  of  Kant  who  maintain  that  Kant  has
shown that scientific knowledge can only give us knowledge of
the ‘world of appearances’, and that a worldview must go beyond
the sciences. Since—these interpreters go on to argue—science
cannot know anything about things as they are in themselves, a
worldview which contains complete knowledge of the world can-
not be based on science alone. A worldview—which is thus un-
derstood as containing knowledge of things as such, not of mere
appearances alone—must therefore be completed by the ‘neces-
sary presuppositions of ethical consciousness’ and by the ‘genial
5 ‘Immanuel Kant’, 141.
6 ‘Immanuel Kant’, 141, see also 140.
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intuitions of art’.7 But to Windelband in 1881, such an extension
of the concept of knowledge beyond empirical, scientific know-
ledge is not an option for philosophy. Rather than relaxing the
criteria  for  scientific  knowledge,  Windelband  discards  the
concept  of  worldview  as  scientifically  unattainable  for  philo-
sophy. Since knowledge of the world as such and in its totality is
not possible in a scientific,  objective way,  a  scientific,  philoso-
phical worldview is also an impossibility. There can be no (meta-
physical) knowledge of the world apart from the sciences, and a
worldview which would claim to provide knowledge of the world
as it is in itself cannot be scientific.
A year later—in an essay dating from 1882—Windelband dis-
cusses the question ‘Was ist Philosophie?’. In an age in which the
special sciences are flourishing and have appropriated many of
the topics  which were traditionally  the domain of  philosophy,
the question about the nature of philosophy as a science must be
addressed. If philosophy is science, what is its object? According
to Windelband in this essay, philosophy has no direct object in
reality, not even in the totality of the real. Such a science of the
cosmos (Weltall) is a metaphysical dream from which philosophy
has awoken. 
Instead,  philosophy  should  be  a  reflexive  critique  of  the
products of reason. Windelband explains this in terms of the dif-
ference  between  judgements  (Urteile)  and  evaluations  (Beur-
teilungen). The former expresses a relation between two repres-
entations (Vorstellungsinhalte),  while the latter  expresses a rela-
tion between a representation and the evaluating consciousness.
Scientific judgements are always accompanied by an evaluation
which either asserts or denies the truth of the judgement. Philo-
sophy should deal with the legitimacy of these claims of truth or
falsity by means of the quaestio juris. The quaestio facti, the judge-
ments about objects,  are a matter of science themselves.  This
pertains not only  to science but to other judgements, such as
moral  and aesthetic judgements as  well.  The object for philo-
sophy are not these judgements themselves, but the evaluations
attached to them, or rather, the principles which have absolute
validity, and on the strength of which these evaluations can legit-
7 ‘Immanuel Kant’, 141.
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imately be made. Philosophy must therefore be taken as a reflex-
ive discipline which examines the validity of the uses of reason
and the principles which provide this validity.
Kantian, critical philosophy must therefore be understood as
the science of principles or norms, or, as Windelband writes, the
science  of  ‘normative  consciousness’  (Normalbewußtsein).  This
normative  consciousness  is  not  an  empirical  or  metaphysical
reality, not that which is factually valid, but rather the totality of
that which should be valid. Philosophy reflects on (the products
of) empirical consciousness in order to discover how much of
this normative consciousness is realized in it:
Philosophie  also ist  die  Wissenschaft  vom Normalbewußtsein.  Sie  durch-
forscht das empirische Bewußtsein, um festzustellen, an welchen Punk-
ten darin jene normative Allgemeingiltigkeit hervorspringt.8 
Windelband  maintains  that  Kantian  critical  philosophy  has
shown the impossibility of a universally valid metaphysics, under-
stood as ‘science of worldview’.9 Such a metaphysical worldview
would entail immediate philosophical knowledge of the world.
In  this  sense,  Windelband  claims,  metaphysics  is  impossible.
Philosophy cannot be a ‘metaphysics of things’, but only a ‘meta-
physics  of  knowledge’.10 The  task  of  philosophy  can  only  be
taken in relation to the faculties of reason, especially theoretical
reason as it is employed in science. The object of philosophy is
not (some part of) the world, the object of philosophy is formed
by the knowledge claims that science makes about the world,
and the validity claims, the evaluations that are entailed in all
activities of reason.11 Philosophy examines the validity of these
claims by means of the faculties of reason, it does not provide
knowledge of the world in the form of a philosophical (meta-
physical)  worldview,  according to  Windelband in this  essay.  A
worldview here is a rather circumscribed concept—metaphysical
8 ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, 46.
9 ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, 27.
10 ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, 19.
11 ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, 23f.
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knowledge of the world as it is—which is sharply distinguished
from philosophy, whose object is the world as it should be, i.e.
the normative consciousness.
An even more specific use of the concept of worldview can be
found in his early essay ‘Pessimismus und Wissenschaft’ (1876).
Here,  the  term  Weltanschauung is  used in  a  discussion of  the
question  whether  a  scientific  evaluation of  the totality  of  the
world as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is possible. If it could be estab-
lished objectively whether the world as such is good or bad, a sci-
entific  foundation  of  optimism or  pessimism could  be  given.
Windelband  is  especially  concerned  with  philosophical  pessi-
mism which, due to the influenceof Schopenhauer, was a popu-
lar stance in this period. Windelband agrees that optimism or
pessimism exist as ‘moods’ (Stimmungen). As mere moods, they
are personal, and not a subject for philosophy. But if pessimism
or optimism are claimed to be scientifically founded judgements
of the value of the world as such, they  are important for philo-
sophy:
Will ich dagegen die Stimmung als solche in eine Weltanschauung um-
setzen  und  jene  Verallgemeinerungstätigkeit  der  Stimmungsbetrach-
tung bis an das letzte Ende führen, wo dann das Urteil: „die Welt ist
gut“ oder „die Welt ist schlecht“ den Anspruch auf objektive Wahrheit
und allgemeine Anerkennung macht – dann stehen wir vor einer Prin-
zipienfrage ersten Ranges.12
Pessimism elevated to the level of scientific knowledge leads to
the  philosophical  question  (‘Prinzipienfrage  ersten  Ranges’)
whether the totality of the world can be evaluated with scientific
objectivity.  Without  addressing  the  specific  arguments  which
Windelband provides, his conclusion is a denial that such a sci-
entific evaluation of the totality of the world (or universe) is pos-
sible. Optimism and pessimism cannot be given an objective sta-
tus as scientific interpretations of the totality of the world.
What does this tell us about the concept of worldview in the
1876 text? According to Windelband, pessimism or optimism as
worldviews,  as  universal  judgements  about  the  value  of  the
world, cannot be given a scientific foundation. Although the dis-
12 ‘Pessimismus und Wissenschaft’, 223.
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cussion  is  limited  here  to  these  two  particular  worldviews,
Windelband’s conclusion on the possibility of giving a scientific
basis to such a worldview is in line with the more general po-
sition taken in the two later texts  which we just discussed.  In
these two later texts he expresses the position that a worldview as
such cannot be scientific, without limiting this to any particular
worldview. 
In these three early texts (1876, 1881, and 1882), Windelband
can thus be seen as being opposed to the idea of a philosophical,
scientific  worldview.  A worldview claims to contain knowledge
about the totality of the world, and has a metaphysical character,
for it goes beyond the empirical knowledge of the sciences. Such
a Weltanschauung cannot be scientifically warranted, as only em-
pirical scientific knowledge can have universal validity (Allgemein-
gültigkeit).  Philosophy  should  examine  the  claims  of  scientific
knowledge to such validity. Worldviews are relegated from phi-
losophy to a proto-philosophical domain, which is personal, sub-
jective and most of all non-scientific. In his later texts, however,
Windelband develops a notion of philosophical worldview that is
different from the ‘metaphysical’ notion which he rejects in his
early work, as we shall see. 
3. The worldview concept in Windelband after 1900
After the publications of the early 1880s, Windelband did not
publish many systematical texts until after 1900.13 In the histori-
cal works from this period, the concept of worldview is not ad-
dressed systematically. Consequently, no information about the
place of the concept of worldview in his thought in this period is
available to us. Interestingly, two of the publications which ap-
peared after this period of systematical silence give a prominent
place to the concept of worldview, which, as we shall see, differs
13 He  did  publish  several  historical  works,  including  his  1893  publication
Geschichte der Philosophie, which appeared in many subsequent editions (the last
in 1993), renamed Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie from the 1903 edition
onwards. See Jakowenko, Wilhelm Windelband, for further bibliographical data.
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markedly from the earlier treatment. Furthermore, the concept
of worldview plays an important role in Windelband’s interpreta-
tion of Kant.
3.1 Windelband’s Kant-interpretation of 1904
Part I: Kant’s worldview
The centenary of Kant’s death in 1904 was the occasion for two
contributions by Windelband on the state of Kantian critical phi-
losophy. One was an essay which appeared in the  Kant-Studien,
entitled ‘Nach hundert  Jahren’.  The other was an address he
held at the University of Heidelberg, under the title ‘Immanuel
Kant  und  seine  Weltanschauung’.  In  these  two  contributions,
Windelband presents an interpretation of Kant’s critical philoso-
phy and its relevance which differs from his earlier interpreta-
tion from the 1880s. For one thing, Windelband’s interpretation
of the relevance of Kantian philosophy is now more extensive
than the earlier one. And even more importantly for our present
purposes, this revised Kant interpretation is developed largely in
terms of the concept of worldview. In this section I will analyse
Windelband’s Kant interpretation of 1904 and the role  which
the concept of worldview plays in it. This sub-section starts with
an analysis of the position taken by Windelband in ‘Immanuel
Kant  und seine  Weltanschauung’.  The  other  1904  text  is  dis-
cussed in the next sub-section. 
Looking  back  on  the  impact  of  Kant’s  critical  philosophy,
Windelband attributes the impact of his philosophy to the ‘inti-
mate and concentrated essence of his personality.’14 Ascription
of (part of) the historical impact of persons to their individual
character is an element which forms part of Windelband’s no-
tion of the historical development of philosophy from at least as
early as his Geschichte der Philosophie (1892). Here, in his 1904 ‘Im-
manuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, this ‘individual’ con-
tribution is specified as stemming from the philosopher’s world-
view:
14 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 4.
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Und dieses innerste Wesen ist bei dem Philosophen seine Weltanschau-
ung,  womit  er  die  Eigenart  seiner  Individualität  auf  die  Wirklichkeit
projizirt.15
Windelband does not evaluate the apparently ‘subjective’ root of
Kant’s philosophical work negatively, or as un-scientific. On the
contrary, he considers the role of the philosopher’s individuality
a prerequisite for historical relevance.16 It is the role of Kant’s
personality,  therefore, which is the ground of his pre-eminent
position in the history of philosophy:
Und so meine ich auch, daß Kants überragende Stellung in der Ge-
schichte der Philosophie in der ganz besonderen Art beruht, wie er die-
se letzte und höchste Aufgabe aller Philosophie aus seiner Persönlich-
keit heraus gelöst hat.17
This final and highest task of philosophy is the task of a world-
view, which is therefore both an expression of the philosopher’s
individuality  and  a  solution  to  the  scientific  problem  which
philosophy faces. Kant’s works express a worldview, and this is
the expression of his personal worldview, in scientific terms.18 
Windelband is aware that his analysis of Kant’s worldview as
Kant’s  most  important  contribution  to  philosophy  might  es-
trange those who subscribe to the common interpretation that
Kant has proven the impossibility of a scientific metaphysics.19
And, as should be recalled from the discussion of Windelband’s
early concept of worldview above, he himself subscribed—with
explicit reference to Kant—to the view that a scientific world-
view, understood as metaphysics, is impossible. However, Windel-
15 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 4.
16 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 4: ‘Ihre [= die Eigenart seiner
Individualität] Wirksamkeit ist es allein, die dauernd auf die Gemüter wirkt, sie
packt und fesselt.’
17 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 5.
18 Which  can  be  seen  e.g.  from  this  expression  by  Windelband:  ‘Diese
Weltanschauung  in  den  monumentalen  Grundzügen,  wie  er  sie  in  seinen
Werken niedergelegt hat, aus den Formeln des Systems herauszulösen, scheint
mir die würdigste Art, sein Bild in dieser Gedächtnisstunde lebendig vor uns
aufzurichten.’ ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 5-6.
19 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 6.
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band maintains now that Kant’s demonstration of the impossibil-
ity of a scientific metaphysics must be understood as only part of
the Kantian worldview.  The first  stage of  Kant’s  critical  philo-
sophy—the reduction of scientific knowledge to the world of ex-
perience—is  indeed  only  a  first  step.  The  sciences  cannot
achieve knowledge beyond experience,  but this  does  not  pre-
clude a metaphysics that goes beyond the knowledge of the phys-
ical world, the world of experience that the sciences study. 
Windelband interprets Kant’s famous dictum that he had to
restrict knowledge for the sake of faith along these lines as well.
The restriction of scientific knowledge to the domain of experi-
ence  means  that  traditional,  natural  science  cannot  achieve
knowledge  beyond  experience.  To  achieve  a  comprehensive
worldview, therefore, another kind of experience and another
kind of  science are  needed. Hence the ‘faith’  meant here by
Kant is  not religion in one of its various historical forms, but
rather a system of necessary and universally valid beliefs:
Freilich ist dann dieser Glaube nicht irgend ein individuell oder histo-
risch bestimmter,  nicht  Kants  oder irgend eine  andere  Privatansicht,
sondern ein System von Überzeugungen, die aus den innersten Not-
wendigkeiten  des  menschlichen  Lebens  durch  die  philosophische
Überlegung herausgelöst und in ihrer allgemeinen Geltung für die Ver-
nunft erwiesen werden. In diesem Sinne habe ich es von jeher als die
epochemachende Bedeutung Kants in der Geschichte der Philosophie
angesehen, daß die Gründe für seine wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung
nicht einseitig in den begrifflichen Formen des Wissens, sondern in der
ganzen Breite der menschlichen Vernunftbetätigung liegen [...]20
This kind of ‘faith’ is therefore not opposed to philosophy and
to scientific knowledge, but rather forms a unity with scientific
knowledge  in  the  philosophical  worldview.  This  ‘faith’  is  de-
monstrated  faith  (‘in  ihrer  allgemeinen  Geltung  für  die  Ver-
nunft erwiesen’).  We will return to the question how the term
‘science’  is  transformed here later.  For now,  it  is  sufficient  to
note  that  the  ‘scientific  worldview’  (wissenschaftliche  Weltan-
schauung) is based on more than the sciences (begriffliche Formen
des Wissens). The ‘scientific’ character of Kant’s worldview is not
20 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 6-7.
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the same as the scientific character of the traditional, natural sci-
ences, for the latter are indeed incapable of knowledge beyond
the domain of experience.
According  to  Windelband,  the  core  of  the  worldview  ex-
pressed in Kant’s philosophical work is to be found in the funda-
mental opposition (Gegensatz) between the material (sinnlichem)
and immaterial (übersinnlichem) world. To prevent the distinction
between these two domains from being erased was the main con-
cern of Kant’s work:
Die Verwischung der Grenzlinien zwischen den beiden Welten zu ver-
hüten,  erkannte  er  als  die  eigentliche Aufgabe  seines  Nachdenkens,
und das hat ihn zum kritischen Philosophen gemacht.21
The structure of Kant’s main critical work—the three critiques—
is analyzed by Windelband in the light of the two sides of the op-
position between material and immaterial world, and their rela-
tionship. The first of Kant’s critiques, the Kritik der reinen Vernun-
ft,  is  concerned  with  the  first  side  of  the  opposition,  the
sensuous, material world, the world of experience. To be more
precise, it is  concerned with the delimitation of knowledge to
the  world  of  appearances  (Erscheinungen).  The  two  roots  of
knowledge, sensuous experience and intellectual forms, are two
independent roots, but they are both rooted in the knowing sub-
ject. The empirical knowledge thus achieved is only knowledge
of the world of appearances. This is the part of ‘Kant’s world-
view’ which early neo-Kantianism—and the early Windelband as
well, as we have seen—mistakenly took for the whole, thus con-
cluding the impossibility of a ‘scientific metaphysics’,  of know-
ledge of the immaterial world. But this part of Kant’s philosophy,
which restricts science to experience, is itself limited. It is limited
by Kant’s concept of science as Newtonian, natural science.22 
A more complete interpretation of Kant’s worldview is called
for, according to Windelband, one which acknowledges the lim-
its of Kant’s concept of science as well.  The way to this more
complete interpretation of Kant can be found in the limited in-
21 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 9.
22 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 14.
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terpretation itself. The delimitation of science to the sensuous,
material  world  points  beyond  these  limits,  to  the  immaterial
world:
Die Sinnenwelt kann Erscheinung nur heißen im Verhältnis zu einer
höheren  Welt  von  tieferer  Realität,  zu  der  übersinnlichen  Welt  der
Dinge an sich.23
Scientific knowledge of the world of appearances points beyond
itself because of what Kant called  der transzendentale Schein—the
metaphysical illusions stemming from the principles of theoreti-
cal reason.24 For instance, the idea of the totality of the world is a
necessary (regulative) idea for theoretical reason, but this totali-
ty cannot be the object of experience, and therefore cannot be
known—in the sense of scientific knowledge.25 
This does not mean that the immaterial world is out of reach
for philosophy—and this  is  the point where Windelband goes
beyond the earlier, restrictive interpretations of Kant:
Wo das Wissen versagt, tritt das Gewissen ein. Ist die theoretische Ver-
nunft aus der höheren Sphäre des Übersinnlichen ausgeschlossen, so
ist die praktische darin heimisch, und mit ihr faßt Kants Lehre festen
Fuß in der Welt, die der wissenschaftlichen Einsicht nur als Grenzbe-
stimmung ihres eigenen Bereiches gesetzt war.26
For empirical, scientific knowledge the relation between the ma-
terial and the immaterial world was determined by the absolute
boundary of experience—even if the transcendental ideas point-
ed beyond the domain of experience. As far as practical reason
is concerned, the relation between material and immaterial can
be described as an antagonistic opposition. Man is a citizen of
both the material and the immaterial world, and to fulfil the du-
ties which he is aware of through his conscience he must con-
front and oppose his natural dispositions. 
23 Ibid.
24 KrV B 349f.
25 Cf. e.g. KrV B 397.
26 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 17.
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This connection of the material and the immaterial world in
man enhances the reality of both worlds with respect to scientific
knowledge.  The immaterial  world is  a reality  for man in con-
science, whereas it was only present as a regulative idea for theo-
retical reason. According to Windelband the reality of the sensu-
ous, material world is enhanced as well. It is no longer merely
appearance, but a reality to be confronted:
Mögen auch alle Empfindungsinhalte und alle Formen, worin wir diese
zu unsrer Erkenntnis verknüpfen, nichts andres als die Arten der Vor-
stellung sein, zu denen wir durch die Einrichtung unseres Intellekts ge-
zwungen sind,  — unser  Gewissen lehrt  uns,  daß darin eine  Realität
steckt, die dem sittlichen Zweckgesetze widerstrebt und ihm unterwor-
fen werden soll. Denn unser eignes sinnliches Wesen ist nicht bloß eine
Vorstellungsform des übersinnlichen, sondern dessen streitbarer Wider-
part.27
All true human life is considered the work of the ethical will to
realize itself in the opposing material world. The material and
the immaterial world are connected for practical reason, but in
an antagonistic way.  This  antagonism must  not be taken as  a
merely negative opposition, however, for it the ground of all hu-
man history.28 
The question whether there is not a deeper connection be-
tween the two worlds than this antagonistic one can be asked as
well. Thus the final and highest problem for Kantian philosophy,
according to Windelband, is the question whether empirical re-
ality, the world of appearances, can ultimately be considered the
realization of a super-sensuous teleological law (eine übersinnliche
Zweckgesetzgebung).29 If this were indeed the case, a fundamental
connection between the two worlds would be discovered:
Dürfte diese Frage bejaht werden, so läge darin eine freilich über alle
unsre  wissenschaftliche  Erkenntnis  hinausgehende  Deutung  der  tief-
sten Wesens- und Lebensgemeinschaft zwischen beiden Welten.30
27 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 20.
28 Cf. Einleitung in die Philosophie, 432. 
29 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 22.
30 Ibid.
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Note that philosophical knowledge of this deep unity is of anoth-
er, higher order than scientific knowledge. In order to call the
Kantian worldview a ‘scientific’ worldview, therefore, the concept
of science must be adjusted. We will return to this further below.
For Windelband, it is the merit of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft
to have given a positive answer to this most fundamental ques-
tion. It is therefore Kant’s ‘greatest work’.31 In the experience of
art,  Kant  finds  an experience of  a  teleological  structure (eine
Zweckmäßigkeit)  which  is  unintentional  (absichtslos).  In  other
words, the teleological structure which in the experience of art is
encountered in the sensuous world is not created by the experi-
encing subject.32 
For Kant, this experience of an unintended teleological struc-
ture is only an indication (eine Hindeutung) of the deep connect-
edness between the material and the immaterial worlds. As Win-
delband writes: 
Das gilt ihm als die von uns zu erlebende Hindeutung auf eine tiefste
Lebensgemeinschaft der beiden Welten, die hier im harmonischen Ein-
klang erscheinen. Aber er ist niemals der Meinung gewesen, daß sich
damit  die  Kluft  zwischen  Sinnlichem  und  Übersinnlichem  wirklich
schließe.33
It  is  in  human labour  rather  than in aesthetic  contemplation
that the connection between the two worlds must be sought. The
adequateness of the material world to the realization of immate-
rial ends gives man the prospect that his work is not futile. The
completion of Kant’s worldview can be found in his conception
of history as the realization of immaterial ends in the material
world:
So vollendet sich Kants Weltanschauung in dem Verständnis der Ge-
schichte als der Verwirklichung der Zwecke der übersinnlichen Welt in
der Sinnenwelt selbst.34
31 ‘Immanuel  Kant  und  seine  Weltanschauung’,  22.  Cf.  ‘Nach  hundert
Jahren’,  141,  Cf.  Windelband’s  Introduction  to  the  Akademie-Ausgabe of  the
KdU, 516.
32 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 23.
33 Ibid.
34 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 27.
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Despite the fundamental adequacy of the material world to the
ends of the immaterial world, Windelband stresses that the dual-
ism between the two worlds is not overcome. The realization of
the immaterial ends in the material world is never completed,
reality is never fully adequate to the ideal:
In diesem Sinne beharrt Kant bei seiner dualistischen Weltanschauung:
er tut es gerade, weil er nie anders philosophiert hat als aus der Erfah-
rung und aus dem Leben selbst. Er stellt es als die letzte und unüber-
windliche Tatsache, als das absolute Faktum der Vernunft fest, daß wir
uns in einer solchen in sich antagonistischen Welt befinden, und er be-
jaht dies Faktum gerade aus der Energie des sittlichen Willens heraus.
Es ist gut so, denn nur so gibt es wirklich etwas zu tun in der Welt.35
Or,  as  Windelband has  argued elsewhere:  the antagonism be-
tween (ideal, universal) norm and (factual,  individual) realiza-
tion is the driving force behind history. If the ideal and its real-
ization were identical, there would be no history.36 
In sum, Windelband presents ‘Kant’s worldview’ here as a du-
alistic metaphysics. The traditional, natural sciences are restrict-
ed to the world of experience, experience of the material world.
Yet this critical reduction of the scope of natural science is only a
limited part of the Kantian worldview in Windelband’s interpre-
tation.  The  immaterial  world  is  experienced  through  con-
science,  and  philosophical  reflection  can achieve  a  system of
necessary principles of this world. As such, philosophy can go
where natural science cannot: it can achieve knowledge of the
immaterial world. 
This indicates that both knowledge and experience of the im-
material world are possible—and therefore that metaphysics is
possible. The extension of the concept of (scientific) knowledge
and the concept of experience, and the interpretation of Kant as
a metaphysician connected to them, will be further emphasized
by examining Windelband’s other 1904 contribution on Kant’s
philosophy, ‘Nach hundert Jahren’. 
35 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 31.
36 Einleitung in die Philosophie
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3.2 Windelband’s Kant-interpretation of 1904
Part II: Kant’s metaphysics
The other publication of 1904 takes a somewhat different,  al-
though complementary, perspective on Kant and the concept of
worldview. The main question in assessing Kant’s legacy after a
century, according to Windelband in this text,  is the question
whether  his  philosophical  work  can  serve  as  a  philosophical
worldview.37 What such a philosophical worldview should entail
remains implicit, but it should serve at least two purposes. First,
as far as the sciences are concerned, a philosophical worldview
should provide an integrated, comprehensive perspective (eine
Gesamtanschauung).  Such a  comprehensive  view must  incorpo-
rate the results of the special sciences, which are disjoined as a
result of their exclusive focus on different, limited parts of reali-
ty. This is not to say that the sciences themselves must broaden
their respective views to more comprehensive ones, rather it is
intended by Windelband as a critique of naturalism, which main-
tains that the scientific perspective represents all there is to know
about reality. On the contrary, the limitedness itself of the sci-
ences already points beyond these limits, and gives rise to the
question of the whole, of which the sciences study only parts.38 
The other purpose which the philosophical worldview must
serve has a more general, cultural character. The ‘national spirit’
(die Volksseele) turns to philosophy for a worldview, which is an ex-
pression of the inner motives of the national spirit:
Durch gewaltige  Geschicke und mächtige Umwälzungen des öffentli-
chen Lebens im Tiefsten aufgeregt, von fieberhaftem Bedürfnis nach
neuer Selbstgestaltung ergriffen, verlangte die Volksseele nach dem be-
stimmten und bestimmenden Ausdruck dessen,  was  sie  bewegt:  […]
eine Weltanschauung.39
37 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 150.
38 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 149. A similar argument is employed by Trendelen-
burg to describe the relationship between the sciences and philosophy.  See
chapter 2, section 3, above.
39 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 149.
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A worldview thus has to have what Windelband later calls practi-
cal relevance, it has to be an expression of the deepest motives
of culture (‘Ausdruck dessen was sie bewegt’). This expression is
a determining cultural factor itself, at the same time (‘bestimm-
ten und bestimmenden Ausdruck’).
According to Windelband, the question what, ‘after hundred
years’,  should  become  of  Kantian  philosophy  must  be  asked
against the background of the question of a philosophical world-
view. If Kantian philosophy has relevance, it must prove itself ca-
pable of providing at least the foundations of a philosophical
worldview which can accomplish both tasks—an integration of
scientific knowledge and a motivating expression of culture. 
According to Windelband, Kantian critical  philosophy is  in
fact capable of fulfilling these tasks. Moreover, Kant’s work al-
ready contains a fully developed worldview. Although the early
neo-Kantian  (and  Windelband’s  own  early)  interpretation  fo-
cused exclusively on Kant’s critical, anti-metaphysical theory of
knowledge, this meant neglect of an important part of his work
—and according to Windelband in 1904, neglect of the most im-
portant  part.  Windelband  does  not  hesitate  here  to  describe
Kant as a ‘metaphysical’ philosopher:
Darum ist der Streit, ob Kant ein Metaphysiker war, ein Wortstreit gewe-
sen.  Es ist offenkundig,  daß Kant  das,  was er  Wissenschaft  nannte,  mit
zwingenden Gründen als unfähig zur Überschreitung der Grenzen der
Erfahrung, zur Erkenntnis der Dinge-an-sich, zum Aufbau einer Meta-
physik im Sinne der „Wissenschaft vom Übersinnlichen“ erwiesen hat.
Aber es  ist  ebenso offenkundig,  daß er  von der  Realität  der  „intelli-
giblen Welt“ unerschütterlich überzeugt war, und daß er von ihrem In-
halt und Leben, wie von ihren Beziehungen zur Erscheinungswelt sehr
bestimmte und wohldurchdachte  Vorstellungen hatte.  Der ganze  Be-
stand seiner philosophischen Lebensarbeit enthält eine streng geschlos-
sene und völlig ausgebildete Weltanschauung: und sie liegt nicht etwa
nur keimartig zugrunde oder andeutungsweise im Hintergrunde, son-
dern offen ausgesprochen zutage.40
40 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 150-151, emphasis in original.
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Kant’s ‘belief’ in the immaterial world is not of a personal, sub-
jective, pre-scientific nature. The ‘postulates and principles’ of
practical reason and of the power of judgment have necessary
and universal validity to the same extent as the mathematical-sci-
entific knowledge of the world of appearances.41
To see this worldview of the ‘metaphysical Kant’, one has thus
to look beyond the critique of pure reason and the critical re-
duction of the scope of the natural sciences that Kant undertook
in it. Yet this reduction was a necessary step to make room for
ethics  and aesthetics  in  the philosophical  worldview.  It  is  the
‘greatness and originality’ of Kant’s critical philosophy to have
sought the principles and content of the philosophical  world-
view not only in scientific theory, but in the totality of reason.42
This limitation of science must not be understood as a charter
for subjective elements in the philosophical worldview. Although
Kant limits science to make room for ‘faith’ or ‘belief’, this must
not be taken as a particular religious or subjective foundation of
the philosophical worldview, but rather as a rationally valid be-
lief. The development of such a universally and necessary valid
belief remains the task of philosophy:
Nicht  jedes  Glauben  oder  jedes  Betrachten  hat  dies  metaphysische
Recht, sondern nur das notwendige und allgemeingiltige, das vernünfti-
ge.  Dies aber,  das allein berechtigte,  aus der Fülle der  individuellen
und historischen Ansprüche herauszuschälen, bleibt auch bei Kant die
Sache der Philosophie,  der „wissenschaftlichen“ Klärung;  — ja, es ist
ihre vornehmste Aufgabe.43
This 1904 interpretation of Kant might seem only remotely con-
nected to Windelband’s Kant interpretation of the early 1880s,
and to his early perspective on the task of philosophy in general.
For in his early work, Windelband stressed the anti-metaphysical
nature of philosophy and determined its task as a reflexive ‘sci-
ence of validity’, first and foremost aimed at the validity of scien-
tific knowledge. Here, Kant’s most important contribution is un-
derstood as his limitation of science for the benefit of a more
41 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 151.
42 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 151-152.
43 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 153.
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comprehensive philosophical worldview.  If philosophy can still
be construed as theory of science, as the foundation of scientific
objectivity, one might get the impression that this is now only a
part of the more comprehensive worldview concept.
Windelband, however, presents the worldview task of philoso-
phy  as  identical  with  the  foundation  of  scientific  objectivity
which a philosophical theory of science should accomplish. This
identification involves a crucial addition to the Kantian frame-
work as interpreted by Windelband. This step beyond Kant en-
ables Windelband to construe philosophy as a theory of scientific
knowledge and as a worldview, as metaphysics, at the same time.
The addition to the Kantian worldview consists of an extension
of Kant’s concept of science. According to Windelband, Kant’s
concept  of  science is  that  of  natural,  Newtonian science.  But
now, after a century, philosophy has to address the ‘new fact’ of
historical science as well.44
Historical science needs to be treated differently by philoso-
phy. Although both natural science and historical science make
a selection from a manifold of ‘empirical’ material, the means
used to make this selection are different. The selection of the
natural sciences is aimed at achieving knowledge in the form of
general  laws.  They  are  therefore  described as  nomothetical  sci-
ences, sciences of law (Gesetzeswissenschaften).45 Historical science,
by  contrast,  is  not  aimed  at  knowledge  of  general  laws,  but
rather at an understanding of particular events, processes or pe-
riods of history. To this end, it selects, from the manifold of what
merely ‘happens’, those elements which are of significance. Ac-
cording to Windelband, such a selection can only be made in a
necessary and objectively valid way when it is based on a system
of  universally  valid  values.46 As  such,  the  critical-philosophical
foundation of historical science leads to the philosophical task of
establishing a system of universally valid values, which can serve
44 ‘Nach  hundert  Jahren’,  155:  ‘Diese  große  Tatsache  der  Existenz  einer
historischen Wissenschaft verlangt nun von der kritischen Philosophie in erster
Linie  eine  Erweiterung  des  kantischen  Begriffs  vom  Wissen:  die  Historie
fordert neben der Naturforschung ihr Recht in der theoretischen Lehre.’
45 Cf. Windelband, ‘Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft’, 145.
46 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 157.
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as the basis for the historian’s selection of significant material.
This system must cover all activities of reason, and so include not
only theoretical values, but also ethics, aesthetics, and religion.
Thus the system of values that Windelband has in mind is not
only ‘metaphysical knowledge of the immaterial world’, but also
the foundation of the historical sciences.47 
By interpreting the philosophical, metaphysical knowledge of
the immaterial world as the necessary foundation of the histori-
cal sciences, Windelband achieves an identification of the world-
view task of philosophy and his early concept of philosophy as a
theory of scientific objectivity. It is no surprise therefore that the
philosophical worldview, metaphysics, and the foundation of the
sciences  are  closely  related—if  not  identical—from  Windel-
band’s point of view:
Denn nichts anderes kann doch schließlich die Aufgabe der philosophi-
schen Weltanschauungslehre — sagen wir doch ruhig der Metaphysik
— sein, als uns darüber zu verständigen, welches Recht wir haben, dem
objektiven Weltbilde, das uns die Wissenschaften als  das notwendige,
und allgemeingiltige Denken der Menschheit darbieten, die Kraft zur
Erfassung der Realität, der absoluten Wirklichkeit zuzutrauen.  Das ist
die Frage der Erkenntnistheorie und — der „Metaphysik“.48 
Although less explicitly  than in the  Kant-Studien essay, the dis-
tinction between the material and the immaterial world, and the
dualistic interpretation of Kant developed on the foundation of
this distinction, plays an important role here as well. And again,
Windelband ascribes to the Kritik der Urteilskraft—‘Kant’s greatest
work’—the accomplishment of having secured the relation be-
tween the two worlds. History must be understood as the realiza-
tion in the material world of the values of the immaterial world.
Whether Windelband succeeds in his identification of the philo-
sophical worldview and the foundation of the historical sciences,
and if he succeeds, at what price, is a question which will be ad-
dressed  in  the  section  on  ‘Windelband’s  metaphysics’  below.
First, we will look at Windelband’s interpretation of Kant’s Kritik
der Urteilskraft as his most important work in more detail. 
47 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 158.
48 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 160.
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4. Kant’s worldview and the Kritik der Urteilskraft
To  understand  Windelband’s  interpretation  of  the  ‘Kantian
worldview’, we must understand his interpretation of the  Kritik
der Urteilskraft, (KdU) as this work functions prominently in both
of Windelband’s 1904 texts on Kant. Both texts end with a rela-
tively long discussion of the central role of the KdU in the Kan-
tian worldview,  both in its  historical  form and as a  worldview
which can fulfil the ‘needs of the present time’. In these 1904
publications, the KdU is lauded by Windelband as ‘Kant’s great-
est work’49 and ‘the most powerful of his works’50 (das gewaltigste
seiner  Werke).  To  comprehend  Windelband’s  appeal  to  critical
philosophy as a philosophical worldview, therefore, we must ex-
amine his interpretation of Kant’s Third Critique in more detail.
To this end, we will have to examine not only the interpretation
offered in the two 1904 texts, but also the interpretation offered
in Windelband’s historical works from this period. 
4.1 The Kritik der Urteilskraft in Windelband’s historical works
In  the  second  edition  of  his  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (1900),
Windelband considers the KdU to contain the mediating princi-
ple  which  can  provide  the  synthesis  between  theoretical  and
practical reason. The sharp distinction which Kant drew between
nature and freedom endangered the unity of reason.51 Accord-
ing to Windelband, the KdU argues for the a priori possibility of
regarding nature as purposive. In nature’s ‘mechanism of causal
relations’ the realization of a highest end of reason (Vernunft-
zweck) can be observed.52 This highest end is ethical law itself,
which is realized in the history of mankind:
49 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 22.
50 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 151.
51 Geschichte der Philosophie (1900), 456.
52 Geschichte der Philosophie (1900), 456.
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Hierin liegen die Gründe a priori, die Natur als Ganzes unter dem Gesichts-
punkte der Zweckmässigkeit zu betrachten und in dem ungeheuren Mecha-
nismus ihrer Causalzusammenhangen die Realisirung eines höchsten Ver-
nunftzweckes zu sehen. Dieser Zweck kann wiederum nach dem Primat
der praktischen Vernunft kein anderer sein als das Sittengesetz und seine
Verwirklichung  durch  die  geschichtliche  Gesamtentwicklung  des
menschlichen Geschlechts:  damit  mündet  die  teleologische  Betrach-
tung in den moralischen Glauben an die göttliche Weltordnung.53 
Even in this 1900 edition, the result is more than a teleological
‘view’  (eine  Betrachtungsweise)54 of  totality,  by  which our  knowl-
edge of nature is unified into a meaningful whole. The upshot of
Windelband’s argumentation seems to be metaphysical, that is,
the material, sensible world is conceived of as a realization of an
immaterial world.
The metaphysical character of Windelband’s interpretation of
the Third Critique is reinforced by an addition to the quoted
passage in the 1907 edition of this work (which by then went un-
der the title Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie). There Windel-
band concludes: 
So zeigt sich, daß das „System der Erfahrung“, die Gesamtheit der Sin-
nenwelt in ihrer räumlichen Ausdehnung und ihrer zeitlichen Entwick-
lung letzthin als die Verwirklichung des die intelligible Welt bestimmen-
den Zweckes angesehen werden muß. Der Dualismus von theoretischer
und praktischer Vernunft ist in der ästhetischen nicht nur formell, son-
dern auch sachlich überwunden: hier erst findet Kants philosophische
Weltanschauung ihren Abschluß, und von hier aus versteht man den
letzten Sinn aller der einzelnen Lehren die er an der Hand der beson-
deren Probleme entwickelt hat.55
The  mediation  between  theoretical  and  practical  reason,  be-
tween material and immaterial world, is not only accomplished
formally by the KdU, but also materially (sachlich): for the materi-
al world is considered a realization (Verwirklichung) of the imma-
terial world. The dualism in Kant’s work is not a dual view of an
undivided reality, but reality itself is considered by Windelband
53 Geschichte der Philosophie (1900), 462.
54 Cf.  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (1900),  462:  ‘Aber  sie  darf  auch  nie  etwas
anderes sein wollen, als eine Betrachtungsweise’.
55 Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (1907), 475.
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to be stratified. Two worlds exist: the phenomenal world and the
noumenal world. On closer inspection, however, the existence of
the phenomenal world is relative to the existence of the noume-
nal world, for the former is a realization of the latter. The Kan-
tian dualism as construed by Windelband is therefore ontologi-
cal and not just formal, for it expresses what constitutes reality.
The  dualistic  interpretation  of  Kant  as  such,  and  the  role
played by the Third Critique in the mediation of this dualism,
can already be found in Windelband’s early work.56 The opening
paragraph of Windelband’s discussion of Kant’s aesthetics in the
second volume of the first  edition (1880) of his  Geschichte der
neueren Philosophie, for instance, reads:
Die Weltanschauung des Kritizismus charakterisirt sich vor allen ande-
ren dadurch,  dass  ihre  Wurzeln mit  vollem und mit  wissenschaftlich
sich begründendem Bewusstsein nicht lediglich in der theoretischen,
sondern hauptsächlich in der praktischen Vernunft liegen. Daraus aber
entspringt ihr dualistischer Charakter. Der Dualismus von Ding an sich
und  Erscheinung,  von  übersinnlicher  und  sinnlicher  Welt,  der  sich
durch Kants ganze Lehre hindurchzieht, ist derjenige von praktischer
und theoretischer Vernunft.57
As he would argue later in his  Geschichte der Philosophie, Windel-
band here considers it the accomplishment of the KdU to have
mediated the Kantian dualism. The unity of reason and thus the
unity of Kant’s worldview would be on shaky ground were this
dualism to be left unmediated. As we have seen in our discussion
of the 1904 essay on Kant’s worldview, Windelband considers it
an essential part of this worldview that—despite mediation—the
dualism between material and immaterial world is not fully re-
solved. The tension that results from the opposition of the mate-
rial and immaterial world is a necessary one.58 Yet, as far as rea-
son is concerned, there must be a connection between the two
sides of the dualism as well. Not only because of the ‘fact’ that
56 The dualistic interpretation also is by no means exclusive to Windelband.
The influence of his teacher Kuno Fischer on Windelband’s Kant interpre-
tation will be discussed in the next section.
57 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1880), 146.
58 This line of thought returns in his Einleitung in die Philosophie, 432.
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human consciousness is at home in both worlds, the realm of na-
ture and the realm of freedom,59 but also because theoretical
and practical reason are in interplay:
Die gesamte Arbeit der theoretischen Vernunft zeigt sich zuletzt durch
die Aufgaben bestimmt, welche ihr die praktische setzt, und die Ener-
gie der sittlichen Aufgabe findet anderseits ihre Begründung gerade in
dem Widerspruche, worin sie zu der sinnlichen Natur des Menschen
steht. So weisen in allen ihren Ausgestaltungen die praktische und die
theoretische Vernunft stets aufeinander hin und deuten miteinander
auf eine Einheit, die in keiner von beiden allen vollständig zum Austrag
kommt.  […] So einander bestimmend und beschränkend, verlangen
die theoretische und die praktische Vernunft den Begriff einer einheit-
lichen Funktion, worin ihre ursprüngliche Identität, vermöge deren al-
lein sie jene Beziehungen entwickeln konnten, selbst zum Ausdrucke
kommt.60
According  to  Windelband’s  interpretation  of  Kant,  therefore,
not only must an identity between theoretical and practical rea-
son exist, but this identity is also more original than theoretical
or practical reason, for the original identity is the condition for
the interplay between theoretical and practical reason. 
This makes it clearer why Windelband considers the media-
tion which the  KdU accomplishes the ‘truly decisive and com-
pleting principle of Kantian philosophy’. Yet this conclusion is
only explicitly drawn in a passage which is added to the 1907 edi-
tion of this work:
Daher beruht der Abschluß, den Kants Philosophie in der Kritik der
Urteilskraft  gefunden hat,  nicht  etwa in seinem persönlichen Triebe
zum Systembau, sondern der »systematische Faktor« ist in seiner tief
sachlichen Begründung das eigentlich entscheidende und vollendende
Prinzip der Kantischen Philosophie, ohne dessen Verständnis und An-
erkennung man nur die disiecta membra philosophi vor sich hat.61
59 Geschichte  der  neueren Philosophie  (1880),  Bd.  2,  147.  Geschichte  der  neueren
Philosophie (1907), Bd. 2, 156.
60 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1880), Bd. 2, 146-147. Geschichte der neueren
Philosophie (1907), Bd. 2, 155.
61 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1907), Bd. 2, 155.
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The accomplishment of the Third Critique is therefore not only
a unification of the ‘body parts’ of Kantian philosophy into a sys-
tem, but it also contains the true principle of Kantian philoso-
phy.
As in the different editions of the (Lehrbuch der) Geschichte der
Philosophie, the basic interpretation of the KdU as the mediating,
concluding,  and  completing  part  of  Kant’s  work  is  already
present here in the earlier text. The explicit conclusion that the
Kritik der Urteilskraft  is the most important (most phenomenal,
truly determining) of Kant’s works is a discovery that was added
by Windelband after 1900. 
Windelband edited the Kritik der Urteilskraft for the Kant editi-
on by the  Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.  The
KdU appeared in volume five of this series in 1908. In compari-
son to the added passages in both his Lehrbuch and his Geschichte
der  neueren  Philosophie,  the  interpretation  offered  here  seems
more modest. Windelband presents the Third Critique as a nec-
essary and completing addition to the two earlier Critiques. But
the metaphysical dimension of the mediation brought about by
the  KdU  is  not mentioned. Yet Windelband repeats,  almost in
passing, the qualification of the KdU as the ‘most impressive’ of
Kant’s works (das gewaltigste seiner Werke).62 
4.2 Windelband’s 1904 Kant-interpretation and the role of the KdU
Now let us return to the 1904 texts and re-examine the role of
the  KdU  in them. We have seen in our  discussion so far  that
Windelband considers the KdU to be a necessary and completing
addition to the first two Critiques. Yet this—not uncommon63—
interpretation  of  the  KdU is  not  in  itself  enough  to  warrant
Windelband’s claim that the Third Critique is the greatest and
most impressive of Kant’s works, that it contains the ‘truly deci-
sive principle’ of Kantian philosophy, and even contains the orig-
inal identity of theoretical and practical reason.64 What is it in
the KdU that can carry the burden of these claims?
62 Windelband, ‘Einleitung’, 516.
63 E.g. Dorner, ‘Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft’ (1900). See also section 4 below.
64 Cf. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1911), Bd. 2, 155.
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To  find  an  answer  to  this  question,  we  must  go  back  to
Windelband’s  1904  Kant-Studien essay  ‘Nach  hundert  Jahren’.
Two elements spring to mind when we read this text: Windel-
band’s emphasis on the role of historical science for philosophy,
and his praise for the KdU and its central role in Kantian philos-
ophy. In order to fully understand the latter issue, the role of the
KdU, one must also consider the former, the role of historical sci-
ence for philosophy.  The importance of history and historical
science for philosophy is itself only fully comprehensible against
the background of Windelband’s interpretation of the Third Cri-
tique. Both elements combined reveal the core of Windelband’s
Kant interpretation, as well as what he considers to be the neces-
sary step beyond Kant. Let me elaborate this claim.
We have already noted that Windelband considers the exis-
tence of the historical sciences the ‘great new fact’ which post-
Kantian philosophy to take into account.65 Theoretical philoso-
phy should explain the objectivity of historical knowledge. In do-
ing so, theoretical philosophy necessarily enters the domain of
practical reason, for objective historical knowledge presupposes
a system of universally valid values. These values cannot be ob-
ject in an empirical sense, they are meta-empirical. The system of
universally valid values is discovered by all three domains of rea-
son, not just theoretical reason. Unlike the natural sciences, the
theoretical foundation of the historical sciences enlists philoso-
phy as a whole. 
Although the foundation of the objectivity  of the historical
sciences thus alters the relation between the different domains
of philosophy—practical reason, theoretical reason, aesthetics—
this line of argument cannot do more than that. Specifically, this
argument by Windelband does not provide for the mediation be-
tween the  noumenal  and the phenomenal  world.  It  serves  to
connect theoretical and practical reason, but it cannot establish
the unity of reason, let alone the unity of the (noumenal and
phenomenal) ‘world’.
But there is a further role played by history and the historical
sciences for the philosophical worldview, one that has less to do
with the foundation of historical objectivity and much more with
65 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 155.
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the mediating place of history itself and the role of historical sci-
ence as an organon for philosophy. This is apparent from Windel-
band’s interpretation of the  KdU in this 1904 text (‘Nach hun-
dert  Jahren’).  The  question  which  remains  unresolved—after
the system of universally valid values is introduced as the neces-
sary foundation of the historical sciences—is that of the relation
between  the  noumenal  and  the  phenomenal  world,  or  in
Windelband’s phrasing: how are the realm of (natural) laws (das
Reich der Gesetze) and the realm of values (das Reich der Werte) re-
lated?66 According to  Windelband, the  KdU makes  its  decisive
contribution in providing a basis for the answer to this question. 
Kant’s Third Critique demonstrated the compatibility of natu-
ral law and purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit), of nature and free-
dom.  Or  as  Windelband formulates  it,  referring to  Hermann
Lotze’s ‘teleological idealism’: the totality of laws is a system of
forms by which the content of the realm of values is realized.67
The concepts  of  realization  (Verwirklichung)  and development
(Entwicklung) are the key concepts in the KdU. It is the overarch-
ing  concept  of  realization,  the  realization  of  the  immaterial
through the material world, which provides the unity of Kant’s
worldview. The essence of life and the universe must necessarily
be considered a development. 
Interestingly, this view leads Windelband to discover a prob-
lem in Kant’s transcendental aesthetics, the basis of the Kantian
theory of knowledge: 
Wenn die Entwicklung als das reale Wesen des Lebens und des Univer-
sums vernunftnotwendig betrachtet  werden soll,  — wie ist  damit die
Phänomenalität der Zeit vereinbar? Wenn die Werte in der Verwirkli-
chung begriffen, nur in ihr zu verstehen sind, so muß das Geschehen,
das  ohne  Zeit  nicht  denkbar  ist,  eine  wesentliche  Bestimmung  des
Wirklichen selber sein, so darf es nicht bloß als Form der Anschauung
gelten.68
66 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 162: ‘wie verhält sich das Reich der Gesetze zu dem
Reich der Werte?’.
67 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 162.
68 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 163.
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Although the problem is only mentioned and not addressed by
Windelband, it is remarkable enough, especially in comparison
with Trendelenburg’s position. The central concept in the lat-
ter’s ‘organic worldview’ was the concept of motion. Trendelen-
burg arrived at this dynamic concept through a critique of the
exclusive subjectivity of space and time in Kant’s transcendental
aesthetics. If space and time did not have objectivity as well, a
mediation between thought and being (or between the phenom-
enal  and  the  noumenal  world)  would  be  impossible.  Here
Windelband  arrives  at  a  fundamentally  dynamic  view  of  the
world as well: the essence of ‘life and the universe’ is develop-
ment and realization of the realm of values, the essence of the
phenomenal world is historical—yet this realm of values itself is
timeless and static, an important difference compared with Tren-
delenburg’s position, which we will come to speak about later.
The common denominator is the problem that both dynamic
views of the world have with the exclusive subjectivity of time in
Kant’s transcendental aesthetics.
Towards the end of the 1904 essay,  Windelband reveals his
motivation for this interpretation of the Kantian worldview: it is
the  ‘battle’  against  naturalism.69 Earlier  on  we  encountered
Windelband’s criticism of an empiricist,  naturalistic interpreta-
tion of Kant, focusing on the First Critique and the impossibility
of knowledge of the immaterial world. Here we encounter the
corollary  of  Windelband’s  ‘more  complete’  interpretation  of
Kant: we should consider the material world to be more than a
law-governed, material world, we should construe it as the real-
ization of an immaterial world of values. As such, the worldview
of critical philosophy would grasp the ‘spiritual value-content’ of
69 Windelband himself speaks of a battle (Kampf), consider for instance the
following,  quite  unacademic,  passage  towards  the  end  of  ‘Nach  hundert
Jahren’:  ‘Schon  erleben  wir  –  fast  von  Tage  zu  Tage  –  einen  rapiden
Niedergang der naturalistischen Weltanschauung, die nur noch gelegentlich
einmal von einem der Alten, die nichts mehr gelernt haben, mit glücklicher
Ahnungslosigkeit  aufgetischt  wird.  Unsere  Jugend,  die  die  Macht  des
historischen  Lebens  in  sich  fühlt,  –  sie  brennt  darauf,  ihre  gährenden
Wertgefühle in klare Begriffe umgesetzt zu finden. Es ist alle Hoffnung, daß
der gute Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt,  wie ihn z.B.  Eucken mit
edler Leidenschaft kämpft, zum Siege führe.’, ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 165. 
WINDELBAND: PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE OF WORLDVIEW 127
reality.70 But to grasp the ‘spiritual content’ of reality presuppos-
es that such a content is present, and it is this which is demon-
strated by the Third Critique, in Windelband’s interpretation of
it. Or, as Windelband formulates it poignantly in his lecture on
Kant’s worldview from the same year: 
So vollendet sich Kants Weltanschauung in dem Verständnis der Ge-
schichte als der Verwirklichung der Zwecke der übersinnlichen Welt in
der Sinnenwelt selbst.71
The reverse side of the argument for the dynamism and historic-
ity of the phenomenal world is that history and historical science
become a necessary organon for philosophy. Although the system
of  values,  the  ‘normative  consciousness’  (Normalbewußtsein),
works immediately, it can only be known mediately, more specifi-
cally: it can only be known through a philosophical analysis of
history. History is therefore the primary source of material for
philosophical analysis.
Yet this ‘normative consciousness’ is now more than just the
totality  of  universally  valid  norms  which  it  represented  in
Windelband’s  early  work.  Instead,  this  expression  refers  to  a
metaphysical  realm of  values.  It  refers  to  an  absolute  reality,
which is realized (although only partially) in history. We will re-
turn to this metaphysical dimension of Windelband’s interpreta-
tion of the ‘Kantian worldview’ below.
5. The foundations of a philosophical worldview:
The Einleitung in die Philosophie
70 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 165: ‘So drängt alles darauf hin, daß die kritische
Philosophie, wenn sie die Lebenskraft,  die sie ein Jahrhundert lang bewahrt
hat, auch in der Bewältigung der intellektuellen Bedürfnisse der Gegenwart
bewähren  soll,  sich  fähig  erweisen  muß,  mit  ihrem  Begriffsystem  eine
Weltanschauung zu tragen, welche den geistigen Wertinhalt der Wirklichkeit
in sicherem Bewußtsein zu erfasssen vermag.’
71 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 27.
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The last  major  work which Windelband published during his
lifetime is his Einleitung in die Philosophie (1914). This work gives
a prominent place to the concept of a philosophical worldview.
Such a philosophical worldview is to be understood as a world-
view which is  the result  of  philosophical  science,  a  worldview
which is constructed by philosophy. In the opening paragraph of
the book, Windelband observes a growing interest in, and ‘need’
(Bedürfnis) for, philosophy. This need is aimed at a worldview,
and this need of a worldview is a constant inclination (Trieb) of
human nature.72 But can and must philosophy as a science—and
it is  considered to be a scientific enterprise by Windelband—
cater to these needs? 
Windelband’s answer is affirmative, but not unqualified. First
he distinguishes between a pre-scientific worldview and a scien-
tific treatment of the problem. In a sense, everyone always has a
worldview. This is the pre-scientific or proto-philosophical sense
of worldview, described by Windelband as ‘a view of the totality
of the world and the position of man within it.’73 Since these pro-
to-philosophical worldviews carry different kinds of presupposi-
tions in them, their domain of validity is limited.74
Philosophy aims at universally valid, scientific knowledge. If
one turns to philosophy for a worldview, one should be prepared
to discard the presuppositions which are carried by one’s proto-
philosophical  worldview.  Philosophy can change one’s view of
life and the world.75 Yet this does not imply for Windelband that
these proto-philosophical worldviews should be discarded com-
pletely. On the contrary, since science always starts from life it-
72 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 1.
73 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 2: ‘Freilich bringt ja eigentlich jeder schon eine
solche [Weltanschauung] mit: kein Mensch kommt ohne so etwas aus, jeder
braucht und hat in irgendeiner Form eine Ausweitung seines Kennens und
Wissens, eine Ansicht vom Ganzen der Welt und zumal von der Stellung, die
der Mensch darin einnimmt oder einnehmen soll.’
74 Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  3:  ‘Sie  alle  haben  natürliche,  individuelle,
historische Voraussetzungen und  damit  die  Grenzen für  den Bereich ihrer
Geltung.’
75 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 5-6.
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self, and since philosophy starts from the special sciences, both
the sciences  and life  provide  philosophy  with the material  to
work with:
Wie das Leben in seinen vorwissenschaftlichen Begriffen das Material
für jede wissenschaftliche Arbeit, so geben das Leben und die Wissen-
schaften zusammen in den  vorwissenschaftlichen und den  vorphilosophi-
schen Begriffen das Material für die Arbeit der Philosophie ab.76
Two things should be noted. The first is that Windelband intro-
duces here the proto-scientific concepts of life as an (at least par-
tial)  factual  basis  for  philosophy.  And secondly,  life  is  placed
alongside the special sciences in that respect. 
In the period up to the 1904 Kant publications, Windelband
adhered to the view of philosophy as a theory of science or of sci-
entific objectivity—even if he had to broaden the concept of sci-
ence in his 1904 Kant essay in order to maintain this view. As a
theory of science, the sciences are the immediate object of phi-
losophy.  Every  relation  that  philosophy  has  to  ‘life’  or  the
‘world’ is mediated by the sciences. The relation between philos-
ophy and science is more complex here in the Einleitung, howev-
er. If philosophy is construed as a theory of scientific objectivity,
the sciences can be said to provide the ‘material’ for philosophy,
since philosophy should explain what  the special  character  of
scientific theories is which causes them to provide us with objec-
tive, universally valid knowledge of reality. But since life is placed
alongside the sciences as giving philosophy its material, it is clear
that the interpretation of philosophy as a theory of worldview
(Weltanschauungslehre)  can  no  longer  be  completely  identified
with  the  interpretation  as  a  theory  of  science.  As  we  recall,
Windelband’s 1904 Kant essay interpreted philosophy as a theo-
ry of science and as a theory of worldview at the same time, and
both aspects exhausted the philosophical task. Here, in the 1914
Einleitung, the worldview task of philosophy is not exhausted by
providing a theory of science, because the introduction of life
76 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 6.
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would not be necessary on such an account. Rather the material
provided by life is itself a necessary contribution to the philo-
sophical worldview project.
Unfortunately, the relations between life and science and be-
tween life and philosophy remain unclear and are not specified
in the Einleitung. As a consequence, Windelband fails to discuss
several potential problems which arise when life is placed along-
side the sciences as a basis for philosophy, without the relation-
ship between the two being explicated. For instance, if the pre-
scientific concepts of life are the material for science, and the
pre-philosophical concepts of science are the material for philos-
ophy, why (and how) should the pre-scientific concepts be the
material for philosophy as well, since these proto-scientific con-
cepts are already transformed into scientific knowledge? Windel-
band seems to assume that science somehow is not able to cover
the whole of reality, and that philosophy therefore needs anoth-
er medium to reach this totality (life). But why science fails, and
what its limits are with respect to the philosophical worldview-
project, are topics which remain unaddressed.
Despite the obscurity  surrounding the concept of  life,  it  is
nevertheless used by Windelband to explain the project of an
‘introduction’ to philosophy and the relation between its system-
atical and historical dimensions. Philosophy should examine the
presuppositions which occur in science and in life. An introduc-
tion to philosophy should accordingly lead from the instinctive,
unreflected presuppositions of life and science to the basic prob-
lems of philosophy. Throughout history, these basic problems of
philosophy, together with the basic forms of their solutions, ap-
pear in persistent, yet mutually opposing forms.77 
Both the introduction of the concept of life as providing the
material for philosophy, and the idea of certain basic, persistent
philosophical  problems  and  ‘stereotypical’  solutions  to  them,
are reminiscent of Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie. And in fact,
like Dilthey, Windelband asks whether this constant return to the
77 Einleitung in  die  Philosophie,  10:  ‘Es  kommen immer  die  gleichen Fragen
wieder […] Aber auch die Versuche der Antwort haben etwas Stereotypes an
sich. Gewisse Gegensätze der Welt- und Lebensauffassung treten immer wieder
von neuem auf, befehden sich und zerstören sich in gegenseitiger Dialektik.’
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same questions does not signify a lack of progress in philosophy,
and whether the apparent incapacity of philosophy to solve its
basic problems is  consistent with its  scientific pretensions.  Ac-
cording  to  Windelband,  the  persistence  of  the  philosophical
problems shows that these problems are universal and necessary
problems for thought. If anything, the fact that philosophy re-
turns to ever the same questions shows that these questions are
unavoidable and that they should be addressed by philosophy,
even  though  they  have  not  been  and  perhaps  never  will  be
solved definitively.78
According to Windelband, however, a classification of philo-
sophical problems and answers has its place only in an introduc-
tion to philosophy. Whereas Dilthey’s analysis of philosophy ends
with a typological theory, beyond which no unification can be
expected, Windelband starts with an inventory and classification
of problems and solutions, in order to enable the subsequent
critical analysis and judgment of these problems and proposed
solutions:
Daher faßt sich die Aufgabe, um die es sich hier handelt, dahin zusam-
men, die Hauptprobleme der Philosophie und die Richtungen, nach
denen ihre Lösung zu suchen ist, mit umfassender Darlegung ihrer his-
torischen Erscheinungen zu entwickeln, zu begründen und zu beurtei-
len: auf diesem Wege gestaltet sich die Einleitung in die Philosophie zu
einer kritischen Untersuchung über die möglichen Formen philosophi-
scher Weltansicht.79
Such an introduction has a historical as well as a systematic di-
mension.  The historical  dimension of  philosophy serves a  sys-
tematic purpose, or as Windelband expresses it: history, especial-
ly  the  history  of  philosophy,  is  an  organon for  systematic
philosophy.80 This interpretation of history as an organon for sys-
tematic philosophy is construed by Windelband as a  preliminary
phase: the study of the historic forms of philosophical problems
78 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 11-12.
79 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 14.
80 Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  17,  also  see  Windelband,  ‘Geschichte  der
Philosophie’  (1904),  and my discussion in ‘Philosophy and the  Problem of
History’.
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and concepts provides systematic philosophy with its task. As an
organon for systematic philosophy, it is a prolegomenon as well: the
problems of philosophy are ‘prepared’ by history for their sys-
tematic treatment.81
This systematic task of philosophy is subsequently defined by
Windelband in terms of a worldview:
Als Wissenschaft der Weltanschauung hat die Philosophie zwei Bedürf-
nisse zu befriedigen. Man erwartet von ihr einen umfassenden, sicher
gegründeten und womöglich abschließenden Ausbau aller Erkenntnis
und daneben eine auf solcher Einsicht errichtete Ueberzeugung, die
den inneren Halt im Leben zu gewähren vermag.82 
The genitive in ‘science of worldview’ should thus be read such
that a worldview is the result of the philosophical science, not its
object (as in Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie, for example). An
analysis of (historical) worldviews is part of this scientific enter-
prise only as a prolegomenon. 
The most conspicuous element of Windelband’s definition of
philosophy as science of  worldview is  the dual  task of  such a
philosophical worldview. Philosophy as science of worldview has
both theoretical and practical relevance (Bedeutung). Any form
of philosophical endeavour which aims to fulfil only one of these
two elements of the philosophical task is considered one-sided
and inadequate (unzulänglich) by Windelband.83 A worldview as
intended by philosophy is thus a matter of knowledge (an inte-
gration of all knowledge into a comprehensive and well-founded
totality), but also a matter of ‘belief’ (Überzeugung). The practical
relevance of philosophy lies in the purchase on life that it pro-
vides.
81 Einleitung in die Philosophie,  17:  ‘Ihm [Hegel] verdanken wir die Einsicht,
daß die Gestaltung der Probleme und Begriffe, wie sie die Entwicklung der
menschlichen Vernunft in der Geschichte herbeigeführt hat, für uns die allein
zureichende Form ist, um die Aufgaben der Philosophie für ihre systematische
Behandlung vorzubereiten.’
82 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 19.
83 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 19.
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Windelband takes up a Kantian element—the division of phi-
losophy into theoretical and practical—but transforms this Kan-
tian element according to his own needs. For the Kantian dis-
tinction  between  theoretical  and  practical  philosophy  is  a
distinction between theoretical  principles,  the laws  of  (knowl-
edge of) nature, and the laws of (realization of) freedom. Practi-
cal philosophy is practical because its principles derive from the
formal law of freedom, not because its principles are applicable
in practice.84
According to Windelband, the element of ‘belief’, i.e. a phi-
losophy which is applicable in actual life, is a necessary element
of scientific philosophy:
Die Philosophie ist Wissenschaft,  Begriffsarbeit,  wie alle anderen Wis-
senschaften, Umsetzung des anschaulich Gegebenen in Begriffe. Aber
in ihr waltet zugleich das Bedürfnis, aus dem Abstrakten und Begriff-
lichen in das Leben, in Anschauung und Wirken zurückzugelangen. Sie
bedarf der Gestaltung zu einer lebendigen Gesamtanschauung, die da-
mit  eben auch eine  tatkräftige  Ueberzeugung bedeutet.  Philosophie
kann niemals bloß Wissen, sie will und soll künstlerisches und sittliches
Leben sein.85
This ‘intimate union’ (innige Gemeinschaft) of the theoretical and
practical dimensions which philosophy exhibits, must be seen in
the light of the introduction of life as a basis for philosophy. For
without  the  connection  between  life  and  philosophy  which
Windelband established with this introduction, the possibility of
and need for this ‘practical relevance’ of philosophy would be
incomprehensible.  Now—even if  the philosophical  motivation
and justification of  Windelband’s  introduction of  life  remains
obscure—the distinction between philosophy’s theoretical rele-
vance (for science) and practical relevance (for life) is consistent
with the dual basis of philosophy in life and science. 
The duality of philosophy’s theoretical and practical aspects
points  to  the  fundamental  philosophical  dualism  on  which
Windelband already laid much emphasis in his 1904 Kant inter-
84 KdU  A/B  XV-XVI.  On  the  formality  of  the  principles  of  practical
philosophy, see below.
85 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 22.
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pretation: the dualism between the phenomenal (sinnliche) and
the noumenal (übersinnliche) world.  Throughout the  Einleitung
in die Philosophie this dualism is present, and it is explicitly ad-
dressed in the final part of the work. 
In the Einleitung Windelband discusses the different domains
of philosophical principles and their validity. He applies the ter-
minology  of  values  (Werte),  which  he  adopts  from  Hermann
Lotze.86 The three fundamental philosophical disciplines—logic,
ethics,  aesthetics—can be understood as three domains of val-
ues, that is, three domains of universally valid norms. 
The relation of logical values to the other two value-spheres is
somewhat  peculiar  in Windelband’s  discussion.  He introduces
the apparently fundamental concept of value at the start of the
second chapter of the Einleitung ‘Axiologische Probleme’ (value
problems), after discussing ‘theoretical problems’ (i.e. logic, the-
ory of knowledge) in the first chapter. But after the concept of
value has been introduced, it appears in retrospect that the prin-
ciples of theoretical reason are ‘values’ as well:
Wenn in dem affirmativen und dem negativen Urteil ähnlich alternati-
ve Momente vorhanden sind wie in den Bejahungen und Verneinungen
des ethischen und ästhetischen Urteils, so stehen in gewisser Beziehung
logische, ethische und ästhetische Wertung koordiniert und bedingen
dadurch  die  drei  Philosophischen Grundwissenschaften Logik,  Ethik
und Aesthetik. Das ist die Einteilung der allgemeingültigen Werte, wel-
che Kant der Gliederung seiner kritischen Philosophie zugrunde gelegt
hat.87
On  the  other  hand,  immediately  after  the  quoted  passage
Windelband distinguishes the ‘theoretical order’ (logic) and the
‘practical order’ (ethics and aesthetics) and apparently identifies
this distinction with the distinction between the ‘world of being’
and the ‘world of values’: 
Allein das Verhältnis der theoretischen Weltordnung zu der praktisch-
en fordert deshalb auch eine letzte Synthesis. Sie besteht in der Frage,
wie die beiden Ordnungen im ganzen Zusammenhange der Dinge sich
86 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 245.
87 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 255.
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zueinander verhalten, d. h. wie die Welt der Dinge, welche sind und als
seiend erkannt werden, sich zu der Welt der Werte verhält, welche sein
sollen und für die Dinge wie für uns gelten sollen.88
Instead of the relation between the different faculties of reason,
or between the principles of theoretical and practical reason, we
now face the problem how two ‘worlds’—the world of being and
the world of value—can be related. However, the problem of the
relation of the different faculties of reason need not necessarily
be treated this way, as the next section will show.
A similar problem arises with the ‘subjective’  character de-
rived from the metaphor of value, that is, the question whether
values can only exist in relation to the valuing consciousness of a
subject. Although Windelband stresses that the discussion of the
validity of values must be freed from psychological lumber,89 this
apparently does not apply to the question whether values are al-
ways values of a valuing subject: in fact values always exist in rela-
tion  to  a  valuing  consciousness,  according  to  Windelband.90
Since philosophy evaluates factual human valuations in order to
arrive at universally valid values (meta-values as it were),91 there
must be a consciousness to which these universally valid values
correspond.92 This ‘normative consciousness’ (Normalbewusstsein)
is only a necessary postulate—necessitated by the quest for uni-
versal values—and is therefore not a metaphysical reality at this
stage of Windelband’s argument.
However, the ultimate reality of the universal values to which
Windelband strictly adheres (unlike his former student Heinrich
Rickert),93 and his  adherence to the correlation of values and
88 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 255-256.
89 E.g. Einleitung in die Philosophie, 251. This is a constant theme in Windelband
which  can  already  be  found  in  some  of  the  early  essays,  e.g.  ‘Was  ist
Philosophie?’, ‘Kritische oder genetische Methode?’ (1883).
90 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 254.
91 Windelband speaks of ‘eine Bewertung zweiter Stufe’ and ‘eine Wertung
der Wertungen’, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 252.
92 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 253-254.
93 Rickert stressed the ‘unreal’ character of values, and the following passage
in Windelband can be read as a direct reference to Rickert’s position in this
matter:  ‘Andererseits  aber  bedeutet  doch  gerade  die  Unabhängigkeit  des
Geltens von allen psychischen Vorgängen, in denen es anerkannt wird,  ein
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valuing consciousness, lead him to introduce an ‘absolute con-
sciousness’, which he nominally identifies as ‘God’.94 The final
chapter of the Einleitung, in which all these problems culminate,
is entitled ‘religious problems’. To secure their universal validity,
the absolute values require a meta-empirical, metaphysical foun-
dation:
In diesem Sinne verlangt das Wertleben eine metaphysische Verankerung,
und wenn man jenen übererfahrungsmäßigen Lebenszusammenhang
der Persönlichkeiten mit dem Namen der Gottheit  bezeichnet, so kann
man sagen, daß ihre Realität mit dem Gewissen selbst gegeben ist.95 
The conclusion that the reality and validity of conscience imply
the reality of an absolute metaphysical subject (God) is only valid if
one  subsequently  assumes  that  (a)  values  need  an  absolute,
metaphysical foundation to be valid, and (b) values need a cor-
relate consciousness in order to be real. Both assumptions can
be contested however, and are not self-evident, to say the least. 
To conclude this section, let me summarize its results. It has
been argued that Windelband makes a number of interpretative
and systematic  philosophical  choices  (that  is  to  say,  he  intro-
duces arbitrary, not sufficiently founded theses) in working out
his  philosophical  worldview  and  his  theory  of  values.  These
choices lead him to construct a fundamental distinction between
the domain of the theoretical and that of the practical, between
the ‘world of being’ and the ‘world of value’, and to the intro-
duction of an absolute, metaphysical consciousness as correlate
to the universally valid values. Most importantly, these choices
lead Windelband to assume a fundamental dualism between two
‘worlds’, the noumenal and the phenomenal. In the next section
these choices will be discussed in relation to Kant.
Maß von eigenem Bestande, für das wir kein besseres Wort haben als höchste
Wirklichkeit  oder  Realität.  Daher  bleibt  es  paradox,  das  Geltende  als  das
Unwirkliche  zu  bezeichen.’,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  212.  Cf.  Krijnen,
Nachmetaphysischer Sinn, 378f.
94 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 255 and 388ff.
95 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 392.
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6. Kant’s and Windelband’s metaphysics
We have seen that Windelband endorses a metaphysical interpre-
tation of the KdU in his 1904 essay and lecture on Kant: that is,
the duality which is bridged by the teleological power of judg-
ment is a dualism in reality, between the noumenal and the phe-
nomenal world. The ultimate ground of reality must be sought
in a noumenal world, beyond experience, which—though it can-
not be known in the same way as the empirical world is known—
can be grasped philosophically, and which expresses itself in the
empirical, phenomenal world in the course of history. This inter-
pretation of Kant returns in the final part of Windelband’s 1914
Einleitung in die Philosophie. In this section we will examine this
metaphysical interpretation of the Third Critique in more detail.
Windelband considers an absolute, metaphysical foundation
necessary for the universal validity of values. This metaphysical
foundation  and  the  relation  of  human  consciousness  to  this
metaphysical foundation are considered to be  religious. The sa-
cred (das Heilige) is defined as the relation between the values
and this  metaphysical  foundation.96 Furthermore,  Windelband
ascribes this interpretation of the relation between the phenom-
enal  world  and  a  meta-empirical,  noumenal  reality  (eine
übersinnliche Realität) to Kant too:
Deshalb hat diese metaphysische Verankerung des Wertens nicht bloß
die Geltung eines Ueberzeugtseins oder eines Glaubens, das ja auch ein
Meinen oder eine Illusion sein könnte. Man hat Kants Lehre, wonach
jener überempirische Lebenszusammenhang nicht Sache der auf die
Sinnenwelt beschränkten Erkenntnis, sondern vielmehr eines vernunft-
notwendigen Glaubens sei, so aufgefaßt, daß dies Postulat des Glaubens
ein Ideal enthalte, das nur für ein Fürwahrhalten aus dem Interesse der
Vernunft gelte und das deshalb auch wohl eine  für den praktischen
Zweck gültige Illusion oder Fiktion sein könnte. Albert Lange hat sei-
nerzeit die Energie des kantischen Gedankenganges in dieser Weise ab-
geschwächt, und die neueste „Philosophie des Als-ob“ ist ihm darin ge-
folgt.  In  der  Tat  aber  steckt  in  dem  Inhalt  des  Gewissens,  das  ein
zweifellos ebenso gewisses Erlebnis ist wie jede andere Erfahrung, die
wir im Aufbau unserer Welterkenntnis verwenden, diese Beziehung auf
eine übersinnliche Realität: mögen alle Vorstellungen, die wir uns davon
machen können, bildhaft und unzutreffend, mögen sie Illusionen oder
96 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 390f.
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Fiktionen sein, — diese Beziehung selbst ist etwas völlig Unzweifelhaf-
tes, es ist wie Kant gesagt hat, das Faktum der reinen Vernunft. Und darauf
allein kommt es an, wenn wir die Gewißheit gewinnen sollen, daß das
religiöse Problem ein durchaus reales und nicht ein fiktives Problem
der Philosophie ist.97
Hence the noumenal in Kant’s theory is a metaphysical reality.
The ‘experience’ of conscience is used as an analogy to sensuous
experience (‘ein ebenso gewisses Erlebnis wie jede andere Er-
fahrung’). It is instructive to compare Windelband’s metaphysi-
cal interpretation of Kant’s Third Critique, and the philosophi-
cal framework from which this interpretation is developed, with
Kant’s views on the coherence of philosophy as a system. A con-
cise version of Kant’s view on this matter can be found in the two
versions of the introduction to the KdU—the published version
and the longer version now known as the ‘first  introduction’.
Kant in fact set himself the task of mediating between theoretical
and practical reason in the KdU. but what is to be mediated, and
how does this mediation take place?
In the published introduction to the KdU Kant writes the fol-
lowing with respect to the division of philosophy:
Unser gesamtes Erkenntnisvermögen hat zwei Gebiete, das der Natur-
begriffe, und das des Freiheitsbegriffs; denn durch beide ist es a priori
gesetzgebend. Die Philosophie teilt sich nun auch, diesem gemäß, in
die theoretische und die praktische. Aber der Boden, auf welchem ihr
Gebiet errichtet, und ihre Gesetzgebung ausgeübt wird, ist immer doch
nur der Inbegriff der Gegenstände aller möglichen Erfahrung, sofern
sie für nichts mehr als bloße Erscheinungen genommen werden;98
The philosophical problem under discussion in the Third Cri-
tique is the problem how the principles of knowledge of the nat-
ural world (Naturbegriffe)—which he examined in his  Kritik der
reinen Vernunft—are related to the principles of ‘freedom’, that
is,  principles of knowledge of right action—which were exam-
ined in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. It is important to note
that this distinction between principles of (knowledge of) nature
97 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 392-393.
98 KdU A/B XVII.
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and  principles  of  freedom is  a  distinction  within  philosophy,
more specifically, within the philosophical analysis of the cogni-
tive faculty. 
The formal possibility of the co-existence of these two sets of
principles (of nature and freedom) was already demonstrated by
Kant in the First Critique.99 Yet this demonstration does not fully
resolve  the problem of  the relation between nature and free-
dom. For even if the two sets of principles have different kinds of
objects—the principles of nature enable theoretical knowledge
of empirical objects, whereas the objects which are connected to
the principles of freedom are things-in-themselves—they do have
a  common  ground:  both  sets  of  principles  are  ‘legislations’
(Gesetzgebungen) which apply to the realm of experience (‘the to-
tality of objects of possible experience’). The demonstration of
the possibility of co-existence must be completed by a demon-
stration of the compatibility (and even unity) of the two sets of
principles:
Ob nun zwar eine unübersehbare Kluft zwischen dem Gebiete des Na-
turbegriffs, als dem Sinnlichen, und dem Gebiete des Freiheitsbegriffs,
als dem Übersinnlichen, befestigt ist, so daß von dem ersteren zum an-
deren (also vermittelst des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft) kein
Übergang möglich ist, gleich als ob es so viel verschiedene Welten wä-
ren, deren erste auf die zweite keinen Einfluß haben kann: so soll doch
diese auf jene einen Einfluß haben, nämlich der Freiheitsbegriff soll
den durch seine Gesetze aufgegebenen Zweck in der Sinnenwelt wirk-
lich machen; und die Natur muß folglich auch so gedacht werden kön-
nen, daß die Gesetzmäßigkeit ihrer Form wenigstens zur Möglichkeit
der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke nach Freiheitsgesetzen zusammen-
stimme. – Also muß es doch einen Grund der  Einheit des Übersinnli-
chen, welches der Natur zum Grunde liegt, mit dem, was der Freiheits-
begriff  praktisch  enthält,  geben,  wovon  der  Begriff,  wenn  er  gleich
weder theoretisch noch praktisch zu einem Erkenntnisse desselben ge-
langt, mithin kein eigentümliches Gebiet hat, dennoch den Übergang
von der Denkungsart nach den Prinzipien der einen, zu der nach Prin-
zipien der anderen, möglich macht.100
99 KdU A/B XVIII.
100 KdU A/B XIX-XX.
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Although the principles of practical and theoretical philosophy
are radically different (‘eine unübersehbare Kluft’), they have a
common ground on which they work, on which the laws of na-
ture are valid, and on which the law of freedom must be real-
ized. Therefore they have to have a unifying ground as well, ac-
cording to Kant. This calls for a mediation. But what exactly has
to  be mediated?  According to  Windelband’s  interpretation  of
the KdU, the dualism between the noumenal and the phenome-
nal world is mediated in such a way that the latter is considered
to be a realization of the former. Yet such an interpretation can-
not be warranted by Kant’s  exposition of  the problem in the
KdU alone. According to Kant in the passage quoted above, the
difference between the ‘domain of the principles of nature, as
the phenomenal’ and the ‘domain of the principles of freedom
as the noumenal’—it is worth to recall that these are domains of
the cognitive faculty—can be understood  as if (‘als ob’) these
were two different ‘worlds’.  But the metaphor of two different
worlds only serves to highlight the fundamental difference be-
tween the two domains of the cognitive faculty. Their relation-
ship is just as important for Kant, since they are both legislations
which have validity for the realm of experience, and is the deci-
sive point in the endeavour which he undertakes in the Third
Critique. 
The central question facing the Kritik der Urteilskraft is there-
fore how the two ‘legislations’ (of nature and freedom) are relat-
ed. That is to say, how a transition from one ‘way of thinking’
(Denkungsart) to the other  is  possible.  The question is  thus a
question how two fundamentally different sets of philosophical
principles can be connected. Despite Kant’s use of the metaphor
of two worlds—which serves to stress the difficulty and urgency
of the problem—one cannot find enough ground here to sup-
port  a  metaphysical  or  ontological  interpretation  which  con-
strues the two worlds as two realms or domains of reality. By tak-
ing the metaphor of two worlds literally, such that they are really
two different metaphysical realms, Windelband misses an impor-
tant subtlety in Kant’s  presentation of the central issue of the
KdU. 
WINDELBAND: PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE OF WORLDVIEW 141
Next, let us have a closer look at Windelband’s appeal to the
‘Faktum der reinen Vernunft’  in Kant.  In the passage quoted
above, Windelband claims that it is a fact of reason that we expe-
rience the reality of the noumenal world in our conscience.101
The reality of the relationship to a noumenal world is given with
conscience. We have already seen that Windelband considers the
reality of this noumenal world (which he calls God) given with
the reality  of conscience as well.  We must therefore conclude
that Windelband considers it a ‘fact of reason’ that God (as a
name for  the  metaphysical  ground of  the  values)  is  a  reality
which is experienced through the experience of validity in our
conscience.
The expression ‘Factum der Vernunft’ appears in §7 of Kant’s
Kritik der  praktischen Vernunft,  where Kant discusses the ‘funda-
mental law of pure practical reason’ (Grundgesetz der reinen prakti-
schen  Vernunft).102 According  to  Kant,  the  fundamental  law  of
pure practical reason—act in such a way that the maxim of your
will  could be a  universal  law as  well—is the only  principle  of
practical reason which is ‘given’, that is: posits itself and does not
derive from anything else:
Man kann das Bewußtsein dieses Grundgesetzes ein Faktum der Ver-
nunft nennen, weil man es nicht aus vorhergehenden Datis  der Ver-
nunft […] herausvernünfteln kann, sondern weil es sich für sich selbst
uns aufdringt als synthetischer Satz a priori […] Doch muß man, um
dieses Gesetz ohne Mißdeutung als gegeben anzusehen, wohl bemerken:
daß es kein empirisches, sondern das einzige Faktum der reinen Ver-
nunft sei, die sich dadurch als ursprünglich gesetzgebend (sic volo, sic
iubeo) ankündigt.103
This fact of reason is indubitable, and it is synonymous with the
autonomy,  the  self-legislative  character,  of  practical  reason.104
Kant’s description of this fundamental moral law as ‘given’ may
101 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 393.
102 KpV A 54f.
103 KpV A 56-57.
104 KpV A 58-59: ‘Also drückt das moralische Gesetz nichts anderes aus, als die
Autonomie der  reinen,  praktischen Vernunft,  d.i.  der  Freiheit,  und diese ist
selbst  die  formale  Bedingung aller  Maximen,  unter  der  sie  allein mit  dem
obersten praktischen Gesetze zusammenstimmen können.’
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give  the  impression  that  reason  is  dependent  on  something
external to it. However, the ‘givenness’ of the fundamental law
refers to its self-productive nature, which is indubitable, but not
demonstrable. The autonomy of reason follows from the formal
and reflexive nature of the fundamental law: it is a principle for
selecting maxims, not a maxim itself.  The fundamental  law is
itself undetermined, and it determines by appealing to the form
of universality,  not by measuring the content of maxims to its
own content.  Concrete maxims are material maxims:  they are
directed at certain objects and therefore are (partially) depen-
dent on empirical laws, so not autonomous.105
Now, does this fundamental law, as an indubitable fact of rea-
son, constitute a relationship to a noumenal reality, a metaphysi-
cal foundation, as Windelband claims? To answer this question,
let us look at the concept of ‘sacredness’  (Heiligkeit), which is
used by Windelband to describe the relation to the noumenal re-
ality, and which is used by Kant in his discussion of the funda-
mental moral law as well. 
As ‘pathologically affective’ beings, affected by needs and em-
pirical  causes,  the  human,  finite  will  is  capable  of  producing
maxims  which  are  not  in  accordance  with  the  fundamental
moral law.106 As a reasonable being,  man is in possession of a
pure will:  that  is,  is  capable of self-legislation.  But  only  a will
which is not capable of producing maxims which are incompati-
ble with the fundamental moral law is called ‘sacred’ by Kant. By
consequence, the fundamental moral law is also called ‘sacred’
by Kant, since it projects the ‘practical idea’ of such a sacred will
to finite reasonable beings, who can only try to approach such
an ‘archetype’ (Urbild) in an infinite progression.107 
Again, it would seem that only the ascription of ‘practical re-
ality’, that is, reality as an ideal construction for the benefit of
practical reason, to the ‘sacred’ or the ‘sacred will’ is warranted
by Kant’s discussion of the matter. But it is exactly against such
an ‘as-if’ interpretation of Kant that Windelband turns.108 Win-
105 KpV A 59.
106 KpV A 57-58.
107 KpV A 58.
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delband stresses that the foundation of the validity of values lies
in a noumenal, metaphysical reality, which indicates more than
just ‘practical reality’.
Windelband’s  use of  the concept  of the sacred is  different
from Kant’s, however. Whereas for Kant the concept of the sa-
cred is derivative with respect to the fundamental law, as an ideal
construction,  for Windelband the sacred secures the universal
validity of the values itself. For Windelband it is the relation to a
noumenal world which gives the fundamental moral law its valid-
ity, while for Kant this validity is given by reason itself. 
One could perhaps argue that Windelband merely describes
the universal legislative character of the fundamental moral law
in different terms, by calling it a noumenal reality. Yet this would
miss the importance which Kant ascribes to the formal character
of the fundamental law:109 According to Windelband, on the oth-
er hand, the metaphysical foundation of the values is a ‘meta-em-
pirical  life-connection of  personalities’,  a  ‘transcendent,  meta-
physical essence of conscience’, a ‘transcendent authority’ (eine
überweltliche Instanz).110 
7. ‘Kuno Fischer und sein Kant’
The question of the ‘right’ interpretation of Kant, and especially
of  his  stance  towards  metaphysics,  was  a  much debated topic
around 1900. Friedrich Paulsen, for instance, presented his in-
terpretation of Kant in his work  Immanuel Kant: sein Leben und
seine  Lehre (1898),  which  appeared  in  the  series  Frommanns
Klassiker der Philosophie. This book aroused so much criticism that
Paulsen felt  it  necessary  to  reply  to  his  critics  (among whom
Vaihinger, Cohen, and Rickert were the most prominent) in two
108 Einleitung in die Philosophie,  393.  The expression ‘Philosophie des Als-ob’
refers  to  Hans  Vaihinger’s  Die  Philosophie  des  Als  Ob.  System der  theoretischen,
praktischen  und religiösen  Fiktionen  der  Menschheit  auf  Grund  eines  idealistischen
Positivismus. Mit einem Anhang über Kant und Nietzsche, 1911.
109 KpV, A 59-60.
110 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 391.
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contributions in the Kanstudien, in 1900 and 1903 respectively.111
In his 1900 article, Paulsen describes ‘Kant’s metaphysics’ in a
similar way to Windelband:
...eine Metaphysik, die als vernunftgemässe Weltanschauung über die
physikalische Ansicht der Wirklichkeit hinausgehe zu einer Auffassung,
die man als objektiven Idealismus bezeichnen kann.112 
Paulsen also motivates his Kant interpretation as an attempt to
present ‘the whole personality of Kant’, not just the Kant of the
First Critique.113 Faith and knowledge are not radically different,
but  the  philosophical  worldview  entails  both  scientific  know-
ledge and (rational) faith.114 Yet despite the parallels  between
Windelband and Paulsen, the despondent tone of Paulsen’s 1903
article reflects the severe criticism that his position aroused.115
Kuno Fischer  also  participated in  the  debate  about  Kant’s
metaphysics around 1900. The earlier exchange between Fischer
and Trendelenburg was by no means the end of the discussion,
and other participants in the discussion had taken Trendelen-
burg’s place, resulting in a debate that was no less heated. In the
preface to the fourth, revised edition of his  Immanuel Kant und
seine  Lehre, which appeared in  1898,  Fischer  complains  about
both  the  complete  misunderstanding  and  the  ‘rude  insults’
(gröblichsten  Ausfälle)  addressed to  him  by  the  ‘editor  of  the
Kantstudien’ in the latter’s recent commentary on Kant.116 In the
same  preface,  Fischer  extensively  thanks  Windelband  for  the
111 F. Paulsen, ‘Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik’,  Kant-Studien  4 (1900), 413-
447, and ‘Kant und die Metaphysik’, Kant-Studien 8 (1903), 111-112.
112 Paulsen, ‘Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik’, 413.
113 Paulsen,  ‘Kants  Verhältnis  zur  Metaphysik’,  415:  ‘Ich  wollte  eben  den
ganzen persönlichen Kant, nicht bloss die Gedanken, die er in der Kritik der r.
V. ausgeführt hat dem Leser vor Augen stellen.’
114 Paulsen, ‘Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik’, 446-447.
115 Paulsen,  ‘Kant  und  die  Metaphysik’,  111:  ‘Meine  Hoffnung,  dass  es
überhaupt  möglich sei,  über Kant  zu  reden und verstanden zu werden,  ist
längst fast bis auf den Nullpunkt herabgesunken.’
116 Fischer,  Immanuel  Kant  und seine  Lehre (1898),  VI-VII.  Although Fischer
does not mention his name, this refers to Hans Vaihinger, who was the editor
of the  Kantstudien  at the time and published a two volume commentary on
Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
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commemorative essay written on the occasion of the fiftieth an-
niversary of Fischer’s dissertation. Windelband’s Festschrift was
entitled ‘Kuno Fischer und sein Kant’, exactly the same title as
one of Trendelenburg’s polemic contributions in the earlier ex-
change.117 But according to Fischer, Trendelenburg’s essay is a
text from the past, and from another philosophical ‘area’.118
The relationship between Fischer and Windelband was close
in  Windelband’s  early  period,  but  also  in  the  period  around
1900. This is not only borne out by Windelband’s rather hagio-
graphical essay and Fischer’s response to it in the preface of the
fourth  edition  of  his  Kant  book,119 but  also  by  the  fact  that
Windelband was Fischer’s successor in Heidelberg in 1903 and
by  the  extensive  in  memoriam  he  wrote  for  his  teacher  in
117 Windelband,  ‘Kuno  Fischer  und  sein Kant’,  Heidelberg,  1897.  Cf.
Trendelenburg, Kuno Fischer und sein Kant (1869).
118 ‘Es  giebt eine ebenso bezeichnete Schrift,  welche in der  Vergangenheit
liegt und in einer anderen Gegend der Philosophie ihren Ursprung hatte,’
Fischer,  Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre (1898), VI.  Fischer does not mention
Trendelenburg’s name either. 
119 There  are  some  remarkable  parallels  between  Windelband’s  text  and
Fischer’s preface,  especially  concerning the historical  role of Fischer in the
revival of Kantianism and philosophy in general in Germany. Windelband: ‘Die
Mitte  des  Jahrhunderts  bezeichnet  fast  genau  den  tiefsten  Stand  des
philosophischen  Interesses  und  der  philosophischen  Leistung.  […]  da,  im
Todesjahre  Schopenhauers,  1860,  erscheint  Kuno  Fischers  Kant.  Sogleich
stürzt  sich  der  neu  erwachte  Trieb  auf  die  willkommene Nahrung,  und in
wenigen Jahren hallt es von allen Seiten: „Zurück zu Kant“! […] So gab Kuno
Fischers Kant den entscheidenden Anstoss zu der neukantischen Bewegung
[…]’, Windelband, Kuno Fischer und sein Kant, 7. Compare this with Fischer, in
the preface to his Kant book:  ‘Als ich in der Mitte des Jahrhunderts meine
akademische  Lehrthätigkeit  begann,  hatten  die  philosophischen  Interessen
und Studien in Deutschland  seit  der  Epoche Kants  wohl  ihren  niedrigsten
Stand erreicht. […] Im Jahre 1860, dem Todesjahre Schopenhauers, war die
erste  Auflage  dieses  Werkes  erschienen.  Welchen Einfluß  dasselbe  auf  den
Gang der philosophischen, insbesondere auf die sehr bemerkenswerthe, fast
plötzliche  Wiederbelebung  der  kantischen Studien  ausgeübt  hat,  bezeugen
nicht  bloß  seine  erneuten  Auflagen,  sondern  zahlreiche  Stimmen  der
Anerkennung  von  Freund  und  Feind  […]  Dankbar  und  freudig  bewegt,
nenne ich aus jüngster Zeit die Stimme eines mir wohlgesinnten, mit meinem
Wesen  und  meiner  Lehrart  aus  eigener  Erfahrung  vertrauten  Mannes
[Wilhelm Windelband].’, Fischer, Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre (1898), V-VI. 
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1907.120 Bearing in mind the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate over
the interpretation of the subjectivity of space and time in Kant,
the question  how Fischer’s  and Windelband’s  Kant-interpreta-
tions relate is an interesting one. I will briefly discuss the relation
between Windelband and his teacher as far as their interpreta-
tion of the Third Critique is concerned. 
According  to  Windelband  in  his  ‘Kuno  Fischer  und  sein
Kant’, the interpretative picture that Fischer draws of Kant is that
of ‘transcendental idealism in its metaphysical sense’.121 The du-
alism of phenomenal and noumenal world, of theoretical and
practical reason, the phenomenality of space and time, the inab-
ility of theoretical reason to know things in themselves are the
cornerstones  of  Fischer’s  Kant  interpretation.  In  fact  Fischer
stresses time and again the importance of the exclusive subjectiv-
ity of space and time, and of the dualism between experience
and the thing-in-itself that follows from it. 
Yet the relation between the two sides of the dualism figures
as prominently in Fischer’s presentation of the Kantian system as
the dualism itself. The last part of his Kant book is entitled ‘Kri-
tik der kantischen Philosophie’, and despite its title it is rather a
concise presentation and defence of Fischer’s own Kant interpre-
tation against the criticism of others. The third chapter of this
critique of Kantianism, entitled ‘Die kantische Philosophie als
Entwicklungslehre’, discusses the relation between the phenom-
enal and the noumenal world, and the role of the Third Critique
in establishing this relation. According to Fischer,  Kant’s philo-
sophy is ultimately to be understood as a theory of development
(Entwicklungslehre):
Wir sehen, wie sich die kantische Philosophie in ihrer gesammten Welt-
anschauung als Entwicklungslehre darstellt: sie betrachtet die Natur wie
die Freiheit, die Cultur wie den Staat, die Religion wie die Kirche ent-
wicklungsgeschichtlich, und wenn sie diese Themata auch nicht ausführt,
120 Kuno Fischer. Gedächtnisrede bei der Trauerfeier der Universität in der Stadthalle
zu Heidelberg am 23. Juli 1907 gehalten von Wilhelm Windelband, Heidelberg, 1907.
121 Windelband, ‘Kuno Fischer und sein Kant’, 8.
WINDELBAND: PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE OF WORLDVIEW 147
sondern nur in großen Zügen und allgemeinen Umrissen entwirft, so
hat sie die Aufgabe einer solchen Weltansicht schon vor der Vernunft-
kritik ergriffen und durch die letztere begründet.122
According to Fischer, the constant theme of Kant’s worldview (!)
is thus its developmental character, an observation that is echoed
by Windelband in his 1904 essay ‘Nach hundert Jahren’.123 
This  developmental  character  of  Kant’s  philosophy is  most
evident in his Third Critique. Kant’s theory of the teleology of
nature establishes a connection between the noumenal and the
phenomenal  world,  which from the perspective  of  theoretical
reason appear fundamentally different. The thing-in-itself, which
cannot be known by theoretical reason, can be known by practic-
al reason.124 
As in Windelband therefore, we already find in Fischer’s in-
terpretation of Kant an extension of the concept of knowledge
and of  the concept of appearance (Erscheinung).  Whereas  the
noumenal world cannot be known by (natural) science and the-
oretical reason, practical reason does have access to it. Further-
more, the connection between the noumenal world and the phe-
nomenal  world  that  is  established  in  the  Third  Critique  and
which completes Kant’s teleological worldview allows for an in-
terpretation of history as appearance of the noumenal world, ap-
pearance of the thing-in-itself:
Mit dem Zweck tritt der Wille, mit diesem die Freiheit, der intelligible
Charakter oder das Ding an sich in die Erscheinung ein und immer
deutlicher  hervor,  je  höher die  Entwicklung der  Dinge fortschreitet.
Die Weltentwicklung gilt in der Lehre unseres Philosophen als die Er-
scheinung und zunehmende Offenbarung der Freiheit.125
122 Fischer, Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre (1898), 574.
123 Windelband, ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 162: ‘Aber der übergreifende Begriff,
der in dieser Weise das Reich der Gesetze mit dem der Werte verbindet, ist der
der  Verwirklichung,  die  höchste  Kategorie  der  Weltbetrachtung  ist  das
Verhältnis des Mittels zum Zweck: es ist das Prinzip der Entwickelung.’
124 Fischer, Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre (1898), 577: ‘[Die kantische Lehre]
verneint nicht die Geltung der Werte, sondern nur deren theoretische oder
naturwissenschaftliche  Erkennbarkeit  in  der  Körperwelt,  auch  in  der
organischen; sie bejaht ihre Erkennbarkeit in der moralischen Welt, weil hier
die Wirksamkeit der Zwecke unmittelbar aus dem Willen selbst einleuchtet.’
125 Fischer, Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre (1898), 581.
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Windelband’s statement that ‘Kant’s worldview culminates in the
interpretation of  history  as  the realization of  the ends  of  the
noumenal world in the phenomenal world’126 is thus prefigured
in his teacher’s interpretation of the Kritik der Urteilskraft and the
completing picture that this Third Critique enables. One does
not find in Fischer similar explicit judgements about the KdU as
Kant’s ‘greatest’ or ‘most powerful’ work. Yet Fischer’s interpret-
ation of this work and its place in the Kantian worldview impli-
citly assigns a comparable status to it. Windelband’s 1904 Kant
interpretation has strong connections to Fischer’s interpretation
and his position in the debate about Kant’s metaphysics.  
8. Conclusion: science, worldview, metaphysics
Let me recall  the three stages of the concept of worldview in
Windelband which were discussed in this chapter. First, the early
works, especially the two publications from the early 1880s. Sec-
ond, the period around 1904,  from which the two 1904 Kant
publications and the related historical work on Kant were dis-
cussed. Finally, the  Einleitung in die Philosophie, which is the last
published work by Windelband in which the topic of worldview
is addressed.
Although Windelband is  negative about the possibility of a
scientific worldview in the early period, his arguments contain
the central concepts which return in his later discussions of the
topic. In the early texts, he considers a worldview to be meta-
physical, for it aims at knowledge beyond the scope of the empir-
ical  sciences. As such, a scientific worldview is a contradictory
concept, for by definition the worldview goes beyond scientifical-
ly warranted knowledge. According to the early Windelband, this
was demonstrated by Kant, who proved the impossibility of meta-
physics  as  science  and  restricted  scientific  knowledge  to  the
world of experience. In short: Kant demonstrated the impossibil-
126 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 27: ‘So vollendet sich Kants
Weltanschauung in dem Verständnis der  Geschichte als  der Verwirklichung
der Zwecke der übersinnlichen Welt in der Sinnenwelt selbst.’
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ity of a scientific worldview. Philosophy cannot achieve a scientif-
ic ‘view of the world’. The object of philosophy is not the totality
of the world, but rather the totality of universally valid values,
taken in a non-metaphysical way. Philosophy should be a theory
of normative consciousness only.
In his Kant interpretation of 1904, Windelband qualifies this
earlier position considerably.  The most conspicuous change is
the turnaround in his evaluation of the prospects for a scientific
worldview. Where the earlier texts completely denied the possi-
bility, with an appeal to Kant, now Kant himself is described as
having a worldview, not just a personal one, but one that is ex-
pressed in the totality of his philosophical work. The critique of
scientific knowledge is now considered to be only the first stage
of  the  Kantian  worldview.  It  is  Kant’s  worldview,  Windelband
claims, which is the cause of his exceptional historical influence. 
This shift in the interpretation of the concept of worldview in
Kant is connected to shifts in meaning of other concepts, espe-
cially the concept of science. A first alteration of the concept of
science is the explicit inclusion of the historical sciences. Accord-
ing to Windelband, this leads philosophy in its task of founding
the sciences  (philosophy as  theory of science is  an important
part of Windelband’s concept of philosophy as science of norma-
tive consciousness) to ethics and aesthetics too, for a complete
system of values is needed to warrant scientific objectivity in the
historical sciences. This extension of the concept of knowledge
allows Windelband to present philosophy as theory of science
and as a comprehensive worldview, encompassing ethics and aes-
thetics, at the same time.
But yet another extension of the concept of scientific knowl-
edge can be discerned in Windelband, one that is not explicitly
recognized.  Philosophy  is  both  science  and  metaphysics,  as
Windelband recognizes in his 1904 texts. Yet this is paradoxical,
since by definition scientific knowledge cannot be metaphysical
knowledge, for the Kantian critique of science, even if it is to be
considered  only  a  first  stage  of  the  Kantian  worldview,  still
stands. The implicit assumption is therefore that philosophy as a
science  is  different  from  the  other  sciences,  for  it  can  have
knowledge of the noumenal  world,  the realm beyond experi-
ence. Although Windelband carefully  avoids drawing this con-
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clusion, it is a corollary of his argument that philosophy discov-
ers principles which have universal and necessary validity.  Fur-
thermore, the noumenal world is realized (and thus appears) in
history, and therefore accessible to philosophy through history.
Windelband’s interpretation of Kant as providing a metaphys-
ical worldview places him firmly in the debate about Kant’s meta-
physics at the time, as we have seen. The metaphysical interpre-
tation of Kant in Windelband can be traced back to the Kant
interpretation of his teacher, Kuno Fischer. And Fischer’s Kant
interpretation has  its  foundations in the dualism between the
noumenal and the phenomenal world, a dualism which is itself
rooted in Kant’s theory of the exclusive subjectivity of space and
time, according to Fischer. The question what a philosophical
worldview is and whether (neo-)Kantian philosophy could pro-
vide such a worldview connects Windelband to Fischer and his
debate with Trendelenburg. The worldview debate is at least par-
tially, too, the debate about how Kant should be read. We will re-
turn to this issue in the next chapter, in which Trendelenburg’s
worldview concept  will  be compared to Dilthey’s  and Windel-
band’s worldview concepts. 
In his  1914  Einleitung,  Windelband further complicates the
worldview concept, by loosening the tie between philosophy and
science—which he still retained, at least formally, in his 1904 dis-
cussion. Now life is introduced as a basis for philosophy, along-
side  the  sciences.  Also,  the  worldview  which  philosophy  con-
structs—philosophy  is  now  explicitly  defined  as  ‘science  of
worldview’—should have relevance in ‘life’ as well. This connec-
tion of the philosophical worldview with life, which Windelband
calls the ‘practical’ side, though it is not practical in the Kantian
sense, is not further developed in this work, unfortunately. The
relation between science and life remains obscure as far as the
philosophical worldview is concerned.
CHAPTER 5
WORLDVIEW AND METAPHYSICS
1. Introduction
The previous chapters have shown that the discussion of the con-
cept of worldview is invariably linked to the most fundamental
philosophical  concepts—thought,  being,  knowledge,  validity,
metaphysics. The analysis of the concept of worldview led us in
each of the three cases to a more general discussion of the basic
structure and limits of philosophy. The question of a philosophi-
cal worldview is intimately connected to the question what phi-
losophy as science can achieve. In this chapter I will discuss the
three concepts of worldview and their systematic philosophical
background, and the systematic connections which exist between
them.
Before discussing general systematic implications of the pre-
ceding analysis of the concept of worldview, I will  give a brief
overview of the three worldview concepts as they were analyzed
in the previous chapters. Following this, I will compare the three
worldview concepts with respect to the systematic place which
they occupy.  After that, I  turn to the systematic framework in
which these worldview concepts are embedded. A discussion of
the philosophical theories underlying the worldview concept will
enable an understanding of the relation between the three posi-
tions discussed separately (even though some comparisons have
already been made). As a prelude to this discussion of the sys-
tematic connections between the three positions, I will return to
the  Fischer-Trendelenburg  debate  on  Kant’s  metaphysics.  Fis-
cher’s influence on Windelband’s Kant interpretation is an im-
portant historical and systematic nexus which links central con-
cerns  of  Trendelenburg’s  worldview  concept  to  the  Kant
interpretation underlying Windelband’s worldview concept. Af-
ter  that,  the relationship between Trendelenburg and Dilthey
will be discussed. As it turns out, both these systematic-historical
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relations lead to a discussion of the metaphysical character of
the  concept  of  worldview.  Together  with  the  comparison  of
worldview concepts, these systematic considerations allow a con-
cluding assessment of the worldview concept among the three
protagonists of this study.
2. Three philosophical concepts of worldview 
According to Trendelenburg,  a  worldview,  in its  philosophical
sense, is first of all a fundamental metaphysical notion (metaphysi-
scher Grundgedanke). It presents an answer to the question how
thought and being are related. Yet this fundamental notion de-
termines the totality of knowledge: as a basic principle, it orders
and transforms the totality of philosophical and scientific know-
ledge. The concept of worldview in Trendelenburg denotes both
the  basic  principle  and the  ordered totality  which  derives  its
structure from this fundamental principle. 
The fundamental metaphysical question how thought and be-
ing are related can be answered in three different ways, accord-
ing to the typological distinctions made by Trendelenburg in his
1847 essay ‘Die Typen der Weltanschauung’. These three world-
views are opposite and mutually exclusive ways to unite and or-
ganize the totality of philosophical and scientific knowledge into
a meaningful whole. Only one of them can be ‘true and actual’.
As I have argued, the point of Trendelenburg’s classification in
this essay is to arrive at a critical evaluation of the three types of
worldviews. More specifically, he aims to build a case for the or-
ganic worldview, the view which gives thought priority over being
in its answer to the fundamental question how the relationship
between  them must  be  conceived.  The  case  for  the  organic
worldview (also referred to as the teleological worldview, ideal-
ism, or Platonism by Trendelenburg) is only supported by prac-
tical arguments in this text. The choice of the organic worldview
must be made for the sake of ethics. A sufficient theoretical found-
ation was a task which could not be yet completed, according to
Trendelenburg in this 1847 essay. 
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The Logische Untersuchungen, in the revised second edition of
1862, aims to establish this theoretical foundation of the organic
worldview, which was not yet attainable in 1847. The programme
of the Logische Untersuchungen consists of a theoretical answer to
the fundamental metaphysical question, i.e. a theoretical answer
to the question how thought and being are related, which at the
same time is an answer to the question how knowledge is pos-
sible. This programme is the project of a founding science which
simultaneously encompasses logic (the possibility of knowledge)
and metaphysics (the connection between thought and being).
According  to  Trendelenburg,  such  a  fundamental  science
(Grundwissenschaft) must take its point of departure in the sci-
ences (das Faktum der Wissenschaft) and establish the philosophic-
al preconditions for scientific knowledge. However, the validity
of  the  results  of  this  philosophical  discipline  is  not  different
from that of empirical scientific knowledge. The philosophical
fundamental science is hypothetical as well as ‘empirical’, i.e. it
should adequately explain the possibility of its object—the sci-
ences themselves. Such a fundamental science can be described
as ‘non-foundationalist’,  since it does not locate the source of
the validity of knowledge in a (metaphysical) foundation which
is external to it. 
The concept of motion (Bewegung) plays a crucial role in ex-
ecuting this programme of the Logische Untersuchungen. With this
concept, Trendelenburg claims to have identified the mediating
principle between thought and being, or rather: the principle
which is prior to both thought and being, the principle from
which they are both constructed. With this principle, Trendelen-
burg achieves the first part of the task he set himself. The prin-
ciple of motion explains the relation between thought and be-
ing,  and  thus  explains  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  Yet  the
theoretical foundation of the organic worldview demands more
than this. To found the organic worldview, Trendelenburg also
has to prove the priority of thought over being, in other words:
he has to answer the question how thought can determine be-
ing. 
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This  second  step  of  his  argument  can  be  found  in  the
chapters  of  the  Logische  Untersuchungen which  deal  with  end
(Zweck) and the will.1 In these chapters, Trendelenburg argues
for the possibility of an influence of thought on being, through a
discussion of the reality of ends in nature. Since ends are real-
ized in nature, ‘blind forces’ are not enough for an understand-
ing of nature. Furthermore, man as both a natural and a think-
ing being, can realize, or at least can try to realize, his own ends
in nature. ‘The ethical’ is defined as organic life—life in the bio-
logical sense—which has become free through knowledge and
the  will.  In  this  regard,  Trendelenburg  has  fulfilled  the  task
which he set himself, to give a theoretical account of the organic
worldview. 
In sum: Trendelenburg’s discussion of a philosophical world-
view and his classification of types of worldviews have an epistem-
ological character, since they deal with the possibility of know-
ledge.  The  programmatic  essay  from  1847  reveals  that  this
epistemological  discussion (or:  logical-metaphysical  discussion,
to use Trendelenburg’s own characterization) has an underlying
practical motivation: Trendelenburg’s aim is a theoretical found-
ation2 of the organic worldview, which is a prerequisite for eth-
ics. The discussion in the Logische Untersuchungen must be read as
an explanation for the possibility of knowledge of the world, as
well as of ethics. We will return to the issue of ethics and free-
dom in Trendelenburg in our discussion below.
The  second  philosophical  interpretation  of  the  worldview
concept we encountered was that of one of Trendelenburg’s stu-
dents,  Dilthey.  Dilthey’s  worldview concept is  much more com-
plex than Trendelenburg’s.  As  I  have  argued,  the concept  of
worldview in Dilthey must be understood as representing a pyr-
amid of different worldview concepts. In addition, Dilthey also
specifies  the  internal  structure  of  worldviews,  especially  the
threefold  structure  of  philosophical  worldviews.  In  general,
1 LU 2, chapters IX and X.
2 It  is  hard  to avoid  ‘foundationalist’  language when discussing  Trendelen-
burg’s  position.  As  I  have  argued,  this  foundation  is  not  an  absolute,
metaphysical foundation. In other words: the foundation is not fundamentally
different from the building it is supposed to support. See chapter 2.
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worldviews are interpretations of the totality of the world. This
holds for the most immediate, unscientific worldview as well as
for the most sophisticated scientific-philosophical one. The dif-
ference between the concepts which make up this pyramid lies
in their validity.  The higher levels of this worldview-pyramid—
Dilthey distinguishes especially religious, artistic, and philosoph-
ical worldviews—are characterized by an increasing amount of
inter-subjective stability and validity. The zenith of the pyramid is
formed by the philosophical worldviews, for which objective, sci-
entific validity is claimed. 
According to Dilthey, however, this scientific validity is only a
claim. Historical consciousness reveals a recurring competition
between philosophical  worldviews which can be classified into
three basic types. This is the point where the Weltanschauungsty-
pologie comes in. The crucial observation which Dilthey makes in
his publications on this topic is that the competition between the
different worldviews cannot be decided in favour of one of them:
the typology  of  worldviews  represents  an irreducible plurality.
The historical plurality of types of worldviews and their perpetu-
al interplay is the horizon beyond which no philosophical unific-
ation is possible. 
The reason for this ultimate plurality of worldviews is that all
worldviews are rooted in life, according to Dilthey. Life is the
substrate and cause of all human expression. Yet life itself cannot
be known directly; only through an interpretation of these cul-
tural  expressions  can  an  ‘understanding’  of  life  be  reached.
Since the philosophical types of worldviews are equally—but par-
tially—valid interpretations of life, one cannot rationally decide
between them. A philosophical-historical typology of worldviews
is the only option for a philosophical worldview theory. Whether
Dilthey abandons the idea of philosophy itself being a worldview,
is  a question which will  be discussed in the remainder of this
chapter.
The third and final philosophical worldview concept analyzed
is found in the writings of  Windelband. In his early work up to
and  including  the  1880s,  Windelband  rejected  the  idea  of  a
philosophical worldview. He construed a worldview at that time
as something which would give knowledge of the world as a total-
ity, which meant both the world of appearances and the world of
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the thing-in-itself, the noumenal world. With an appeal to Kant’s
critique of metaphysics, Windelband claimed that such a world-
view could not be scientifically established.
Interestingly,  the  Kant  year 1904  saw  two  publications  by
Windelband in which he turned again to both the concept of
worldview and the interpretation of Kant. In these two publica-
tions, Windelband ascribes a worldview to Kant himself, not just
a personal worldview, but one which has acquired scientific valid-
ity.  The critique of metaphysics  is  now interpreted by Windel-
band as only a first stage of the Kantian worldview, concerning
empirical, natural science. Philosophy has to address the historic-
al sciences, which also established themselves in the nineteenth
century. 
The philosophical foundation of the historical sciences is to
be found in a system of universally valid principles,  or values.
This system of values, or: normative consciousness, is the true
object  of  philosophy.  Although  knowledge  of  this  noumenal
realm of values is not possible in the same way that empirical
knowledge,  knowledge  of  the  phenomenal  world,  is  possible,
philosophy can show the necessity and content of this world of
values. History plays a crucial role in this philosophical project,
since the noumenal world is realized in history. Because of this
actuality of the noumenal world, Windelband does not hesitate
to describe Kant as a ‘metaphysician’. As I have argued, this Kant
interpretation  has  a  strong  affinity  with  that  of  Windelband’s
teacher, Kuno Fischer. 
The  philosophical  worldview  is  a  scientific  worldview  for
Windelband: the system of values is the necessary foundation of
the objectivity of the historical as well as natural sciences. The va-
lidity of the sciences is established by this philosophical world-
view, and the worldview itself is the result of philosophical sci-
ence.  This  concept  of  science  is  broader  than  the  concept
employed by Windelband in his early  period: scientific knowl-
edge is not restricted to the world of appearances alone.
The third and final stage in the development of the concept
of worldview in Windelband’s work saw the introduction of the
concept  of  life.  In  his  1914  work  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,
Windelband refers to both the sciences and life as the ‘material
basis’ for philosophy—unfortunately without specifying this basis
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in  life.  Conversely,  the  philosophical  worldview  should  have
‘practical’ relevance—by which Windelband means a relevance
for life. The philosophical worldview should also be a life-view,
provide  stability  and  a  guide  in  life.  Again,  this  relationship
between philosophy  and life  is  not  thematically  addressed by
Windelband. 
3. Comparing the three worldview concepts:
The systematic place of the worldview concept
The three different worldview concepts we encountered can be
compared at different levels. Before discussing particular system-
atic questions raised by the topics discussed so far, I will provide
in this  section a first  comparison of the three worldview con-
cepts. This first comparison will cover (1) the systematic place of
the concept of worldview in relation to the general philosophical
theory in which it occurs, (2) the related topic of how the plural-
ity of worldviews is dealt with, and (3) how the relation between
science and worldview is construed.
(1) First, let us compare the place of the worldview concept in
the philosophical system or within the more general philosoph-
ical theory as developed by the authors under consideration. For
Trendelenburg, the concept of worldview is not a basic concept in
his philosophical system. This might seem more than a little sur-
prising,  since  we  have  seen  that  Trendelenburg  denotes  the
worldview  as  a  fundamental,  metaphysical  thought  (metaphysi-
scher Grundgedanke). Yet this fundamental character only pertains
to the content of this metaphysical thought, namely the specific-
ation of the relation between thought and being. The nature of
this relationship is a fundamental question in Trendelenburg’s
work, a question which is answered by his theory of motion. The
concept of worldview and the classification of worldviews are pre-
liminary  to  the  theoretical  foundation  of  the  ‘organic  world-
view’, which is the most important result of Trendelenburg’s sys-
tem.  This  theoretical  foundation  of  the  organic  worldview
effectively renders the classification of worldviews obsolete, since
only  the  organic  worldview  is  capable  of  being  theoretically
founded. Insofar as the worldview concept entails the idea of a
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plurality of worldviews—as a mere view of the world which ad-
mits  of  other,  different  views—the concept  of  worldview itself
would  be  obsolete  after  Trendelenburg’s  logical-metaphysical
foundation of the organic worldview. The fact that Trendelen-
burg still uses the term Weltanschauung even in his retrospective
section (Rückblick) at the very end of the Logische Untersuchungen
can be seen as an indication that the concept of worldview is not
necessarily  pluralistic  in  his  account.  So  even  though  the
concept  of  worldview  is  an  important,  systematic  concept  in
Trendelenburg,  it  is  not  as  fundamental  as  the  metaphysical
thought which is entailed in it. 
Whereas  for  Trendelenburg the classification of  worldviews
comes early in his work, only to be replaced or even made obsol-
ete in his later work, for  Dilthey  the typology of worldview is a
product of his later work. Systematically, it is a philosophical ac-
count which seeks to integrate the historical plurality of forms of
philosophical  systems into  a single account (without reducing
the plurality itself to a single form, more on this below). As I ar-
gued in the chapter discussing Dilthey’s concept of worldview,
the  Weltanschauungstypologie itself has the character of a world-
view, and aims to provide a better understanding of life—better
in such a way that the limits of the different, historical types of
worldviews are overcome. The typology of worldviews therefore
rounds off Dilthey’s work, by integrating the different types of
philosophical systems—between which no rational decision can
be made, they are equally valid interpretations of life—into a re-
flexive, historical theory. Rather than dissolving the project of a
philosophical worldview into historical relativism, the typology of
worldview takes the next step by adding historical awareness to
the philosophical worldview theory. 
In Windelband’s work, the concept of worldview gains increas-
ing importance, culminating in the interpretation of the ‘ulti-
mate and highest task’ of philosophy as the construction of a
worldview.3 Philosophy should provide a scientific worldview, and
the concept of worldview can be considered a shorthand for the
results of philosophical science as such. The concept of world-
view is therefore not a technical term in Windelband, it is not
3 Windelband, ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 5.
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part of his philosophical theory, but it is the denominator for
this philosophical theory itself.  Philosophy is science of world-
view, and I have argued that this must be read as a science which
results in a worldview. The interpretation of philosophy as sci-
ence of worldview is itself not philosophical: it is an external in-
terpretation and, as the arguments for this interpretation are giv-
en prior to the philosophical enterprise itself, they are (as I shall
argue below) non-philosophical. Furthermore, these non-philo-
sophical arguments are not replaced by philosophical ones later
in Windelband’s work.
The identification of philosophy and worldview is not suffi-
ciently  warranted by  philosophical  arguments  in  Windelband,
and therefore this identification is an external determination of
philosophy. Since this is a far-reaching and perhaps controversial
statement, I will go into some detail to support it here. A survey
of  the  different  occurrences  of  the  concept  of  worldview  in
Windelband serves to confirm the statement. In the early texts,
we have seen that worldview and philosophy are considered mu-
tually exclusive. If anything, the concept of worldview serves a
‘negative  systematic  function’,  philosophy  is  not  a  worldview
(which is construed as knowledge of the world ‘as it is’, beyond
appearances). Since, according to Windelband, the concept of
worldview does not define philosophy but rather is fundamental-
ly different from philosophy, it is a non-philosophical concept in
the early texts.
In the 1904 texts on Kant the situation is quite different. In
the text on ‘Kant’s worldview’, the concept of worldview is intro-
duced by the following line of reasoning: Kant’s historical suc-
cess—and historically effective philosophical work in general—
results from the essence (innerste Wesen) of the philosopher’s per-
sonality. This essence is to be found in the philosopher’s world-
view, by which ‘he projects his individual character onto reality’.4
Kant’s superior place in the history of philosophy rests on the
special way in which he has solved the ‘highest task’ of philo-
sophy—i.e. to express a worldview. The task which Windelband
sets himself in this commemorative essay is to extract this world-
view from the ‘formulas’  of Kant’s  system.  It  is  clear  that  the
4 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 4.
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concept of worldview is applied to the definition of philosophy
in general, since it is used as an interpretation of the results of
philosophy  as  such.  Yet  this  is  not  subsequently  vindicated in
Windelband’s discussion. He posits that Kant’s philosophy is the
expression of a worldview, and that this worldview connects the
essence of his personality with his scientific work. He also posits
that any historically effective philosophy derives its effectiveness
from the fact that it contains a worldview. No further arguments
for the claim that philosophy is (is an expression of, contains) a
worldview are given, however—the argument from historical ef-
fectiveness is insufficient to warrant the validity  of this  claim.5
The identification of worldview and philosophy is therefore not
an identification warranted by philosophical arguments, hence
we must consider this identification to be non-philosophical. 
In  ‘Nach  hundert  Jahren’,  the  other  1904  text  on  Kant,
Windelband starts his discussion by observing that contemporary
culture  is  in  need  of  a  worldview,  that  the  ‘national  spirit’
(Volksseele) even ‘demands’ (gebieterisch erheischt) a worldview from
philosophy.6 In the assessment of Kant’s legacy, the central ques-
tion therefore is whether his critical philosophy can serve as a
philosophical worldview. We have seen how Windelband in his—
affirmative—answer to this question primarily discusses the role
of historical science, the connection between the noumenal and
the phenomenal world,  and thus the question of the unity of
reason.  Two  important  questions  are  neither  asked  nor
answered, however. The first is the question whether the philo-
sophical theory outlined by Windelband can serve as a worldview
in the sense in which it is required of philosophy. The second
question  is  whether  the  cultural  demand  of  a  philosophical
worldview is a legitimate one. 
5 Windelband does not present the coincidence between effective historical
philosophical work and this personal mark of a worldview as an argument for
the identification of philosophy and worldview. It would have been a peculiar
argument for Windelband had he claimed this,  for the examination of the
validity  of  natural,  empirical,  or  historical  ‘facts’  is  an  important  thread
throughout his work.
6 Windelband, ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 149-150.
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The fact that Windelband does not ask or answer these ques-
tions indicates that the concept of worldview is not a systematic
concept here either: the task of philosophy is set externally, by
culture in general, by the ‘national spirit’. This task is to provide
a worldview. Windelband thus operates with a concept of world-
view  which  is  pre-philosophical,  for  it  is  put  forward  before
philosophy can start to fulfil its task. Even if the characteristics
required of such a worldview are not specified beyond the obser-
vation that it must be a motivating expression of the essence of
culture,  at  the  very  least  a  rudimentary  worldview  concept  is
needed to specify  this task for philosophy.  Furthermore, since
Windelband fails to answer whether his philosophical worldview
theory  (Weltanschauungslehre)  can  indeed  serve  the  purpose
which it is meant to have (and also fails to provide a retrospect-
ive vindication of the task which he formulates in advance), the
concept of worldview with which he begins does not receive suffi-
cient theoretical foundation afterwards. 
In his 1914 Einleitung in die Philosophie, Windelband starts by
similarly  observing  that  there  is  a  general  cultural  need  for
philosophy to provide a worldview.7 A worldview is  demanded
(verlangt man) of philosophy. And even though everyone always
has  a  worldview,  philosophy should provide  a  special  kind of
worldview: one that has scientific validity. Philosophy, thus inter-
preted as a ‘science of worldview’, has a double task:
Als Wissenschaft der Weltanschauung hat die Philosophie zwei Bedürf-
nisse zu befriedigen. Man erwartet von ihr einen umfassenden, sicher
gegründeten und womöglich abschließenden Ausbau aller Erkenntnis
und daneben eine auf solcher Einsicht errichtete Ueberzeugung, die
den inneren Halt  im Leben zu gewähren vermag.  Darin besteht  die
theoretische  und  die  praktische Bedeutung der  Philosophie:  sie  soll
Weltweisheit und Lebensweisheit zugleich sein, und jede Form der Phi-
losophie,  die nur die eine oder die andere dieser Aufgaben erfüllen
wollte, würde uns von vornherein als einseitig und als unzulänglich er-
scheinen.8
7 Windelband, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 1.
8 Windelband, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 19.
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Windelband’s dual definition of the task of philosophy was al-
ready discussed in the previous chapter. Here I want to draw at-
tention to the perspective from which this passage has been writ-
ten.  Philosophy  receives  a  task,  but  from  whom  exactly?
Philosophy  should fulfil  two  needs,  it  must be  wisdom of  the
world as well as of life. But these demands and constraints on the
results  of  philosophy are given in advance,  before philosophy
has really taken off (in the prolegomena of the introduction).
This is apparent from the last sentence, quoted above as well: A
form of philosophy which would address only one of the tasks
put  forward  by  Windelband  would  be  considered inadequate
from the outset (von vornherein). 
Without acknowledging it, Windelband in effect works with
two worldview concepts, the worldview as it is demanded of phi-
losophy by the ‘national spirit’ on the one hand, and the con-
cept of worldview in the philosophical sense on the other. The
philosophical concept of worldview basically denotes the episte-
mological foundation of knowledge, as discussed by Windelband
in ‘Nach hundert Jahren’. Yet he fails to elucidate the relation
between these two concepts; indeed, he does not distinguish be-
tween them and seems to assume that the two are identical. It is
by no means self-evident, however, that the philosophical world-
view can in fact be the worldview demanded by cultural needs.
Windelband  should  provide  a  connection  between the  philo-
sophical and the cultural worldview concept, in both directions:
he  should  argue  that  philosophy  should  indeed  take  up  the
worldview task put forward by cultural demands, but he should
also argue that the philosophical worldview as he envisioned it
does in fact fulfil these demands. However, both lines of argu-
ment are missing in Windelband’s elaborations. 
It would seem therefore, that the double task for philosophy
is derived from extra-philosophical—and thus non-philosophical
—considerations. The double worldview task also seems to be in-
dubitable: every form of philosophy which fails to address both
tasks is rejected as insufficient. This is all the more striking since
the main characteristic of the philosophical worldview in distinc-
tion to other kinds of worldviews (religious, poetic, etc.) is that
philosophy examines and when necessary corrects or rejects the
presuppositions of these other kinds of worldviews. The interpre-
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tation of philosophy as itself resulting in a worldview, a world-
view which should fulfil a double task, is a presupposition which
is apparently indubitable and which is not subjected to critical
examination. In any case, there are no arguments to be found in
Windelband which could serve as a subsequent (philosophical)
vindication of these prior constraints on philosophy.
For these reasons, the identification of philosophy as science
of worldview must be considered an external interpretation of
philosophy: it is not a self-interpretation, the worldview task of
philosophy is an external demand, which receives no internal-
philosophical justification. The concept of worldview as applied
to philosophy is therefore an external, non-systematic concept:
its meaning and its application are motivated by considerations
which are derived from other sources than philosophy. 
Put  next  to  one another,  the worldview concepts  could be
schematically described as (a) an internal-philosophical concept in
Trendelenburg, (b) a boundary concept in Dilthey, and (c) an ex-
ternal,  non-philosophical concept in Windelband: (a) The world-
view concept is introduced by Trendelenburg as a concept to be
used in a systematic evaluation of basic philosophical  concep-
tions of the relationship between thought and being. It is there-
fore both internal to his philosophical system and has a clear sys-
tematic function within it. 
(b) Dilthey’s concept of worldview is both a technical term
used for various kinds of worldviews and a term which is applied
to philosophical systems as a whole. In its latter sense, the con-
cept is the basis for his typology of (philosophical) worldviews.
With this theory, Dilthey adds a new reflexive level to philosophy,
the typology of worldviews tries to combine what in itself cannot
be  combined:  the  mutually  exclusive  types  of  worldviews.  By
making them part of a theory which explains both their necessity
and their historical relativity, he tries to overcome the inherent
limits of the types of worldviews. Dilthey can only save philoso-
phy by extending its boundary: he tries to save metaphysics by
overcoming it,  at  least  overcoming  it  in  its  historical,  relative
form. 
(c) In Windelband’s case, the concept of worldview and the
identification of philosophy and worldview are presuppositions
of  his  systematic  work  (from 1904  onwards),  presuppositions
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which are not sufficiently vindicated either beforehand or after-
wards. They appear in systematic texts and discussions, but they
do not originate in Windelband’s more general philosophical the-
ory, rather it is the other way around: the identification of world-
view  and  philosophy  by  Windelband  is  used  to  describe  the
philosophical task and to constrain its results. Since the concept
of worldview and its identification with philosophy do not origi-
nate from within philosophical theory, this identification is an
external,  prior  determination.  Since  it  also  does  not  receive
philosophical vindication afterwards, the identification of philos-
ophy and worldview must be considered external and non-philo-
sophical itself.
To conclude this general comparison of the systematic place
of the concept of worldview,  an interpretation of Windelband
must be considered which, when adopted, could perhaps eluci-
date (but not warrant) his anterior identification of philosophy
and  worldview.  We  have  discussed  Windelband’s  notion  of  a
‘realm of values’ which is timeless (‘eternal truths’). It is possible
to conceive of this noumenal realm of values as being in essence,
or rather the essence of, the ‘philosophical worldview’, which is
only gradually explicated in the history of philosophy. Yet what-
ever validity the philosophical worldview has (as an actual result
of philosophical work), it has, by virtue of this noumenal realm
of values, normative consciousness. This ‘Platonic’ constellation
might explain why Windelband apparently sees no problem in
identifying philosophy and worldview before actually developing
any systematic or foundational theory. Philosophy insofar as it
has any validity, and therefore insofar as it has any prospect of
scientifically fulfilling the tasks assigned to it, is an expression of
this eternal realm of values. Philosophy is worldview for Windel-
band, because the concept of philosophy contains this ‘Platonic’
worldview. Yet the metaphysical character of the theory of values
in Windelband is problematic itself, as we have seen. The ques-
tion of the validity of the identification of philosophy and world-
view transforms into the question of the validity of the metaphys-
ical worldview underlying Windelband’s concept of philosophy. 
(2)  Elaborating  on  this  first  comparison,  one  can  further
compare the different worldview concepts with respect to their
stance towards the plurality of worldviews. We have already not-
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ed the transient  character of  Trendelenburg’s  classification of
worldview  types.  The concept  of  worldview  is  not  intrinsically
pluralistic. This is also evident from the definition of worldview
as the fundamental metaphysical thought: Trendelenburg’s aim is
to provide one metaphysical thought with sufficient theoretical
support. The concept of worldview can therefore return in his
Logische Untersuchungen, while the classification of worldviews is
no longer needed. The worldview concept in Dilthey on the oth-
er hand is intrinsically pluralistic. Different types of worldviews
are equally valid interpretations of life, which are produced with
a certain necessity and among which no rational choice can be
made. The  Weltanschauungstypologie is  an attempt to fixate this
plurality  in  a  theory  of  historical  reflexivity,  an  attempt  to
achieve a more complete interpretation of life by integrating the
plurality of its interpretations. In the case of Windelband, the
matter is less clear. Although he talks in the Einleitung about an
inventory of forms of world-views (Formen der Weltansicht), such
an inventory only functions as a prolegomenon to a single philo-
sophical system which is  established with scientific validity.  Yet
the  conventional  character  of  the  concept  of  worldview  in
Windelband—i.e. the concept of worldview is an external inter-
pretation of philosophy as a whole, not a necessary systematic
concept—allows for the possibility that other, philosophical or
non-philosophical, systems can function as ‘worldviews’ as well.
(3) One can also compare the worldview concepts with re-
spect  to  their  relationship with  the  concept  of  science.  More
specifically, one can ask whether the worldview concepts are con-
cepts of scientific worldviews or whether they  must be under-
stood as the basis for a philosophical, scientific theory of world-
views—or still  differently.  With Husserl’s terminology in mind,
this question could be rephrased as: are these philosophical con-
cepts of worldview able to combine in a single concept the no-
tions of philosophy as worldview philosophy and as scientific phi-
losophy?
In Trendelenburg we find both approaches intertwined. First
of all, there is continuity between the concept of science and the
concept of philosophy: philosophy, itself a fundamental science,
should address the sciences as a ‘fact’  (Faktum).  Secondly, the
concept of worldview is introduced in a philosophical-scientific
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theory of worldviews (the typological classification). This theory
of worldviews is superseded by the theoretical foundation which
one of the worldviews receives in the Logische Untersuchungen. So
the concept of worldview is retained while the scientific theory
of worldviews is no longer systematically needed. Trendelenburg
aims at giving one of the worldviews, one answer to the funda-
mental metaphysical question, a philosophical-scientific founda-
tion. This worldview therefore can be called a scientific worldview
if indeed the Logische Untersuchungen succeed in their attempt to
give  it  its  theoretical  basis.  In  Trendelenburg  the  concept  of
worldview thus develops from a scientific theory of worldviews to
a scientific worldview. In terms of Husserl’s distinction between
worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy,  one could say
that the concept of worldview as applied to philosophy in Tren-
delenburg is  derived from the scientific nature of philosophy:
the sciences, as a ‘fact’, lead Trendelenburg to a conception of
philosophy as ‘theory of science’ of which the basic question is
the ‘worldview question’, the question how thought and being
are related, i.e. the question how (scientific) knowledge is possi-
ble. 
Dilthey frames his concept of worldview in a scientific theory
of worldviews—the Weltanschauungstypologie—from the outset. Yet
I have argued that this theory of worldview has the pretension to
constitute a worldview itself—a worldview which would therefore
be scientific, more scientific than the worldviews analyzed in the
typology. It must be borne in mind however, that this is accompa-
nied in Dilthey by a broadening of the concept of science and of
knowledge.  The typology  of  worldviews  is  presented as  an at-
tempt to save the scientific character of philosophy, Dilthey thus
apparently chooses one horn of Husserl’s dilemma: philosophy
as science. Yet, due to the pretensions of the Weltanschauungsty-
pologie constituting itself a (more scientific) worldview, Dilthey in
fact aims at combining both approaches (philosophy as science
and as worldview). Unfortunately, the price for this manoeuvre is
the metaphysical character of life which underlies the typology
of worldviews, as will be discussed below. This casts doubt on the
success of Dilthey’s approach as a scientific one.
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Windelband—although  using  the  expressions  ‘theory  of
worldview’  (Weltanschauungslehre)  and  ‘science  of  worldview’
(Wissenschaft der Weltanschauung)—sees a worldview as resulting
from philosophy, with scientific validity. At the same time he also
construes philosophy, especially in his 1904 essay ‘Nach hundert
Jahren’, as a theory of the principles of scientific objectivity. In
his 1914 Einleitung, the relation between science and worldview
is loosened by Windelband’s introduction of life as a basis for
the  philosophical  worldview,  alongside  science.  Unfortunately,
this role of life is not specified, and it cannot be compared with
the role of Dilthey’s concept of life in his theory of worldviews.
Like Dilthey and Trendelenburg, Windelband aims at combin-
ing the two approaches which Husserl presented as mutually ex-
clusive:  philosophy  as  science  and as  worldview.  Even though
Windelband presents his discussion of philosophy as theory of
scientific objectivity as a worldview theory, I have argued that this
concept  of  worldview  differs  from the  one  which is  expected
from philosophy as worldview philosophy. Windelband does not
succeed in connecting the interpretation of philosophy as (theo-
ry of) science with the interpretation of philosophy as worldview.
Whereas for Trendelenburg and Dilthey the concept of world-
view resulted from a discussion of the scientific character of phi-
losophy, for Windelband the role of philosophy as worldview is
put forward prior to philosophical theory. 
4. Further comparison: the systematic background
Now that we have compared the three worldview concepts on
different aspects, I will turn to some systematic issues connected
to the concept of worldview in the philosophical positions we en-
countered. To this end, I will first return to the Fischer-Trende-
lenburg debate and one of its central questions, which remained
unresolved so far. After that I will discuss the relation between
Windelband and Trendelenburg and between Dilthey and Tren-
delenburg respectively. Both these comparisons raise similar is-
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sues in different forms. This discussion together with the preced-
ing comparison of worldview concepts will enable a final assess-
ment of the worldview concept among our three protagonists.
4.1 The Fischer-Trendelenburg debate revisited:
Freedom and metaphysics 
Prima  facie,  the  Fischer-Trendelenburg  debate  can  be  con-
sidered a merely technical discussion about a detail of Kant’s epi-
stemology, viz. the question whether Kant has proven the exclus-
ive  subjectivity  of  space  and  time  as  necessary  forms  of
appearance. The underlying motivation for Trendelenburg’s al-
legation that Kant in fact did not prove the exclusive subjectivity
of space and time, and that they could be objective as well, has a
much broader impact and determines the evaluation of Kantian
philosophy as a whole. The restriction of empirical knowledge to
knowledge  of  mere  appearances,  and  not  of  things  in  them-
selves,  is  what  ultimately  worries  Trendelenburg.  Knowledge
would thus be doomed to remain in the ‘magic circle’ (Zauber-
kreis)  of  subjectivity,9 and  would  never  be  knowledge  of  the
world. And as we have seen, the project of Trendelenburg’s  Lo-
gische Untersuchungen was precisely aimed at the demonstration of
the possibility of a ‘worldview’: a principle and subsequent sys-
tem of knowledge in which thought and being are connected, in
which knowledge can be seen as knowledge of the world indeed.
According to Trendelenburg, the exclusive subjectivity of space
and time, and the ensuing distinction between empirical objects
and things in themselves, constitute an abyss between knowledge
and the world which cannot be bridged.
Now that we have analyzed some aspects of Fischer’s Kant in-
terpretation in more detail in the last chapter, it is more clear
why he opposed Trendelenburg’s claims so vehemently.  To Fi-
scher, and even more to his pupil Windelband, the theory of the
thing-in-itself and the general distinction between the noumenal
and the phenomenal which it exemplifies are part of the core
structure of Kant’s  philosophy.  According to  Windelband, the
theory of values (which to him is the contemporary expression
9 LU 1, 160.
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of Kantianism) needs a metaphysical foundation, a foundation
in the noumenal world. Even more than in theoretical philoso-
phy, the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal
world is essential to practical philosophy. 
It  is  indeed  the  case  that  Kant  considered  the  noumenal
world to be the ‘realm of freedom’, the sphere where (practical)
principles  of  freedom reign,  not  the  causal  laws  of  empirical
nature.  Without  this  distinction  between  noumenal  and  phe-
nomenal, freedom as the principle of practical philosophy would
have no place.  Yet Trendelenburg considers the non-dualistic,
organic worldview to be the necessary philosophical foundation
of ethics, as we have seen: without the organic worldview, ethics
is not possible. The question which still needs to be asked about
Trendelenburg’s project is therefore: how is freedom possible in
this account?
To obtain an answer to this question we turn once again to
the Logische Untersuchungen. The concept of freedom appears in
the second volume of this work,  in the chapters on ends (der
Zweck) and the will. Given the mediation between thought and
being, which is established by motion, both an influence of be-
ing on thought and an influence of thought on being are pos-
sible and real according to Trendelenburg. The concept of end
represents the influence of thought on being. It is a necessary
concept for our understanding of the world. Yet it has more than
a mere hypothetical or ‘regulative’ status: it has reality and it is a
determining reality in nature. Trendelenburg is therefore critic-
al of Kant’s ascription of only regulative validity to the products
of the reflexive power of judgement (reflektive Urteilskraft).10 Ends
are real, not only as far as our knowledge of the world goes; they
have a determining power in reality as well. 
This is especially true with respect to the ends of the (human)
will. All living (‘organic’) beings strive to fulfil their needs, and
thus are aimed at ends. Human life is  characterized by being
conscious of itself and the needs and ends it has, according to
Trendelenburg. And as a thinking being, it can subscribe to ends
other than its particular, natural needs:
10 LU 2, 46-54.
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Anders der Mensch, dessen Wesen es ist,  dass er denke und dass das
Denken das Begehren und Empfinden durchdringe und zu sich in die
Höhe ziehe. Durch das Denken ist er des Allgemeinen fähig und dies
bewusste Allgemeine hebt den Menschen über das Thier, indem es in
die  blinden  Regungen  des  Eigenlebens  bestimmend  eintritt  und
umgekehrt das Eigene in sich aufnimmt.
Im Gegensatz gegen das blind Organische der Natur bezeichnen wir,
was aus dieser eigenthümlich menschlichen Quelle fliesst, als ethisch.11
The origin of the domain of ethics is therefore the distinction,
which appears in nature only in human beings, between immedi-
ate,  natural  needs and the ends which are posited by reason.
Man’s ability to reflect upon his own needs and to act in accor-
dance with  ends  which are  derived from thought,  and which
thus may differ from natural needs, is what constitutes free will:
Diese Fähigkeit, im Widerspruch mit den Begierden und unabhängig
von sinnlichen Motiven das nur im Gedanken erfasste Gute zum Beweg-
grund zu haben, nennen wir die Freiheit des Willens.12
Freedom according to Trendelenburg is thus to be found in the
ability to reflect on one’s needs and to determine one’s actions
in accordance with different ends if they are the result of this re-
flection.
The difference from Kant’s  concept of  freedom is  evident,
and it is not surprising that Trendelenburg criticizes the Kantian
concept of freedom, just as he criticized the Kantian concept of
end. There are two problems with the Kantian point of view. The
first objection is a general contradiction which Trendelenburg
observes in Kant’s idealism.13 Although causality is restricted to
the sphere of appearances and has no meaning outside of this
sphere, the thing-in-itself becomes a causal factor as intelligible
freedom (intelligible Freiheit). As such, the concept of causality is
applied outside the realm of appearances, across the boundary
between phenomenal and noumenal world.
11 LU 2, 106.
12 LU 2, 111.
13 LU 2, 115.
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The second objection which Trendelenburg presents is a co-
rollary of the first. According to Kant, the human will and hu-
man acts have both an empirical and an intelligible character.
The empirical character is determined by causal relations, and
from this point of view there is no freedom. Yet the same will
and the same acts also have an intelligible character, by which
they  are  not  subject  to  causal  relations  but  are  instead  free.
Trendelenburg’s objection to this view is that it is far from clear
how the two perspectives (empirical,  intelligible) on the same
act are related and how freedom can become a factor in the
causal relations.14 
Trendelenburg’s objections exemplify the more general prob-
lem he has with the Kantian distinction (or dualism) between
the phenomenal and the noumenal world. The Kantian concept
of freedom is described as nothing less than an ‘invented’ solu-
tion to escape the causal constraints of the empirical world:
Um aus diesem Zwang des Determinismus den Willen zu retten und da-
mit die Moral möglich zu machen, ersann Kant, der das Causalgesetz
für die ganze Welt der Erscheinung, aber nur für diese anerkannte, die
intelligible Freiheit, die Freiheit jenseits und gleichsam hinter der Er-
scheinung.15
Trendelenburg’s  own concept  of  freedom does not have,  and
does not need,  a metaphysical foundation.16 The metaphysical
possibility of freedom, which Kant sought to warrant by making
a distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal world,
is given by the reality of ends. The reality of ends in Trendelen-
burg’s analysis exemplifies the possibility of an effect of thought
in being and is a delimitation of causal relations. The ability of
human beings to subscribe to ends that are contradictory to nat-
ural needs and inclinations is an ability which is learned.17 
14 LU 2, 117-118.
15 LU 2, 113.
16 LU 2, 111-112.
17 LU 2, 113: ‘Wie das Denken erst nach und nach reift, so wird auch der freie
Wille nicht fertig geboren, sondern in der Entwickelung erworben.’
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According to Trendelenburg, the concept of freedom needed
in ethics is not an unconditional or absolute (unbedingte) free-
dom. One expects human beings to be able to do what is morally
demanded  of  them—otherwise  all  ethics  would  be  in  vain.
Trendelenburg’s ethics needs a concept of freedom which en-
ables man to do that which is morally asked of him, i.e. to set
himself ends which are given by reason and not by nature.18
The concept of end, therefore secures freedom in an ethical
sense. For Kant, the reign of causality in the empirical world re-
quired the introduction of a noumenal world, a world beyond
experience where causality had no place. For Trendelenburg, in
line with his  refusal to take space and time as only  subjective
forms of  appearance,  both thought and being,  the noumenal
and the phenomenal, have their origin in motion. And because
both a causal effect of being on thought and a teleological effect
of thought on being are possible in his view, the problem of free-
dom is not a special, metaphysical problem.
4.2 Windelband and the metaphysical dimensions 
of the philosophical worldview
In  Trendelenburg’s  analysis,  the  problem of  freedom is  thus
solved almost in passing. One could argue that the ‘problem of
freedom’ is never a real problem for Trendelenburg, because of
his  logical-metaphysical  starting  point:  the  division  between a
causally  determined  world  of  appearances  and  a  noumenal
world of freedom is precluded in his ‘metaphysics of motion’.
The distinction between thought and being, the starting point
for his analysis of the types of worldview, is only a ‘conceptual’
distinction,  used to classify  philosophical  systems.  This distinc-
tion is a mere hypothetical starting point of the  Logische Unter-
suchungen as well, a starting point but not a point of origin, as
the distinction originates and finds unity in motion. So the meta-
physical  problem  of  freedom never  occurs  as  a  fundamental
problem in Trendelenburg, and (rightly!) receives comparatively
little attention in his discussion. Notwithstanding this relatively
minor position of the problem of freedom in Trendelenburg’s
18 LU 2, 112.
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work, the possibility of a philosophical ethics was a main concern
for him. This is evident from the discussion of his classification
of worldviews—which is  intended to  lend practical  support  to
the organic, ethical  worldview—and of his founding science—
which is intended to give it theoretical support. 
Windelband’s  worldview  concept  shares  a  certain  practical
motivation with Trendelenburg’s  project.  We encountered this
practical motivation in both the 1904 texts on Kant and in his
1914 Einleitung. The high point of Windelband’s Kant interpreta-
tion of 1904 is his interpretation of the Third Critique. Accord-
ing to Windelband, Kant did not only prove the possibility of the
realization of the noumenal world, but the upshot of the Third
Critique is that history must be considered the actual realization
of the noumenal world. The thing-in-itself, the noumenal realm
of practical,  moral  values, appears in history—even if this is a
gradual  work of  human labour.  Without the metaphysical  dis-
tinction  between  the  noumenal  and  the  phenomenal  world,
practical  values  would not  have  absolute  validity.  Without the
bridge built by the Third Critique in Windelband’s interpreta-
tion, it would not be possible for man to realize his duties in the
phenomenal world in which he is at home.
In his later work, culminating in the 1914  Einleitung in die
Philosophie,  Windelband laid more and more emphasis  on the
practical  relevance  which  the  philosophical  worldview  itself
should have.19 The philosophical worldview should not only be
able  to  integrate  the totality  of  knowledge into  a  meaningful
whole,  it  should also  be an  ‘active  belief’  (tatkräftige  Ueberzeu-
gung)20 which is a motivating factor in culture and in life in gen-
eral. This practical actuality of the philosophical worldview can
only be achieved by founding it on universal,  absolute values.
Therefore  the  application  of  values  in  life—Wertleben as  it  is
called by Windelband—needs a metaphysical foundation.21 The
relation of man’s conscience to this noumenal realm of values,
19 Of  Windelband’s  later  work,  the  1907  lecture  ‘Die  Erneuerung  des
Hegelianismus’  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  increasing  importance  which  he
ascribes to the philosophical worldview.
20 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 22.
21 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 392.
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this metaphysical reality,  is  described by Windelband as a reli-
gious one. Wertleben is therefore religious life: living in relation-
ship with absolute, universal values.
However,  this  exposition  of  the  practical  dimension  of
Windelband’s  concept  of  philosophical  worldview  does  more
than reveal a shared motive with Trendelenburg. It also shows
how fundamentally different their respective approaches to the
concept of worldview are, especially when the ‘practical motive’
just observed must be converted into fundamental philosophical
theory. For Windelband, the only way to secure the validity of
the practical values is to give them a ‘metaphysical foundation’, a
foundation in the noumenal world. Or to rephrase his position
programmatically:  only  Kant’s  dualism  enables  ethics.  Tren-
delenburg,  on the contrary, deliberately  discards any dualisms
from his founding science. In his view, only a logical-metaphysic-
al science based on the concept of motion is able to secure eth-
ics. Any metaphysical distinction between the noumenal and the
phenomenal world (or any distinction at all, for that matter), is
constructed from the principle of motion. 
It is not difficult to find the origin of these two approaches to
the  concept  of  worldview  in  the  respective  interpretations  of
Kant,  and  therefore  in  the  Fischer-Trendelenburg  debate.  Fi-
scher’s almost obsessive defence of the exclusive subjectivity of
space and time as forms of appearance is reflected by his com-
parably  rigorous  dualistic  interpretation  of  the  distinction
between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Only an exclusive
subjectivity of space and time warrants the introduction of the
thing-in-itself and the ensuing distinction of noumenal and phe-
nomenal  worlds.  Or,  as a recent interpretation of Kant’s  tran-
scendental aesthetics has argued (commenting on the Fischer-
Trendelenburg  debate):  without  the  exclusive  subjectivity,  the
problem of freedom would not be solved.22
22 Cf.  Michel,  Zeitkonzeption.  Michel  argues  that  Trendelenburg  missed  the
important  consequences  which  Kant’s  transcendental  aesthetic  has  for  his
theory  of  freedom.  I  have  shown that  the  ‘problem’  of  freedom is  solved
differently in Trendelenburg’s work, and that Trendelenburg’s denial of the
exclusive subjectivity of space and time does not have the consequences which
it  would  have  in  the  Fischer/Michel  interpretation  of  the  transcendental
aesthetic.  Whether  Fischer’s  interpretation is  more  faithful  to  the  letter  of
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Fischer’s position is reflected in Windelband’s 1904 essay on
Kant’s worldview, where Windelband determines the metaphysic-
al dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal world
(and the role of the Third Critique in determining the relation-
ship between the two) as the fundamental point of the Kantian
worldview. According to Windelband, the dualism is a necessary
and integral  part  of  Kant’s  work.  The  claim in  Windelband’s
1904  Einleitung that a metaphysical foundation is necessary for
the validity of values is the systematic counterpart of this Kant in-
terpretation.
In sum, although a certain shared motive can be discerned in
Trendelenburg  and  Windelband  concerning  the  question  of
worldview—the  importance  of  the  practical,  i.e.  ‘ethics’23 for
Trendelenburg, and the universal, absolute validity of values for
Windelband—the  philosophical  theories  in  which  these  basic
motives are substantiated are radically divergent: 
For Windelband, the validity of values can only be secured by
a ‘metaphysical foundation’, by which he means a realm of val-
ues which is eternal, transcendent (beyond the realm of experi-
ence), transcendental (the values are constitutive of and normat-
ive for the activities and products of human reason). According
to Windelband, this metaphysical, transcendent realm of values
is  realized—and  thus  actually  appears!—in  history,  through
which it can (partially, incrementally) be known. The philosoph-
ical worldview is thus historically determined—since the eternal
values are realized and known through history—and a determin-
ing force in culture (and therefore determinative for history)—
since the eternal values are constitutive of human cultural activit-
ies. 
For Trendelenburg, by contrast, ethics is only possible when
the philosophical  worldview has a fundamentally  unitary,  non-
dualistic character. The ‘founding science’ is a non-foundational
but rather hypothetical  philosophical  theory,  which takes  into
Kant’s texts is an altogether different question which is of less importance in
the current discussion of the worldview concept.
23 For  Trendelenburg,  ‘ethics’  is  much  more  than  ‘moral  philosophy’,  it
includes the study of the philosophical foundations of law, and also what is
nowadays described as ‘social philosophy’.  Cf. Trendelenburg’s  Naturrecht auf
dem Grunde der Ethik (1860).
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consideration the results of the special sciences and is open to
future  development.  Since  there  is  no  opposition  between  a
realm of eternal truths and historical realization in Trendelen-
burg, his theory of worldviews is not a philosophy of history, and
not even a theory of the historical development of (philosophi-
cal) knowledge. Such a founding science is extremely restrictive
in  its  metaphysical  pretensions—the  asserted  relationship  be-
tween thought and being has a merely hypothetical character.
Within these limits, ethics is enabled only by the ‘metaphysics of
motion’, which gives priority to thought over being. 
4.3 Life and motion:
Worldview and metaphysics in Dilthey and Trendelenburg
As we have seen, the concept of life is introduced by Windelband
as a (partial) factual basis for philosophy in his 1914 Einleitung in
die Philosophie. As such, it appears to have a similar role as life in
Dilthey. However, the function of life as a basis for philosophy in
Windelband is a supplement to the function of the sciences: they
remain the primary basis for philosophy, even in the Einleitung.
A further comparison between Dilthey and Windelband on this
point is not possible, due to the lack of a systematic elaboration
of the role of life for philosophy in Windelband’s work.
In the case of Trendelenburg, the concept of life is not a fun-
damental concept in his theories, nor are there apparent similar-
ities  to  Dilthey in this  respect.  Yet  the question can be asked
whether  similarities  in  their  approach exist  at  a  more  funda-
mental level. I am thinking here of a possible parallel between
Trendelenburg’s principle of motion and the concept of life in
Dilthey.  It  would  seem that  the function of  ‘life’  in  Dilthey’s
philosophy and the function of ‘motion’ in Trendelenburg’s are
in many respects comparable. Let us examine this impression in
more detail.
Both life in Dilthey and the principle of motion in Trendelen-
burg have a mediating function, which is fulfilled, on closer in-
spection, by being original to the two sides that are being medi-
ated. Motion mediates between thought and being, according to
Trendelenburg, because it is original and prior to thought and
being. As such, the principle of motion serves to explain the pos-
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sibility of objective knowledge: the object (being) can be known
by the knowing subject (thought) because both are produced by,
and actually rooted in, motion. In Dilthey, life is original to indi-
vidual consciousness (the Lebendigkeit of the individual) and the
world as  it  is  known by  the individual.  Object  and subject  of
knowledge are never completely independent, but always con-
nected through the life-connections between the inner life of
the subject  and the ‘external’  world of  objects.  Through life,
consciousness and the world are correlative to each other.
Can  this  support  the  hypothesis  that  Dilthey’s  ‘life’  and
Trendelenburg’s  ‘motion’  are functionally  the same, that they
fulfil  a  comparable  function in both philosophies?  This would
perhaps be plausible if there was no further evidence against the
identification of motion and life. There are apparently subtle,
but important differences between the two concepts, however.
One  of  the  most  important  differences  can  be  found  in  the
metaphysical status of the respective mediating concepts. 
Let us recall the metaphysical status of the principle of mo-
tion  in  the  interpretation  of  Trendelenburg’s  Logische  Unter-
suchungen presented in chapter 2 above. The principle of motion
does  not  refer  to  an  independent  metaphysical  reality,  which
founds the possibility of objective knowledge. Instead, it was ar-
gued, the principle of knowledge must be taken as itself part of
the body of knowledge of which it explains the possibility. This I
called the non-foundational character of Trendelenburg’s theory
of knowledge. 
Dilthey’s concept of life refers to more than just a non-found-
ational epistemological principle, or so it seems. Consider a pas-
sage like the following (already quoted in chapter 3):
In unzähligen einzelnen Lebensläufen über die Erde verbreitet, in je-
dem Individuum wieder erlebt, und, da es als bloßer Augenblick der
Gegenwart der Beobachtung sich entzieht, in der nachklingenden Erin-
nerung festgehalten, andererseits wie es sich in seinen Äußerungen ob-
jektiviert hat nach seiner ganzen Tiefe in Verständnis und Interpreta-
tionen vollständig erfaßbar als in jedem Innewerden und Auffassen des
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eigenen Erlebnisses – ist  das Leben in unserm Wissen in unzähligen
Formen uns gegenwärtig und zeigt doch überall  dieselben gemeinsa-
men Züge.24 
It is hard to see how life in this sense cannot be an ontological
reality, independent of our knowledge of it. Life, in this sense, is
different from the knowledge of life, for it shows itself in know-
ledge. Life is something that precedes our knowledge of it, and
it escapes from complete determination, for our knowledge of
life is always limited and partial at best. Life, as foundation of the
possibility  of  human knowledge,  is  therefore  a  ground which
precedes knowledge. It is a metaphysical reality, which is called
upon by Dilthey to found knowledge. Trendelenburg’s ‘motion’,
on the contrary, is not something we have knowledge of—I have
therefore described it as ‘empty’—but is an epistemological prin-
ciple that serves to  explain the possibility of knowledge. As an
epistemological principle it also has a hypothetical status, and is
itself part of knowledge—it is far from being an independent,
metaphysical reality.
This different metaphysical status of the central concepts in
Dilthey and Trendelenburg also sheds light on the reasons why
both consider these concepts indefinable. Life in Dilthey cannot
be defined, for it cannot be fully known. It always shows itself in
limited ways, never complete. Furthermore, it always shows itself
indirectly,  by means of  the expression it  receives  through the
Lebendigkeit of individuals. Life is only reflexively accessible. 
Motion,  on  the  other  hand,  itself  a  reflexive  principle  of
knowledge, cannot be defined because it is presupposed in the
act of defining itself.  It  is the point beyond which no further
questions can (and need) be asked, not because it provides a
metaphysical ground for knowledge, but because it provides a
hypothetical answer to the possibility of knowledge. The princi-
ple of motion does not refer to a hidden world which reveals it-
self in limited perspectives, but it is the principle which is origi-
nal to revealing and viewing alike. Every act of determination is
24 Dilthey, Typen, 78.
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possible only by virtue of this principle, therefore it is both itself
indeterminable and the precondition for determinability as such
at the same time. 
Life, although it makes subjective determinations of it possi-
ble by virtue of the connections between subject and world it
provides, is not the principle at work in acts of determination,
viewing, revealing, etc. Although it is ‘activity’ and ‘force’, it also
is  passive,  to  be determined through the  series  of  worldviews
which historical consciousness must start to grasp in a compre-
hensive, post-metaphysical view of the metaphysical systems. Al-
though it can be known reflexively, it is not a reflexive non-foun-
dational  principle  of  knowledge.  It  remains  a  metaphysical
ground, a foundation beyond knowledge, in the independent re-
ality of life which produces worlds which the individual can ex-
perience, but life as such hides itself behind them. 
This brings us to Dilthey’s equivocal approach to metaphys-
ics.25 On the one hand, Dilthey appears to firmly reject meta-
physics. Metaphysics, the ‘objective knowledge of the totality of
the world’ (die objektive Erkenntnis des Zusammenhangs der Wirklich-
keit),26 is  characterized by a self-certainty  which historical  con-
sciousness has revealed as unfounded. As a result of historical
consciousness, metaphysical systems of philosophy are no longer
a viable approach to understanding the world, for historical con-
sciousness shows the lack of universal validity of these systems,
despite their claimed objectivity.27 The antinomy between meta-
physical certainty and historical relativity cannot be solved at the
level of metaphysical systems themselves (by providing another,
better, more valid system). It can only be solved by taking the his-
torical systems themselves as the object of a philosophical analys-
is which takes them as expressions of life. 
Yet, despite the ‘destruction’ of metaphysics as a universally
valid science, there is a metaphysical consciousness in man that
is eternal, according to Dilthey: ‘Die metaphysische Wissenschaft
ist ein historisch begrenztes Phänomen, das meta-physische Be-
25 See also Bollnow, Dilthey, 90-92.
26 Dilthey, GS 8, 6.
27 Dilthey, Wesen, 404-406.
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wußtsein der Person ist ewig’.28 Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie,
which is an attempt to overcome the historical blindness of meta-
physical systems, aims at providing a complete interpretation of
life by overcoming the one-sidedness of traditional metaphysical
systems. Again, this complete interpretation is only possible by
virtue of the connecting,  unifying presence of life behind the
worldviews which it produces. The reality of life, which lies bey-
ond experience  and can only  be known through its  ‘appear-
ances’  in  worldviews,  remains  a  metaphysical  element  in
Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie. It provides an external founda-
tion of knowledge. Life becomes something beyond experience,
of which the typology of worldviews seeks to obtain knowledge.
As such, this enterprise is exemplary of man’s natural metaphys-
ical  tendency  to  find  knowledge  beyond experience  (Kant).29
But since there are no criteria for distinguishing adequate from
inadequate  interpretations  of  life,  this  enterprise leads  not  to
knowledge of life, but only to ‘dialectical make-believe’ (dialek-
tischer Schein) and false conclusions (Trugschlüsse).
Another difference in the approaches of Dilthey and Trende-
lenburg can be discerned in the role of the (human) subject and
its finitude, in relation to life and motion respectively. We have
seen that the individual human subject plays a decisive role in
Dilthey’s conception of life and his typology of worldviews, for it
is the origin of the worldviews. The world which is interpreted in
a worldview is always the world as it is experienced by the indi-
vidual. Even if life expresses itself through different individuals
in  structurally  comparable  ways—both  the  inner  structure  of
worldviews and the outer types show a persistency throughout
the manifold of individual worldviews—the subjective element is
irreducible in a worldview. 
The principle of motion in Trendelenburg is not specifically
subjective. The system of knowledge based on idealism, the or-
ganic worldview, is a system that does not assign a special place
to the human subject. The human subject is characterized by fi-
nitude, and can therefore only hope to achieve the full system of
scientific knowledge grounded in the organic worldview, in the
28 GS 1, 386, as quoted in Bollnow, Dilthey, 91.
29 Cf. Kant, Prolegomena, §57, §60.
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long run, with the cooperation of philosophy and the sciences.
Yet this finitude of the human subject is not the source of a plur-
ality of worldviews. Because the worldviews themselves are ulti-
mately not grounded in the individual’s experience of the world,
the finitude of the human subject does not cause the limits and
one-sidedness of worldviews, as in Dilthey. The finitude of hu-
man knowledge is an obstacle to achieving full development of
the organic worldview, but not a definitive barrier which cannot
be  taken.  Therefore  the  finitude  of  man  does  not  prevent
Trendelenburg from critically  reducing the plurality  of  world-
views to a single worldview. For Dilthey, this plurality can only be
overcome by occupying a more comprehensive,  historical  per-
spective.  The  one-sidedness  and limits  of  the  different  world-
views are a finitude which cannot be overcome by further devel-
oping one of these worldviews. 
5. From a philosophical concept of worldview
to a philosophical worldview
Throughout the three worldview concepts discussed here, there
is an intrinsic connection between worldview and metaphysics.
This  is  especially  evident  in  Windelband’s  case.  According  to
Windelband, the scientific worldview which results from philoso-
phy  needs  a  metaphysical  foundation,  in  order  to  be  valid.
Windelband uses a particularly strong concept of metaphysics, as
I have argued: his discussion of ‘Kantian metaphysics’ culminates
in the identification of history as the expression of the noume-
nal  world.  The philosophical  worldview developed by  Windel-
band through his discussion of the objectivity of historical sci-
ence  is  a  scientific  interpretation  of  this  expression  of  the
noumenal world, and thus knowledge of the noumenal world—
even if this knowledge can never be complete knowledge.
Trendelenburg’s  1847 essay already laid the foundation for
the connection between worldview and metaphysics: a worldview
is  a  fundamental  metaphysical  principle  (metaphysische  Grund-
gedanke). ‘Metaphysics’ is understood by Trendelenburg in this
connection as (a philosophical understanding of) the relation-
ship of thought and being. Beyond this relationship, Trendelen-
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burg sees no use for metaphysics as knowledge of the noumenal
world. Accordingly, his foundation of the organic worldview is
not an absolute foundation, but rather a hypothetical construct,
connecting,  explaining  and  thus  enabling  the  sciences.  The
metaphysical character of the concept of worldview is thus re-
stricted: Trendelenburg describes a worldview as a fundamental
metaphysical  thought  because  it  addresses  the  metaphysical
question how thought and being are related. He does not need
or aim for a metaphysical foundation of the philosophical world-
view, rather it is the other way around: the scientific foundation
of the organic worldview answers the basic metaphysical ques-
tion in a scientific, non-metaphysical way. 
The connection between metaphysics and worldview can also
be discerned in Dilthey’s work. As was discussed in the chapter
on Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie, this connection even exists
at two different levels. First, the typology of worldviews interprets
the (historical) philosophical systems as metaphysical systems, that
is, as attempts to achieve knowledge beyond the limits of know-
ledge.  That is  why the competition between the rival types of
worldviews cannot be ended: one cannot make a rational choice
between them and adopt one of them as true knowledge. Ac-
cording to Dilthey the time for these metaphysical  interpreta-
tions of life has come to an end. The typology of worldviews re-
places the individual metaphysical attempts to understand life.
Yet it also acknowledges the validity contained in each of them,
as  they  are  partial  interpretations  of  life.  The mistake was  to
ascribe absolute truth to what is only a partially legitimate world-
view.  A  historically  reflexive  interpretation  (i.e.  the  Weltan-
schauungstypologie) can overcome the limits  of  these  historical,
metaphysical systems, according to Dilthey. 
Can  Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie  avoid  the  pitfall  of
metaphysics as well? I have argued that it cannot, and this is the
second level at which worldview and metaphysics are connected
in Dilthey. The typology of worldviews does aim to provide a bet-
ter, more complete interpretation of life. As such, the typology
aspires to be a worldview itself, even if it is a worldview which can
overcome the historical short-sightedness of previous worldviews.
As  was  argued,  life  itself  cannot  be experienced directly,  and
thus cannot be known directly. Life-in-itself can be said to have a
WORLDVIEW AND METAPHYSICS 183
noumenal character in Dilthey, for it is  beyond experience. It
can only be interpreted through the (historical) interpretations
of  it—the  historical  worldviews.  The  Weltanschauungstypologie
aims at an integration of these mutually exclusive and partially
legitimate interpretations of life. As such, it tries to achieve what
the individual, historical worldviews cannot accomplish: a valid
interpretation  of  life.  The typology  of  worldviews  purports  to
gain knowledge beyond experience,  and can therefore be de-
scribed as  metaphysical.  Dilthey  confirms his  own observation
that  even  though  the  metaphysical  philosophical  systems  are
something of the past, the metaphysical need cannot be extin-
guished.
It  is  tempting to  ascribe the metaphysical  character  of  the
worldview theory in Windelband and Dilthey to the extra-philo-
sophical function which they assign to the philosophical world-
view. Since both Dilthey and Windelband assign a ‘cultural func-
tion’  to  the  philosophical  worldview,30 one  could  argue,  they
need a strong philosophical foundation to carry the weight im-
posed by this demand. The important, external function given to
philosophy  is  counterbalanced  by  an  absolute  foundation  of
philosophy and the philosophical worldview. Such a hypothesis
must be examined carefully, however. Windelband does in fact
argue that the philosophical worldview is valid only by virtue of
its  foundation in  the  noumenal  realm of  values.  For  Windel-
band, the practical function of the philosophical worldview is de-
pendent on the metaphysical foundation of philosophy, as any
function of  philosophy presupposes  its  validity.  I  have argued
that Trendelenburg does not seek to found philosophical validity
metaphysically;  instead,  philosophical  theory  has  hypothetical
validity, as has any scientific theory. Yet it would be mistaken to
conclude that Trendelenburg denies practical significance to the
philosophical worldview because its validity does not depend on
a metaphysical foundation. It was shown before that the prime
motivation behind Trendelenburg’s introduction of the concept
30 To be precise, Dilthey does not directly assign a determining function in
culture to the philosophical worldview, but it is only through the other kinds of
worldviews  in  the  ‘worldview  pyramid’  (see  chapter  3)  that  philosophical
worldviews have a mediated cultural actuality. 
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of worldview as description of the basic metaphysical stance of a
philosophical  system was to provide an—at least provisional—
foundation of the organic worldview. Only by adopting the or-
ganic worldview ‘would ethics be possible’.  The prime motiva-
tion for Trendelenburg is therefore practical as well.
However,  one  must  clearly  distinguish  between  Trendelen-
burg’s practical  motivation and the cultural function of philo-
sophy in Windelband. The provisional foundation of the organic
worldview through the classification of worldviews and the sub-
sequent  theoretical  foundation  in  the  Logische  Untersuchungen
aim at securing the possibility of ethics as a philosophical discipline.
The organic worldview, which gives thought primacy over being,
is a necessary and completing principle of philosophy, without
which the part of philosophy which can be described as practical
(ethics, theory of law) would lack a foundation. 
For  Windelband,  philosophy  should  itself  be  a  worldview
which is a determining cultural factor. More than a scientific dis-
cipline,  the result  of philosophy should be a worldview which
functions as a ‘rational belief’, giving meaning to life. It is this
function of philosophy,  a  function attributed to it  by Windel-
band beforehand, which requires a metaphysical foundation of
philosophical knowledge. 
The situation is more complex in Dilthey, for he does not dir-
ectly ascribe a comparable function to philosophy. The typology
of worldviews does, however, help us to gain a better understand-
ing of life and thus to achieve a worldview which is historically
aware, a worldview which does not make absolute what is relat-
ive. As was argued, the price paid by Dilthey is the metaphysical
character of life, which forms the continuous factor behind the
different interpretations of life in the different types of world-
views. If the typology of worldviews can indeed provide us with a
better  understanding  of  life,  we  must  assume  this  noumenal
character of life-in-itself. Without it, there would be no guaran-
tee that the different ‘appearances’ of life (the different types of
worldviews),  which are  taken together  in the  Weltanschauungs-
typologie, are indeed different expressions of the same. 
The most important difference between the worldview con-
cept  in  Trendelenburg  on the  one  hand  and in  Dilthey  and
Windelband on the other is that a strictly philosophical concept
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(Trendelenburg) is applied outside philosophy as well (Dilthey),
or is even applied to philosophy from the outside (Windelband).
The concept of worldview is used by Trendelenburg to refer to
the way in which the fundamental metaphysical relation between
thought and being is  construed in a philosophical  system. As
such, the concept of worldview can also be applied to the philo-
sophical system as a whole, for the basic metaphysical structure
determines the structure of the complete system, according to
Trendelenburg. Beyond this, the concept of worldview does not
apply to anything else. A worldview is intrinsically philosophical,
it is so by definition.
Dilthey distinguishes between different, interrelated kinds of
worldviews  from  the  outset—especially  religious,  artistic,  and
philosophical  ones.  The  philosophical  worldview  is  a  special
kind  of  worldview,  a  worldview  for  which  scientific  validity  is
claimed. Yet the general characteristics of a worldview are shared
among all kinds of worldviews, philosophical and non-philosoph-
ical, according to Dilthey’s analysis. Since these general charac-
teristics of a worldview are invariable among the different kinds,
one could argue that a general concept of worldview is applied
to  philosophy,  and  that  the  philosophical  worldview  is  deter-
mined by this general concept of worldview, which would seem
to have a non-philosophical origin. Again, however, the matter is
more complex in Dilthey. The analysis of the different kinds of
worldviews and of the general structure of all worldviews, philo-
sophical and non-philosophical, applies only to historical philo-
sophical systems. However, Dilthey discards both the idea that a
metaphysical system can have scientific validity and the idea that
philosophy must necessarily have the form of such a system. The
typology of worldviews is meant to overcome these defects. By of-
fering an interpretative model for the classification of the histor-
ical philosophical systems, Dilthey aims at integrating the con-
flicting  worldview  types  into  a  meaningful  totality,  and  thus
offering a better interpretation of life. This interpretative model
can only succeed if there is indeed a continuity (life) connecting
the different worldview types. At this point the extension of the
concept of worldview beyond philosophy to other spheres pro-
vides a nexus between life in its basic forms and in its most re-
flexive form—philosophy. Both the extension of the concept of
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worldview beyond philosophy and the noumenal  character  of
life are the result of Dilthey’s attempt to overcome the limits of
traditional metaphysics.
Even though Dilthey applies the concept of worldview beyond
philosophy,  the  concept  itself  is  determined  in  the  Weltan-
schauungstypologie, which can be considered a philosophical the-
ory.  Windelband, however,  works with a concept  of worldview
which is apparently not part of the philosophical discussion, the
characteristics of which are predetermined and which predeter-
mine  philosophy.  The  connection  between  philosophy  and
worldview is no longer intrinsic but extrinsic: it is demanded of
philosophy that it provides a worldview which is able to fulfil a
double task. 
6. Conclusion
We have come to the point where the results of this study can be
summarized. I have presented a historical and systematical ana-
lysis of the concept of worldview and its function in three philo-
sophical positions from the middle of the nineteenth to the be-
ginning  of  the  twentieth  century.  Historically,  Trendelenburg
was the first to systematically apply the term  Weltanschauung to
philosophical systems as such, and to develop a typological ac-
count  of  worldviews.  Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie and
Windelband’s philosophical worldview theory are representatives
of a period in which the concept of worldview was a central topic
in philosophy. 
The core of Trendelenburg’s worldview concept—which de-
notes the fundamental metaphysical orientation of a philosophi-
cal  system—can  be  recognized in  both  Dilthey’s  and  Windel-
band’s theories. The basic metaphysical question is the question
how  thought  and being  are  related,  according  to  Trendelen-
burg. The philosophical worldview is the answer to this question.
This connection between worldview and metaphysics is present
in Dilthey and Windelband as well,  albeit that their worldview
theories are much more elaborate and differ in many respects.
Important differences exist  in the way in which each of these
philosophers arrives at an answer to the fundamental metaphysi-
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cal question, and in the status which is ascribed to this answer.
For Trendelenburg, the basic metaphysical question must be an-
swered by philosophical theory. As part of a philosophical theo-
ry, the answer to the fundamental question has a hypothetical
nature (as all scientific theory has). 
According to Dilthey, the historical metaphysical systems are
to  be overcome by  a  typology  of  worldviews.  In this  account,
philosophy should aim only at a typological classification of pre-
vious answers to the fundamental metaphysical question. None
of  these  past  answers  has  in  itself  scientific  validity.  It  seems
therefore that Dilthey abandons the quest for a definitive answer
to  the  fundamental  metaphysical  question.  I  have  argued,
however, Dilthey’s typology of worldviews introduces a new meta-
physical layer: life as the noumenal substrate which underlies its
interpretations, the worldviews. Even if the historical metaphysic-
al systems are revealed as partial interpretations of life, this basic
metaphysical  structure (life  as  the root  of  worldviews) is  con-
sidered given by Dilthey. Trendelenburg offers a theoretical ex-
planation of a ‘fact’, science, whereas Dilthey does not attempt
to give a theoretical foundation to this constellation of life as it is
which cannot be known, yet underlies and connects the inter-
pretations of it. 
For Windelband, the basic metaphysical structure of philoso-
phy is given by what he calls the ‘Kantian worldview’, the funda-
mental  dualism between  the  noumenal  and  the  phenomenal
world. To Windelband, this basic metaphysical structure is not
the result of an independent philosophical inquiry, but a prede-
termined constellation within which he operates. Critical philos-
ophy, even a hundred years after Kant, should have its point of
departure in the dualism of the noumenal and the phenomenal
world.
Windelband’s interpretation of the Kantian legacy is adopted
from the Kant interpretation of  his  teacher  Kuno Fischer.  Fi-
scher and Trendelenburg had a notorious encounter concerning
the interpretation  of  Kant’s  transcendental  aesthetics.  The Fi-
scher-Trendelenburg debate is a turning point, connecting Tren-
delenburg’s  concept  of  worldview  with  Windelband’s,  even  if
they take opposite directions. Trendelenburg’s Kant interpreta-
tion seeks to avoid a dualism in the fundamental metaphysical
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structure. Adopting the exclusive subjectivity of space and time
would  necessarily  result  in  a  dualism between  the  noumenal
thing-in-itself and the phenomenal world of appearance. Fischer,
on the other hand, insists on a dualistic interpretation of Kant
and defends the exclusive subjectivity of space and time as forms
of appearance. Windelband’s worldview theory rests on an inter-
pretation of Kant which is perhaps even more radical than that
of his teacher Fischer. Windelband places his interpretation of
Kant’s Third Critique (an interpretation which he adopted from
Fischer as I have shown) at the centre of his worldview theory.
Kant’s worldview is characterized by a fundamental dualism be-
tween the noumenal and the phenomenal world. The upshot of
this worldview, as well as of Windelband’s own worldview, is the
expression of the noumenal world in the phenomenal  world.
Thus Windelband seeshistory as the expression of the noumenal
realm of values. Such a worldview presupposes a distinction be-
tween the noumenal and the phenomenal world which is not
possible in Trendelenburg’s account of transcendental aesthet-
ics.  And this  worldview  has  a  metaphysical  character,  a  point
which is admitted by Windelband as well: he sees no problem in
calling Kant a metaphysical philosopher.
The  metaphysical  character  of  Dilthey’s  and  Windelband’s
worldview theories is the result of an extension of the concept of
worldview beyond the basic notion which it has in Trendelen-
burg.  Whereas for  Trendelenburg the interpretation of  philo-
sophy as worldview is a strictly internal-philosophical interpreta-
tion, Dilthey and Windelband extend the concept of worldview
beyond that. Dilthey’s  Weltanschauungstypologie aims at an inter-
pretation of life, which is posited as the continuous ‘thing-in-it-
self’ beyond ‘appearances’, the different worldviews. For Windel-
band, philosophy as a worldview should have relevance to life.
This can only be achieved by a metaphysical foundation of the
validity of values. 
From  a  systematic-philosophical  point  of  view,  Trendelen-
burg’s approach to the topic of worldview is superior to those of
Dilthey and Windelband. The metaphysical character of life in
Dilthey and Windelband’s adherence to a metaphysical dualism
at the heart of the philosophical worldview must be considered
serious disadvantages when compared with Trendelenburg’s fun-
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damental science. Both approaches involve a sphere which de-
termines philosophy (life, the realm of values respectively), yet
both  these  spheres  are  beyond  philosophical  reflection.  The
foundation of philosophy is thus located in a sphere which is in-
accessible to reason. Trendelenburg, on the other hand, aims to
provide  a  foundation  to  philosophy  without  recourse  to  any
metaphysics. Philosophy as a founding science has a hypotheti-
cal-empirical  character and as such is neither metaphysical (it
does not need an external foundation) nor absolute (philosoph-
ical knowledge is not definitive). Since the metaphysical charac-
ter of both Dilthey’s and Windelband’s worldviewtheory is the re-
sult of an extension of the concept of worldview as compared
with  Trendelenburg,  we  must  conclude  that  Trendelenburg’s
philosophical worldview concept is superior as well.
In the light of Husserl’s dilemma31 of choosing between philo-
sophy as science and philosophy as worldview, Trendelenburg’s
approach is also the most viable position of the three discussed
in this study. On the one hand, his conception of philosophy as
founding science must be interpreted as a hypothetical-empirical
approach, which respects the results of the sciences without suc-
cumbing  to  mere  naturalism.  Philosophy  has  its  own  task  as
founding and integrating science, yet does not fulfil this task by
recourse  to  some given or  eternal  realm beyond experience.
The validity of philosophy as science is not fundamentally differ-
ent from that of the special sciences. This approach cannot be
rejected as failing the ideal of ‘rigorous science’ without further
arguments. On the other hand, Trendelenburg’s founding sci-
ence does not draw a similar sharp distinction between world-
view and science as Husserl did. For Trendelenburg, philosophy
is (founding) science and worldview at the same time, there is
no need to choose between the two. He achieves this through a
specific  interpretation  of  philosophy  as  Weltanschauung,  as  we
have seen. Whether a worldview in this specific sense can fulfil
the ‘need for a worldview’, a need observed by Windelband and
Husserl  alike, is  a different question,  the answer to which de-
pends on what philosophy is expected to achieve. This is a ques-
tion which cannot be answered by philosophy itself.
31 See chapter 1, section 2.
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SAMENVATTING IN HET NEDERLANDS
TRENDELENBURG, DILTHEY EN WINDELBAND
OVER FILOSOFIE ALS WELTANSCHAUUNG
Hoofdstuk 1. Het begrip  weltanschauung is een filosofisch begrip
met een bewogen geschiedenis.  Tegenwoordig wordt het vaak
gebruikt  als  synoniem voor  ‘ideologie’,  met  de  implicatie  dat
wetenschap en  weltanschauung fundamenteel  verschillend zijn.
Deze laatste opvatting wordt exemplarisch verwoord door  Ed-
mund Husserl in zijn essay ‘Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft’
(1910).  Filosofie  kan  zich  volgens  Husserl  richten  op  weten-
schappelijkheid  of  op  een  weltanschauung,  zij  kan  niet  beide
tegelijk (Husserls dilemma). De in deze studie besproken posi-
ties  pleiten  echter  voor  een opvatting  van filosofie  als  weten-
schap én ruimen binnen de filosofie een plaats in voor het be-
grip  weltanschauung.  Kunnen  deze  posities  een  alternatief
vormen voor het dilemma van Husserl? 
Hoofdstuk 2.  Friedrich Adolf  Trendelenburg stelt  dat het begrip
weltanschauung  in de eerste plaats een fundamentele metafysis-
che  betekenis  heeft  (metaphysischer  Grundgedanke).  Een  weltan-
schaaung bevat een antwoord op de fundamenteel-metafysische
vraag hoe denken en zijn zich tot elkaar verhouden. Deze funda-
mentele  gedachte  bepaalt  echter  niet  alleen  het  fundament
maar  ook  het  geheel  van  kennis,  omdat  het  dit  geheel  van
filosofische en wetenschappelijke  kennis structureert  en trans-
formeert. 
Volgens  Trendelenburg  kan  de  fundamentele  metafysische
vraag naar de verhouding van denken en zijn op drie verschil-
lende manieren beantwoord worden. Ik betoog dat het doel van
zijn classificatie is om tot een kritische evaluatie van deze drie
typen van  weltanschauungen te  komen.  Meer  precies,  het  gaat
hem om een pleidooi  voor  de  organische  weltanschauung,  de
zienswijze  die  in  zijn  antwoord  op  de  fundamentele  vraag
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denken prioriteit  over zijn  toekent.  Trendelenburgs argument
voor de organische  weltanschauung is in eerste instantie alleen
praktisch: zonder deze weltanschauung is ethiek niet mogelijk. 
Trendelenburg stelt  zich in zijn magnum opus,  de  Logische
Untersuchungen (in de tweede editie van 1862) de theoretische fun-
dering van de organische weltanschauung ten doel. Het program-
ma van de Logische Untersuchungen richt zich op een theoretisch
antwoord op de fundamentele metafysische vraag.  Deze vraag
(naar  de  verhouding  van  denken en zijn)  is  tegelijkertijd  de
vraag  naar  de  mogelijkheid  van  kennis.  Het  programma  is
daarom een  project  voor  een  grondleggende  wetenschap  die
logica (de mogelijkheid van kennis) en metafysica (de verhoud-
ing van denken en zijn) in zich verenigt. 
Het begrip beweging speelt een cruciale rol in de uitvoering
van het programma van de  Logische Untersuchungen. Trendelen-
burg claimt in dit begrip een principe te hebben dat bemiddelt
tussen denken en zijn, of beter: het principe dat aan denken en
zijn  vooraf  gaat,  het  principe waaruit  zij  beide geconstrueerd
worden. Met dit principe claimt Trendelenburg het eerste deel
van zijn taak te hebben volbracht: Het bewegingsprincipe verk-
laart de relatie tussen denken en zijn en daarmee de mogeli-
jkheid van kennis. De theoretische fundering van de organsiche
weltanschauung vereist  echter  dat  aangetoond  wordt  dat  het
denken prioriteit heeft ten opzichte van het zijn, met andere wo-
orden: de vraag moet beantwoord worden hoe denken het zijn
kan bepalen.
Dit tweede deel van de argumentatie is te vinden in de hoofd-
stukken van de Logische Untersuchungen die gaan over doeleinde
(Zweck) en de wil. In deze hoofdstukken beargumenteert Tren-
delenburg de mogelijkheid van invloed van denken op het zijn,
via een discussie van de realiteit van doeleinden in de natuur.
Omdat doeleinden in de natuur feitelijk gerealiseerd zijn, is de
‘blinde kracht’ niet genoeg om de natuur te begrijpen. Bovendi-
en  is  de  mens  als  natuurlijk  en  denkend  wezen  in  staat  zijn
doeleinden in de natuur te realiseren. Het ‘ethische’ is volgens
Trendelenburg het organische leven dat vrij geworden is door
kennis en de door de wil. Hiermee heeft Trendelenburg de taak
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die  hij  zichzelf  stelde,  een  theoretische  beschrijving  en
(daarmee)  fundering  van  de  organische  weltanschauung,  vol-
bracht.
Hoofdstuk 3. De tweede filosofische interpretatie van het be-
grip  weltanschauung is die van één van Trendelenburgs leerlin-
gen,  Wilhelm Dilthey. Diltheys begrip van  weltanschauung is com-
plexer  dan  dat  van  Trendelenburg.  In  feite  kan  het  opgevat
worden als een piramide van verschillende begrippen. Bovendi-
en  specificeert  Dilthey  een drievoudige  interne  structuur  van
(filosofische) weltanschauungen. In het algemeen moeten weltan-
schauungen opgevat worden als interpretaties van het geheel van
de wereld. Dit geldt voor de meest onmiddellijke, proto-weten-
schappelijke  vorm  zowel  als  voor  de  meest  geavanceerde
filosofisch-wetenschappelijke weltanschauung. Het verschil tussen
de verschillende niveaus van de piramide van  weltanschauungen
ligt in hun geldigheid. De hogere niveaus—Dilthey noemt speci-
aal religieuze, esthetische en filosofische weltanschauungen—wor-
den gekenmerkt  door  een toenemende mate  van  intersubjec-
tieve stabiliteit en geldigheid. De top van deze piramide wordt
gevormd door filosofische  weltanschauungen waarvoor objectief-
wetenschappelijke geldigheid wordt geclaimd.
Volgens Dilthey is dit niet meer dan een claim: Historisch be-
wustzijn  laat  een terugkerend conflict  zien  tussen drie  funda-
mentele typen van filosofische  weltanschauungen. Dit is het cen-
trale punt van de Weltanschauungstypologie. De centrale stelling in
Diltheys betoog is dat er geen objectieve keuze gemaakt kan wor-
den voor één van de typen van weltanschauung. De pluraliteit is
niet reduceerbaar en vormt de horizon waarachter geen verdere
filosofische unificatie mogelijk is.  De oorzaak van deze uitein-
delijke pluraliteit is de wortel van de weltanschauungen in het lev-
en. Leven is het substraat en de oorzaak van alle menselijke ex-
pressie. Het leven is echter zelf niet direct kenbaar. Slechts door
interpretatie van deze culturele expressies kan een ‘begrip’ van
het  leven  bereikt  worden.  Als  interpretaties  van  het  leven
hebben de weltanschauungen elk hun (beperkte) geldigheid, om-
dat ze elkaar uitsluiten is er geen synthese mogelijk. 
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Hoofdstuk 4. Het derde filosofische begrip van weltanschauung
dat onderzocht wordt, is dat van Wilhelm Windelband. In zijn
vroege werk tot en met de jaren 1880 verwerpt hij de idee van
een filosofische weltanschauung. In die periode interpreteert hij
een weltanschauung als iets dat kennis zou opleveren van de total-
iteit van de werkelijkheid. Dit zou betekenen dat er kennis zou
zijn van zowel de wereld van de verschijnselen als van de noume-
nale wereld. Met een beroep op Kants kritiek van de metafysica
claimt  Windelband dat  een  dergelijke  weltanschauung niet  op
een wetenschappelijke manier bereikt kan worden.
In  het  Kant-jaar  1904  verschijnen  twee  publicaties  waarin
Windelband de problematiek  van een filosofische  weltanschau-
ung en de interpretatie van Kant opnieuw en in samenhang met
elkaar bespreekt. In deze twee teksten schrijft Windelband Kant
zelf een  weltanschauung toe. Deze  weltanschauung  is niet slechts
een persoonlijke wereldbeschouwing, maar één die wetenschap-
pelijke geldigheid verkregen heeft. De filosofische fundering van
de wetenschap moet gezocht  worden in een systeem van uni-
verseel geldige principes, of waarden. Dit systeem van waarden
(ook wel normaal bewustzijn genoemd door Windelband) is het
werkelijke object van de filosofie. De filosofie kan de noodzake-
lijkheid en inhoud van deze noumenale wereld van waarden op-
sporen. Deze noumenale wereld wordt in de geschiedenis gere-
aliseerd.  Vanwege  deze  actualiteit  van  de  noumenale  wereld,
heeft Windelband er in zijn interpretatie geen moeite mee om
Kant  een metafysisch filosoof  te  noemen.  Deze Kant-interpre-
tatie heeft sterke verwantschap met die van Windelbands leer-
meester, Kuno Fischer.
Hoofdstuk 5. In het laatste hoofdstuk worden de drie bespro-
ken posities onderling vergeleken en gewogen. Het eerste punt
van vergelijking  betreft  de  systematische  betekenis  en  functie
van het begrip  weltanschauung. Betoogd wordt dat het bij deze
denkers  gaat  om  respectievelijk  een  intern-filosofisch begrip
(Trendelenburg), een  grensbegrip (Dilthey) en een  niet-filosofisch
begrip (Windelband). 
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Vervolgens  worden  systematische  kwesties  besproken  die
nauw samenhangen met het begrip weltanschauung in de bespro-
ken posities. Er wordt nader ingegaan op de Fischer-Trendelen-
burg discussie over Kants metafysica. Aangetoond wordt dat deze
discussie niet slechts een technisch punt van de Kant-interpre-
tatie betreft,  maar dat het debat verstrekkende gevolgen heeft
voor de posities van met name Trendelenburg en Windelband
met betrekking tot een filosofische  weltanschauung.  Trendelen-
burgs verzet tegen een dualistische interpratie van Kant is één
van de leidende motieven in de organische weltanschauung en in
de  Logische Untersuchen.  Windelband daarentegen volgt Fischer
in zijn dualistische interpretatie van Kant. Dit leidt bij hem tot
een dualistische  weltanschauung waarin het metafysische onder-
scheid  tussen  fenomenale  en  noumenale  werkelijkheid  een
grote rol speelt. 
Het begrip leven bij Dilthey en het principe van beweging bij
Trendelenburg lijken overeenkomsten te hebben. (Hoewel het
levensbegrip  ook  bij  Windelband  in  zijn  latere  periode  ver-
schijnt,  wordt  de betekenis  ervan  te  weinig  uitgewerkt  om in
deze vergelijking te kunnen betrekken.) Op het eerste gezicht
vervult het principe van beweging dezelfde functie in het werk
van Trendelenburg als het begrip leven bij Dilthey. Beide begrip-
pen hebben bemiddeling als  belangrijkste  functie.  Bij  nadere
beschouwing blijken de verschillen tussen de begrippen echter
diepgaand.  Het  begrip  beweging bij  Trendelenburg  heeft  het
karakter van een formeel-hypothetisch principe van kennis. Het
begrip  leven  bij  Dilthey  staat  voor  een  metafysische  werke-
lijkheid. 
De discussie in hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 5 toont aan, dat het be-
grip  weltanschauung (tenminste in deze drie posities) intrinsiek
verbonden is met de discussie over metafysica:  Trendelenburg
definieert weltanschauung als het metafysische grondprincipe, bij
Dilthey zijn de historische  weltanschauungen metafysische syste-
men  (hoewel  ook  de  Weltanschauungstypologie een  metafysisch
karakter heeft, zoals betoogd), en bij Windelband tenslotte rust
de  filosofische  weltanschauung op  een  metafysische  fundering
(de noumenale wereld van waarden). Bij Windelband en Dilthey
vindt een uitbreiding van het begrip  weltanschauung plaats.  De
expliciet metafysische fundering van de filosofische weltanschau-
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ung  bij  Windelband en de impliciet metafysische basis  van de
Weltanschauungstypologie bij Dilthey zijn de keerzijde van deze uit-
breiding. Als filosofische funderingsstrategieën schieten deze be-
naderingen echter tekort. Om deze reden moet de positie van
Trendelenburg filosofisch superieur geacht worden aan de latere
twee opvattingen: slechts zijn (metafysisch) restrictieve opvatting
van  weltanschauung biedt een verdedigbaar alternatief voor het
dilemma van Husserl. 
